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!  3
Mateusz Piotrowski
3. Capitalism as a natural-theological category  
3.1. Capitalism as a transhistorical tendency  
3.2. Capitalism as a spontaneous order  
3.3. Capitalism as a necessary evolutionary meta-order  
4. Towards a natural theology of capitalism  
4.1. Cognition  
4.2. Morality  
4.3. Power  
!
!
PART TWO 
OPERATING THE PROCESS 
!
Chapter IV – Separating natural and human processes 
1. Meaning of process: between natural lapse of time, juridical judgement and production  
1.1. Separating the meanings  
1.2. Blurring the semantic borders  
2. Separation of judgement and nature in the dominant economics: acting man vs. reacting 
animal  
!
Chapter V – Apparent critique of the dominant economics/economy 
1. The dominant economics/economy as anti-natural 
!  4
Mateusz Piotrowski
2. The dominant economics/economy as atemporal  
3. The dominant economics/economy as non-judgemental  
!
Chapter VI – Critique of a critique: appearances of time, judgement and nature in the 
dominant economics/economy 
1. Economy as natural environment  
2. Economics as an art of time allocation  
3. Economics as a non-judgemental science for making individual judgements  
!
Chapter VII – The process of human-capital 
1. Human-capital as the amalgamation of capital and labour  
2. Human-capital as contrasted with the subject of law and sacrifice  
!
Chapter VIII – Towards a natural theology of the process of human-capital 
1. Judgement: re-emergence of obligation, transcendence and sacrifice  
2. Nature: incessant scrutiny of productivity  
3. Time: death and the end of the process  
!
!
CONCLUSION 
Chapter IX – Fulfilling the Law - or Towards a working ethics of Grace  
!
!  5
Mateusz Piotrowski
Abstract	!
The main argument of the thesis is that the dominant form of economics and the 
correlative form of  economy - despite its apparently secular character - contains 
an inherently cryptotheological dimension. The argument is presented in two 
parts. In the first part it is demonstrated how the divine faculties of total 
cognition, absolute moral judgement and infinite power circumventing human 
reason and morality are projected onto the market process. In the second part it 
is demonstrated how does this projection form labouring subject constructed as 
‘human-capital’, infinitely guilty/indebted towards its future, formalised as its 
own capital. It is suggested that the above-mentioned process could be treated 
as an instance of ‘law’ understood (after saint Paul, Kafka and Benjamin) as a 
death-driven endeavour of justifying oneself by one’s own work.	!
The analysis is based on a close-reading of the works of influential economists 
focusing on the exponents of the Austrian School - Mises and Hayek - who, as I 
try to prove, express the cryptotheological prejudgements of the dominant 
economics/economy in the most radical and philosophically stimulating manner. 
The thesis is also a polemic with these critics of the dominant economics/
economy who claim that it could be effectively criticised for being simply anti-
natural, atemporal and value-free. My point is that a viable critique of the 
dominant mode of economic acting and thinking cannot be constructed, unless 
the fact that the hegemonic economic model actually makes use of the concepts 
of time, judgement and nature is taken into consideration. Only when we take 
into account the way the dominant economics uses the concepts of economy as 
natural environment, economics as an art of allocation of finite time and as a 
value-saturated theory - elaboration of alternatives (including an alternative idea 
of productive labour) might become possible.	!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!  6
Mateusz Piotrowski
INTRODUCTION 
!
AIM, SCOPE, METHOD AND RATIONALE OF THE PRESENT ENQUIRY 
!
1. Aim: explication of cryptotheological prejudgements and analysis of the process  
!
The aim of this investigation is to engage the reader in a certain process, or rather to explicate 
our actual engagement in it. This process will be explicated as a process in a strictly Biblical 
and Kafkian sense. Although in the Bible we do not find the word ‘process’, we do indeed 
find one of the most powerful examples of process/trial in a collection of texts known as The 
Book of Job. The problem of the titular subject of this book, Job, is not only that he suffers 
from physical pain, social exclusion and accusation, but also that the exact cause and the 
legal basis for his accusation remain unknown. Making apparent the basis of the accusation 
(Job 10:2; 31:35) is what seems to be necessary to bring about final judgement and justice. 
!
At the beginning of the twentieth century another Jewish writer - himself earning a living in a 
private insurance agency with foreign capital and later in the public Workers’ Accident 
Insurance Institute for the Kingdom of Bohemia - Franz Kafka, wrote a story about another 
strangely accused subject, Joseph K. Also in this case the basis for the supposed process 
remains essentially unclear. The opening sentence of the book seems to suggest that a 
prejudgement against Joseph has already taken place. But has he been summoned by some 
unknown instance, which could ultimately justify him, or perhaps release him from the trial 
in some other way? Or is the whole process just a set of contingent events leaving the subject 
faced with automatic-natural processes that have no other meaning outside themselves? Are 
!  7
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we witnessing a process in any legal sense at all, or rather a deepening monomania motivated 
by a persecution complex? Finally, do the problems posed by this process end with the death 
of its subject? Or rather, as the closing sentence of the novel might suggest, is there 
something that does not die, something that outlives the subject, making it impossible for the 
process/trial to be brought to a conclusion? 
!
The present work will not be a literary exegesis, neither of The Book of Job nor of Kafka’s 
Der Prozess, but rather an application of theological prejudgements taken from both these 
sources   into a specific field of research concerned with the dominant economics/economy. 1
As such, the present enquiry can be read as an attempt to contribute to the realisation of a 
research programme of implicit theology. According to Philip Goodchild, the ‘implicit 
theologian is to engage in a determinate field - economics, or politics, or philosophy - out of 
motivations and to do with questions that come from theology,’   and to explain theological 2
‘implicit presuppositions’   operating in apparently secular discourses and institutions. Such 3
!  8
!  These interpretative prejudgements have been preformed by texts on Kafka, especially by: Theodor W. 1
Adorno, “Notes of Kafka,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber, Shierry Weber (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 
243-271; Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death,” in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 111-140.
!  As Goodchild explains, ‘I think that theology has to be done, or it can be done in the most determinate way, 2
when it’s done in particular, concrete, immanent contexts. (…) for example, a notion of atonement can be done 
by talking about what the theological tradition has said about it, but perhaps it can be done effectively by trying 
to actualize it immanently within particular situations.’ Philip Goodchild, Neil Turnbull, “Deleuze, Marx, and 
the Extent of the Theological: An Interview with Philip Goodchild,” Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, 
Politics, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2013): 575.
!  Ibid., 577.3
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theological enquiry aims at exposing what, after Agata Bielik-Robson, could be described as 
cryptotheologies.   4
!
The aim of the present research is an explication of the cryptotheologies of the process of 
capital and the process of labour in the dominant economics/economy. This will be performed 
in two parts. In the first part, the cryptotheological character of the constitutional 
prejudgements of the hegemonic economic discourse and practice will be exposed. In the 
second part, the process of capital and labour and its human subject - re-constructed by the 
dominant economics/economy as human-capital - will be analysed. These two steps - 
explication of the cryptotheological prejudgements of the dominant economics/economy and 
analysis of the process in which they engage the human subject - will lead to a presentation of 
a specific economic natural theology of judgement, time and nature, which constitute the 
fundamental operators of the dominant economic dispositive. 
!
As we will see below, the dominant economic rationality tends to present itself as fully 
secular.  What is more, it openly confesses its imperialistic (or dominative, to use a less 
politically moralistic term) ambitions of establishing itself as the very model of theoretical 
and practical rationality and as the instrument for progressive rationalisation of other 
disciplines. As such, the dominant economics/economy constructs itself in opposition to 
!  9
!  A concise definition of the ‘negative’ mode of operation of the concept of cryptotheologies can be found in 4
Agata Bielik-Robson, In the Wilderness: Cryptotheologies of Late Modernity (Na pustyni: Kryptoteologie 
później nowoczesności) (Kraków: Universitas, 2008), 7-10, where the author presents critical, cryptheological 
readings of modern continental philosophy. These readings aim at exposing theological dimensions at work in 
apparently secular discourses, especially in those that continue a long tradition of philosophical ‘Greek’ thinking 
‘from Jonia to Jena and beyond’. It is this ‘negative’ or ‘critical’ usage that is of the greatest importance for the 
particular aim posed here - that is, for formulating a critique of half-consciously theological economic practices 
and discourses in order to bring about a fuller understanding of these discourses and practices. A different 
‘positive’ usage made of the notion of cryptotheologies for the reconstruction of a counter-tradition of Jewish 
hidden ‘Marrano philosophy’ can be found in Agata Bielik-Robson, Jewish Cryptotheologies of Late Modernity: 
Philosophical Marranos (London; New York: Routledge 2014), 1-39.
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theology and theocracy, which are pictured as anti-rational. However, after further scrutiny 
the economic rationality will reveal itself to be based on specific cryptotheological 
prejudgements.  
!
Exposition of these constitutive prejudgements will be provided in the first part of the 
enquiry, titled Explicating Prejudgements. It will start with an analysis of the general subject-
matters of economics/economy - that is, the foundational laws of economy as explained by 
the dominant economics itself. Then, following the fundamental concept of ‘ultimate givens’ 
back to the context of its emergence, we will proceed towards the specific subject-matters of 
our enquiry: labour and capital. In the case of labour, further analysis of the concept of 
ultimate givens will explore how the dominant economics/economy aims at presenting labour 
under its present conditions as an ultimately given unchangeable tedium. It will also be 
explored how the possibility that such labour could be critically treated as sacrifice is 
suppressed by the dominant conceptualisation of labour. Importantly, we will see how labour, 
and all action in classical and contemporary economics, is reconstructed as motivated by a 
necessary lack, and how rest/peace is conceptualised as a perfect lack of action (viz. death). 
We will then investigate how the problem of sacrifice is displaced by diminishing the 
importance of labour and projecting the characteristic of changeability and progress on the 
second specific subject-matter of our investigation - capital. We will also analyse how capital 
- despite an apparent economic critique of its naturalisation - is still reconstructed as an 
ultimately given category. After a description of the apparent economic critique (which aims 
at presenting capital as a historical, socially embedded and contingent order), we will see 
how the same economic discourse still reconstructs capital and capitalism as a transhistorical 
tendency, a spontaneously growing and naturally necessary evolutionary order of orders. This 
!  10
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will lead us towards the culmination of the first part of the enquiry - towards a presentation of 
the natural theology of capital/ism. We will witness how the divine faculties of total cognition 
of nature and absolute moral judgement are transferred from God to the market-process, 
which is pictured/established as an extra-human power. This enables the imaginary 
positioning of the economic subject in the end-time of the process, whence the cognition of 
the totality of the process, the objective judgement of individual contribution to society, and 
an extra-individual power circumventing human cognition and morality might be 
experienced.  
!
In the second part, titled Operating the Process, a critical dissection will be performed of the 
three fundamental operators of the process - nature, judgement and time. The chapter will 
start with an analysis of the semantic and conceptual structure of the ‘process’ in its natural, 
juridical and productive contexts. We will then describe how separation of these meanings – 
dividing the acting economic human subject, believed to be led by judgement, from purely 
reactive nature - takes place in the dominant economic discourse and practice. This will 
enable us to reconstruct a simplified model of critique of the dominant economics, which 
criticises it for suppressing the dimensions of the natural finitude of resources, the human 
finitude of time disposable for the individual, and the judgement necessary to provide 
direction for action. While important insights will be found in such a critical attitude, its 
insufficiency will also be presented. We will try to demonstrate how nature, time and 
judgement do work as elements of the dominant economic dispositive. We will explore how 
this dispositive reconstructs the dominant economy as a natural and fragile environment, 
economics as an art of the optimal allocation of finite time, and as a value-free, non-
judgemental science for informing individual, free judgements. This will demonstrate how 
!  11
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specifically reconstructed nature, time and judgement form an economic subject, formalised 
and formatted as human-capital. We will see how human-capital appears as the ultimate 
synthesis or amalgamation of capital and labour, how it becomes a subject of law, and how an 
inner doubling brought about by such a formalisation opens the way for the re-emergence of 
the sacrifice of human life and time for capital. This will lead us to the second apex of the 
text, concluding its second part. Towards the end of our enquiry, human-capital will be 
exposed as the subject of a natural theology. Human-capital will be presented as subjected to 
incessant judgement, making it guilty/indebted towards its own future, this future being 
reconstructed as ‘its own’ capital, determined by the abstract end of bringing profits. Human-
capital will be presented as the object of an incessant scrutiny that aims at separating the 
productive from the unproductive, and which mobilises the whole nature of the individual 
towards the ultimate end of the total process. Finally, the drive for this ultimate end will be 
exposed as motivated not only by the realisation of individual self-interest, or by the will to 
participate in the common effort to increase social productivity, but also by the will to end 
labour, to bring the process to an end and to find eternal peace. However, since in the 
dispositive of the dominant economics/economy non-action is reconstructed as the ultimate 
end of action, the end cannot be achieved as long as the subject lives. The eternal peace of 
death as perfect non-action is exposed as both the limit and the motor of this natural-
theological process. The process cannot be brought to its end. 
!
In the conclusion, titled Fulfilling the Law, or Some Preliminary Remarks on the Working 
Ethics of Grace, a proposal for further research will be given, concerning the direction that a 
transformed, positive concept-device of productive labour could take, reconstructed as works 
of grace, developing the fundamental insights of the dominant economics/economy 
!  12
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concerning the entanglement of human production in a natural, temporal and judgement-
saturated process.  
!
!
2. Scope: the Austrian School as a representative of the dominant economic dispositive 
!
2.1. The Austrian School as a radical, philosophical representation of the dominant 
economics/economy 
  
The aim of the present work is not to provide the reader with an overview of the most 
popular, contemporary economic doctrines, treated as forms of ‘religion’.   In order to limit 5
the scope of enquiry to a manageable field, which will allow for a more in-depth analysis, the 
present work will concentrate on the influential economists described as 
‘neoliberals’ (Edward P. Lazaer, Milton Friedman, Gary Becker), and especially on those 
linked to the most radical and philosophical strain of ‘neoliberalism’ known as the Austrian 
School, represented by its two chief figures: Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von 
Hayek.    6
!
!  13
!  Such an attempt has been made, for example, in Robert H. Nelson, Economics As Religion: From Samuelson 5
to Chicago and Beyond (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). 
!  Hayek was a Nobel Prize Winning economist. As a young man, he has been converted by Mises from Fabian 6
socialism to Austrian liberalism. Despite all the differences, he has always acknowledged his indebtedness to 
Mises’ thought. Their relation could be described, cum grano salis, as an inverted relation between Marx and 
Engels. While Engels is often criticised (f.e. by the young Lukasc, Gramsci or Stanisław Brzozowski) for 
simplifying the original theory of his mentor, Hayek is often perceived as someone who had refined the 
dogmatic conclusions of his teacher, and provided them with seductive rationales. Nevertheless, since the aim of 
the present research is rather to reconstruct an ‘ideal form’ of the Misesian-Hayekian system of thought than to 
provide the reader with a report of personal and intellectual affinities and idiosyncrasies of the two major 
representatives of the Austrian School, these issues will not be analysed in details. For an interesting report on 
the complex Mises-Hayek personal and theoretical relations, see Bruce Cladwell, Hayek’s Challenge. An 
Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press 2004) 143-149; 220-223.
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Such an interpretative choice is motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, ‘the Austrians’ 
formulated the basic presumptions of their theory in a more radical and expressive manner 
than most other economists. Secondly, their radicalism, in contrast for example to the 
radicalism of the Chicago School, has been expressed in philosophically self-conscious 
terms, aiming at achieving systematic, philosophical coherence. In other words, the two main 
exponents of the radically pro-market Austrian School, Hayek and Mises, have ambitions of 
creating an overall political and cultural project, backed by a methodical outline of its 
philosophical foundations. 
!
This is evidenced not only by the length and scope of Mises’ major works, including the 900 
page long Human Action: A Treatise on Economics,   or by the philosophical 7
comprehensiveness of Hayek’s work, but also by the explicit enunciations of both thinkers. 
Mises has declared that his work should not be treated merely as a limited ‘theory of the 
“economic side” of human behaviour’,   but rather as ‘a general theory of human choice’.   In 8 9
the same manner, Hayek in his opening address to the influential Mont Pèlerin Society,  10
states that ‘a political philosophy can never be based exclusively on economics, or expressed 
!  14
!  Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. Third Revised Edition (Chicago, Contemporary 7
Books, Inc., 1963).
!  Ibid., 3. 8
!  Ibid.9
!  The Mont Pèlerin Society has been one the most powerful institutions for the propagation of ‘neoliberal’ 10
ideas, gathering such intellectuals as Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, 
Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi and Luigi Einaudi, together with influential policy-makers and businessmen. For 
an important analysis, situated in the tradition of Science and Technology Studies, exploring the theoretical and 
political importance of the Mont Pèlerin Society, see Philip Mirowski, Dieter Plehwe eds., The Road from Mont 
Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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mainly in economic terms’.   He has considered his major task to be advocacy for ‘clear-cut 11
principles of social order’,   declaring that in the face of the decline of religious legitimation 12
of the social ordering we require a ‘political philosophy which goes beyond the fundamental 
but general precepts which religion or morals provide.’    13
!
This philosophical radical expressiveness and explicitness in the formulation of its basic 
principles makes the thought of the Austrian School a good focus for our enquiry for three 
main reasons: its accessibility to a non-economist, the impact of its original ideas, and its 
representativeness for the cryptotheological prejudgements of the dominant economics/
economy. Firstly, assessment of the principles of the Austrian economics becomes possible 
for a theologically and philosophically literate reader who, however, has no professional 
training in economics. This makes also assessment of the present work more accessible than 
if a different economic school, more prone to indulge in the use of mathematically formalised 
methods, would have been taken as the subject of investigation. Secondly, Mises and Hayek 
are rightly given credit for creating original ideas, which have later been taken up and 
popularised. As Philip Mirowski notes, commenting on the relationship between the Austrian 
and the Chicago School: 
!
The Chicago faction did indeed achieve early fame and success, but insiders 
often perceived that this happened because they were relatively shallow 
!  15
!  Friedrich August von Hayek, “Opening Address to a Conference at Mont Pèlerin,” in Studies in Philosophy, 11
Politics and Economics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 155.
!  Friedrich August von Hayek, “Individualism True and False,” in Individualism and Economic Order 12
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 1.
!  Ibid.13
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intellectually and that their approach to political action was insufficiently 
assertive and constructivist. (…) From an outsider’s perspective, it does seem 
that over the longer haul the intellectual innovations of the Chicago wing have 
exhibited less staying power; many of the (..) tenets [of neoliberal doctrine - 
M.P.] (…) have fairly clear origins, if not thorough inspiration, in the 
Hayekian/Austrian wing instead.   14
!
Thirdly, the Austrian School has been chosen as the privileged and exemplary object of 
analysis because its all-encompassing systematic ambitions can be treated as a representation 
of the actual activity of the dominant economy in aiming at the subsumption of other 
disciplines of thought and practice. As such, the Austrian School can be seen as 
representative of the dominant economics, despite its explicitly expressed distance from the 
mainstream.   A detailed analysis of the Austrian apparent critique of the classical and 15
contemporary mainstream economics will be provided in Chapter V of the present work, 
where I will try to demonstrate that in the matters that are of interest to our enquiry - i.e. the 
crucial matters of relation to nature, judgement and time - the Austrian School still represent 
and expresses the dominant economic prejudgements, even if in a more radical manner. 
However, it is precisely this radicalism and explicitness that allows Hayek to openly 
formulate a cryptotheological statement, asserting that, in order to secure the present 
economic order, ‘we must preserve that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled and non-
!  16
!  Philip Mirowski, “Postface,” in The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 442. Later, I will try to present more evidence 14
for this claim by analysing the Misesian and Hayekian roots of influential contemporary concept-devices 
(especially that of human-capital).
!  This distance, as I will try to demonstrate, enables the Austrian School to present itself as oppositional and 15
radical and, as we will see, to relegate all the shortcomings and crises of the present economic order to the 
supposed lack of full implementation of its radically pro-market prescriptions. For more on this issue, see 
section Capitalism as spontaneous order.
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rational which is the only environment wherein reason can grow and operate effectively.’  16
Thus, the Austrian School will be understood not only as a representation of the elementary 
assumptions of the dominant economic discourse and practice but also as one of the most 
explicit representations of the cryptotheological character of these presumptions. Finally, as I 
will try to indicate in the closing section of the work, the fundamental insights of the 
Austrians concerning the importance of nature, time and judgement for economics/economy, 
and their intuition concerning the theological dimension of these issues, are worth 
considering as being right, even if in a distorted, or (to use a technical term) anti-Christic 
manner. 
!
2.2. The dominant economics/economy as a dispositive 
!
The scope of such research must be defined not only in relation to theory but also to practice. 
As the usage of the term ‘economics/economy’ might have already suggested, the present 
investigation aims at addressing in the first instance economics (a discourse), but in the 
second instance also economy (a practice). This suggests that economics will be treated not 
only as a theoretical ‘camera’, registering the economic reality, but also as an ‘engine’, which 
actually moves and transforms it   (although not in the direction officially declared by the 17
dominant economics itself). If we could use another idiomatic term that is often deployed in 
analyses of ‘neoliberalism’, economics/economy will be understood here as a specific 
!  17
!  Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 130-131.16
!  For an analysis of contemporary economics as a ‘performative’ or ‘enacted theory’, see a fundamental work 17
by Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge; London: 
MIT Press, 2006); and Joseph Vogl, The Specter of Capital, trans. Joachim Redner and Robert Savage 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 119-121, 139-141.
Mateusz Piotrowski
dispositive. This term has been defined by Michel Foucault in a somehow preliminary 
manner. According to Foucault, ‘apparatus’ (as the English translator has chosen to render the 
French term disposition) would be constituted of: 
!
(…) a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions - in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. 
The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these 
elements. (…) The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but 
it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from it and, to 
an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies 
of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of 
knowledge.   18
!
I propose the treatment of ‘dispositive’ as a starting point of enquiry into the workings of the 
dominant economics. I also propose to use the term ‘concept-device’ for distinguishable 
‘elements’ constituting the bigger conglomerate of the ‘dispositive’. The most important 
‘concept-device’ analysed in the present research will be human-capital. Its analysis will 
explicitly refer to the way it is conceptualised in the dominant economics, but it will also 
tacitly refer to legal regulations transforming labour codes into temporary contracts; to 
procedures implied in job centres transforming provision of ‘welfare’ for ‘citizens’ into 
!  18
!  See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, trans. Colin 18
Gordon, Leo Marshal, Kate Soper, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). 194-196. 
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production of ‘workfare’ for ‘human-capital’; to television programmes exposing and 
dramatising competition between human-capitals; to manners of self-presentation in social 
media; to organisation of time devoted to family and leisure, etc. 
!
Taking the term dispositive as a starting point for considering these elements seems useful 
for, at least, three reasons. Firstly, because it tries to grasp the heterogeneity of its constitutive 
elements. Secondly, because it exposes that the dis-positive has to be ‘positively’ constructed, 
that it requires a certain work to be done in order for it to emerge and to prolong its 
existence.   Thirdly - somehow counter-intuitively to the functionalist common sense 19
understanding of dispositives as things that normally and usually function well - it exposes an 
important feature of the analysed subject-matter: that it ‘leaks’ and ‘works by breaking’. 
Against the image of the all-powerful and all-functional dispositive, the modes of 
organisation of economic life will be presented as not only orders, but also as dis-orders, 
which ‘continuously generate attrition and loss, exclusion and dysfunction; (…) always 
contain potholes, tracts of wasteland, stagnant ponds of unproductiveness’.   This will, to 20
some extent, go against the self-understanding of the dominant economics/economy, which 
tends to picture itself as constituting a universal plane - a unitary, coherent ‘market’, 
supposed to work smoothly according to a universal logic equal for all. In contrast to this 
self-image, our approach to the dominant economic dispositive will go in line with the 
!  19
!  This theme will be analysed in detail, especially in the section titled Capitalism as constructed and embedded 19
order.
!  See Vogl, Specter of Capital, 189.20
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theological genealogy of this term, as interpreted by Giorgio Agamben,   who indicates that it 21
can be traced back to the notion of ‘positivity’, taken from the Hegelian philosophy of 
religion, where it stands for the non-transparent or not-fully-transparent dimension of history 
- for that ‘which obfuscates the purity of reason’.   22
!
A systematic reconstruction of the dominant economic dispositive must attempt to take into 
account also elements and moments of desperation of the dispositive - elements of 
implicitness or even obscurity of the discourse and moments of discrepancy between the 
official discourse and the actual practice.   The present research aims to reconstruct the 23
system of thought of the dominant economics/economy, and tries to achieve maximal 
‘systemic integrity of that system’.   However, an adequate reconstruction of such systemic 24
integrity must include also an explicit articulation of its integral dysfunctional or afunctional 
dimension (whether functionality be defined accordingly to the immanent terms, conditions 
and promises of the system itself, or in relation to the suffering of creatures that are broken by 
the dispositive, which works by breaking). In other words, reconstruction of ‘the ideal form 
!  20
!  See Giorgio Agamben, “What is an Apparatus,” in What is an Apparatus and Other Essays, trans. David 21
Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). For a different approach towards the 
economico-juridical meaning of theological dispositio, see Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the 
Common Destiny of Man, trans. Lancelot C. Shepard, Elizabet Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988).
!  Jean Hyppolite, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, trans. B. Harris and J. B. Spurlock 22
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 23, quoted i Agamben, “What is an Apparatus,” 5. 
!  This point is underlined by scholars concentrating on the notion of ‘real existing neoliberalism’. They try to 23
conceptualise discrepancies between the official self-presentation of the dominant economics and the actually 
existing economy, not only in terms of a cynical political project requiring management of the ‘double 
truth’ (anti-statist demagogy for the masses vs. fully conscious neoliberal interventionism promoting big 
business for the elites) but also in terms of contingency, lack of absolute flexibility of actual social systems, and 
tensions produced by class power relations. See, for example, Damien Cahill, The End of Laissez-Faire? On the 
Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism (Cheltenham UK; Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2014).
!  Philip Goodchild, Neil Turnbull, “Deleuze, Marx, and the Extent of the Theological,” 560.24
Mateusz Piotrowski
of thought’   should bring the system of thought to a fuller expression - including its inherent 25
eclipses of clarity, constitutional ambiguities and moments of breakdown. 
!
3. Method: cryptotheological explication 
!
As it has been indicated, the method of the present research can be described as 
cryptotheological reading. The present research, following Agata Bielik-Robson’s 
formulation of the concept of cryptotheologies,1 will try to test the hypothesis that the 
dominant economics/economy of capital and labour contains implicit, hidden theological 
dimensions. Moreover, it will also try to test whether suppression of this cryptotheological 
element (an element that obfuscates the purity of secular reason) blocks the possibility for 
achieving a fuller comprehension of economic discourse and practice. 
!
3.1. From post-secularism towards cryptotheologies of the dominant economics/
economy 
!
We have posed a supposition that in the process we are to explicate there is an element that 
must be must be counted as unreason (at least, as far as the dominant, secular understanding 
of rationality is applied). Acknowledgement of this problematic condition on the general 
plane of thought - i.e. recognition of the fact that the dominant form of reason is not-fully-
conscious of its not-fully-secular character - is the starting point of postsecularism. 
Postsecularism is often pictured as springing from a recognition of the possibility and 
!  21
!  Ibid., 561.25
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importance of the dialogue between the religious and the secular.   However, a stronger 26
version of the post-secular argument claims that, not only should secular reason and non-
secular practices work on ‘mutual recognition which is constitutive for shared citizenship’  27
but also, and more radically, that the dominant form of modern reason is itself undermined 
and underwritten by an element that - if understood in the terms of that very reason - would 
have to be termed non-rational. Postsecularism - if this internally diversified and often 
conflicted current can be reduced to an initial exploratory common thesis   - asserts that this 28
unconscious or hidden element behind modern reason is non-secular. This element can be 
described as theology (if we see it chiefly from the perspective of theory) or faith (if we focus 
more on practices). Our endeavour can be understood, then, as a specification of the general 
conviction of the stronger version of the postsecular argument and as an application of it to 
the specific field of dominant economic reason. If modern reason is governed by 
cryptotheologies, hidden beneath the table,   and modern economic governmental reason is 29
driven by unconscious collective faith, it seems that the task of postsecular thought is to put 
these theologies on the table and play the game openly. On the practical plane this means to 
‘bring our collective faith (…) to consciousness.’    30
!
3.2. Explicating the interplay of the implicit and the explicit!
!  22
!  See Jürgen Habermas, “Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society,” in New perspectives 26
quarterly. 25 (2008): 17-29.
!  Ibid., 29.27
!  A cartography of approaches to post-secularism is charted by Roisi Braidotti “In Spite of the Times: The 28
Postsecular Turn in Feminism,” Theory, culture & society. 25 (2008): 1-24.
!  See Bielik-Robson, In the Wilderness, 7-10.29
!   Philip Goodchild, Theology of Money (Durham: Duke University Press, xvi)30
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However, a methodological question arises: is a simple exposition of the implicit lack of 
consciousness of the dominant economic consciousness sufficient for achieving the final ends 
of our work?   This question is all the more pressing if we remind ourselves that the most 31
self-conscious exponents of the dominant economics, like Friedrich von Hayek, have openly 
and explicitly declared that in order to secure the workings of the dominant economic order 
‘we must preserve that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled and non-rational which is the 
only environment wherein reason can grow and operate effectively.’   32
!
Posing this question seems useful since it allows for a preliminary specification of the 
procedure of explication performed in our research. We have stated that our research 
programme assumes that the cryptotheological presumptions of the dominant economics/
economy can be explicated.  This initial methodological presupposition can be broken down 
into the four following elements. (1) Firstly, the procedure of making it explicit - which 
explicates implicit prejudgements and analyses the semantics of ‘process’   - which presumes 33
that the process of capital and labour is somehow already present in our discourses and 
practices. We are already engaged in the process and immersed in it. The process functions as 
our discursive-practical environment, as the background implicit in our language and action. 
(2) Secondly, what is assumed here is that these discourses and practices are not primarily 
and usually fully explicated. That is to say, they are not fully brought to the consciousness of 
the actors engaged in them, that they are somehow hidden or unconscious. (3) Thirdly, the 
!  23
!  Goodchild himself raises this question and answers that ‘raising consciousness’ is insufficient for performing 31
an effective critique of the dominant economic reason and that such an effective critique requires theoretical and 
practical invention of new and more productive economic institutions - see Ibid., 241-257.
!  Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 130-131.32
!  See section Meanings of process.33
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premise is posed that the moment of half-consciousness is important for the constitution of 
the analysed process, and that this necessity cannot be entirely suppressed by the dominant 
discourse, but rather rises to its surface. In other words, the suspension of reason in the 
process is explicitly expressed. (4) Fourthly, the eclipse of reason can be expressed in a 
specific way by the economic discourses. Moreover, it can be expressed by these discourses 
in such a way that reinforces and strengthens these very discourses and practices. This is the 
case of the Austrian School, and especially of Hayek, who makes explicit use of a theological 
matrix in order to secure the dominance of the mode of economic discourse and practice he 
advocates. 
!
Thus, we can see that cryptotheology cannot be reduced only to what is hidden in the 
unspoken depths of a discourse or practice. As we will see in the course of our enquiry, 
openly theological motifs are explicitly expressed as an open secret, which is ‘exploited ad 
infinitum as a secret’   by the very exponents of the dominant economics/economy 34
themselves, on the surface of their discourses. For this reason, not only the dimension of the 
hidden and implicit, but also the dimension of the explicitly exposed will need to be itself 
explicated.   In other words, we need to devote attention not only to theological dimensions 35
present in the ‘depth’ or ‘background’, but also to theologies explicitly presented on the 
‘surface’ - theologies that are explicitly and ostentatiously ‘foregrounded’ and often 
dramatically evoked by the economic discourse/practice itself in order to back its claims. In 
!  24
!  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 34
Vintage Books, 1990), 35.
!  For a magisterial analysis of the mutually constitutive interrelation between the ‘depth’ and ‘surface’ of a 35
discourse/practice, and of the ‘essential formality’ of ‘superficial relation’, see Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of 
Political Economy. Vol. 1. trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 1062-1065. See also an 
important commentary on these issues in Moishe Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A 
Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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other words, what is needed is an explication of the complex interrelations between the 
implicit and explicit theology - between naturalisation and miraculation - of an incessant 
game of theological concealment and disclosure at work in the dominant economics/
economy. 
!
4. The state of the debate and the rationale for the present enquiry 
!
4.1. Expansion of the dominant economics/economy and its crisis as reason for critique 
!
Finally, we must ask for the rationale of the present research. What is the reason for this 
theological questioning of the dominant economics/economy? In recent scholarship there is a 
growing interest in such a mode of posing questions to the dominant economics. This strain 
has been baptised as economic theology and still remains very much a field in formation.  36
The practical reason for this growing critical engagement with the dominant economics/
economy is not difficult to comprehend. While the crisis of the dominant model of 
accumulation has hit the countries of the Western Core (including Western academia), the 
‘imperial’ tendency of the dominant economics/economy to subsume other theoretical and 
practical disciplines (including knowledge production) has not weakened. Thus, the critical 
approach of theology to economics - which attempts to defend the autonomy of theology 
against economics or even to mount a counter-attack on economics by providing, 
theologically motivated ways of thinking and acting on economic practice - is not surprising. 
The present work is an attempt to contribute to this movement of thought. 
!  25
!  To give but one example, publication of The Routledge Handbook of Economic Theology, edited by Stefan 36
Schwarzkopf has been announced for July 2018.
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!
4.2. Critical engagement with the critics of the dominant economics/economy 
!
The assumption that the dominant economic discourse is an objective riddle - a riddle for 
itself - implies a necessity to work towards a critical explication of implicit prejudgements in 
their relation to explicit judgements. However, in order to produce a more adequate image of 
the actual functioning of the interplay of economic cryptotheological concealments and 
theological exposures, we need to critically reassess not only the image of the economics - in 
which the defenders of the dominant economic discourse and practice put their faith - but also 
some beliefs shared by the critics of the dominant economics. In other words, the present 
investigation needs to operate not only as a critique of the self-understanding of the dominant 
economics/economy but also as a qualified, supplementing critique of a simplified model of 
critique of the hegemonic economics/economy.   37
!
All of this will require implicit and explicit engagement with the thought of the classical 
authors scrutinising the implicit prejudgements of the dominant economic model (such as 
Karl Marx and Max Weber). Special attention will be dedicated to the authors who, inspired 
by the thought of both Weber and Marx, have tried to pose the question to the process of 
capital and labour, and have tried to formulate this question as the essential critical, 
!  26
!  This will be done especially in the section titled Critique of a critique. appearances of time, judgement and 37
nature in the dominant economics/economy, where I will try to indicate these points where a simplified model of 
critique of the dominant economics/economy fails to grasp adequately how the economic dispositive not only 
suppresses but also makes explicit use of theologically saturated notions of nature, time and judgement.
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theological ‘Jewish question’.   This includes various so-called German-Jewish thinkers: 38
Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Franz Rosenzweig, and the young Georg Lukacs.  39
Although their thought constitutes the strongest strain of the critical cryptotheological 
tradition to which I will refer, I will also try to enter into dialogue and polemic with the most 
important contemporary analysts of the dominant economic dispositive. Special reference 
will be made to Michel Foucault, whose books and, especially, lectures have heavily 
influenced the contemporary critical reflection on ‘neoliberal’ economics/economy.  40
Foucault has openly rejected the idea that the dominant economic dispositive could be 
explicated cryptotheologocially. A close reading of Foucault’s claim that ‘Economics is an 
atheistic discipline; economics is a discipline without God; economics is a discipline without 
totality’   will provide us with an important counter-part for our discussion. Our critical 41
dialogue will also include engagement with philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists and 
!  27
!  Note that in this famous text which is often described as an example of modern antisemitism, Marx posits 38
himself beyond both orthodox Christian and Jewish tradition explicitly recalling Messianic ideas. He states that: 
‘The god of the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the 
real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange. The view of nature attained under the 
domination of private property and money is a real contempt for, and practical debasement of, nature; in the 
Jewish religion, nature exists, it is true, but it exists only in imagination. It is in this sense that Thomas Münzer 
declares it intolerable “that all creatures have been turned into property, the fishes in the water, the birds in the 
air, the plants on the earth; the creatures, too, must become free.”’ Karl Marx, On The Jewish Question, in 
Marxist Internet Archive, accessed 27 September 2016, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/
download/pdf/On%20The%20Jewish%20Question.pdf. As such, rather than simply be a self-hating Jew, Marx 
recalling the Paulinian motif of emancipation of creaturely life from corruption (Romans 8:19-23), could be 
treated as an exponent of what Jacob Taubes calls Hebraism, beyond both institutional worldly Christianity and 
institutional Judaism. Such position radicalising the prophetic anti-worldly impulse could be treated as 
immanent radicalising critique of Judaism, still at risk of slipping into metaphysical anti-Semitism, like in the 
case of Marcion or Simon Weil. See Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko. (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press 2009). See also a discussion on modern philosophical ‘Jewish Marcionism’ in 
Bielik-Robson, Jewish Cryptotheologies of Late Modernity, 178-182.
!  For more on the concept of the tradition of Messianic German-Jewish thinkers, which cum grano sails is 39
extended back towards Paul of Tarsus see Eric Santner, “Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and 
the Matter of the Neighbor,” in Kenneth Reinhard, Eric L. Santner, Slavoj Żiżek, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries 
in Political Theology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
!  See The Foucault Effect: Studies in Govermentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller 40
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
!  Michel Foucault The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–79 (New York: Palgrave 41
Macmillan, 2008), 282. 
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economists representing different currents of the critical analysis of economics - from the 
works of Philip Goodchild and Joseph Vogl, through the tradition of Italian workerism 
(Maurizio Lazzaratto, Elettra Stimilli, Massimiliano Tomba, Alberto Toscano), to British 
social history and Political Marxism (E.P. Thompson, E.M. Wood, Samuel Knafo). Finally, 
the work of those scholars who directly engage with the thought of Mises and Hayek - such 
as William Connolly, Philip Mirowski and Geoffrey Hodgson - will be taken into account. 
This will allow me to provide the reader with an internally differentiated set of accounts on 
the cryptotheological prejudgements of the economic process, while simultaneously 
embedding the research in an articulated tradition of the critical thought of the German-
Jewish thinkers. 
!
4.3. The theological prejudgment of the present work itself 
!
If we do indeed share the conviction of the strong version of postsecularism that there can be 
no explicit ‘secular’ judgements without implicit ‘theological’ prejudgements; that our 
thinking is always determined by hidden decisions of a theological nature; that in the last 
instance there is no secular in an absolute sense, then it is also necessary to attempt to put on 
the table some theological prejudgements of my own research - that is, to indicate 
prejudgements that predetermine the final judgement towards which this work strives. Such a 
gesture seems justifiable since it makes the reader more aware of the author’s prejudices and 
extra-theoretical interests. 
!
The main rationale for taking up this process is a belief that the nature of the dominant 
economics/economy - its mythical, sacrificial core - cannot be explicated by secular means. It 
!  28
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cannot be brought to completion, not only because of the deficiencies of the author of the 
present work, but also because of the immanent structural barriers produced when a concept 
of cryptotheology, in a strong sense, is at work. If cryptotheology is indeed a cryptotheology, 
then it cannot become completely transparent to secular, human reason, even if our reason 
believes that it could. As such, reasoning always remains in need of a step of faith, which is 
in turn conditioned by the fact that ‘we know in part and we prophesy in part, but when 
completeness comes, what is in part disappears’ (1 Corinthians 13:9). However, even this 
completeness of vision, when we will see face to face, need not be understood as a simple 
liquidation of the inexplicable. Perhaps there will be mystery after mystery, just as there will 
be glory after glory. ‘To explicate’ need not equal ‘to get rid of’. This may mean that the non-
explicable dimension of the process does not have to be abolished through progressive 
revelation.   Rather, the explicating subject should be brought to a fuller comprehension of it, 42
making another relation to the inexplicable possible. This, perhaps, could be a relation not 
towards a mythical secret,   but towards the ‘economy of the mystery, which throughout the 43
ages has been hidden in God, who created all things’ (Ephesians 3:9).  !44
!
!
!
!  29
!  This is the fundamental insight of Karl Rahner’s essay on the concept of mystery. Rahner, while critically 42
exposing the structural incompleteness of the things of this world, tries to formulate a positive notion of 
mystery, in which it is not liquidated in the process of revelation. See Karl Rahner. “The Concept of Mystery in 
Catholic Theology,’ in Theological Investigations Vol. 4., trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press; 
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 36-73. I would like to thank Karen Kilby for introducing me to this 
text.
!  For an interesting analysis of the concept of an empty mythical secret and its relation to the ‘halo’ of power 43
and death, see Agata Bielik-Robson, “A Broken Constellation: Agamben’s Theology between Tragedy and 
Messianism,” in Telos 2010 no. 152 (2010): 103-126.
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PART ONE 
EXPLICATING PREJUDGEMENTS  
!
Chapter I General subject-matters: the dominaOnt economics/economy and its laws 
!
1. The dominant economics/economy, rationality and theological prejudgements 
!
1.1. The dominant economics/economy as the model of rationality 
!
Before we can start the process - which should ultimately lead to a final judgement of its 
subject-matters - we have to start with a presentation of the fundamental prejudgements 
constitutive for the field of our investigation. Our research is to deal with processes of capital 
and labour. That is to say, with economics (economic discourse) and economy (correlative 
practice),   which together are now widely believed to constitute a rational science and 45
practice. What is more, the dominant form of economics/economy aims at presenting and 
enforcing itself as the measure and model of what is rational (i.e. economic), and as the most 
important instrument of rationalisation (i.e. economisation) of other social practices. Through 
this rationalisation, equated with economisation, equated with enforcement of peculiar forms 
of economic discourses and practices, the dominant economics/economy aims at positing 
itself as the ultimate rationale, the absolute aim of other practices and discourses. 
!
!  30
!  For a more concretely determined definition of ‘economics/economy’, following MacKenzie’s and Vogl’s 45
conceptualisations of economics as ‘performative’ or ‘enacted theory’ see subsection Rationale, scope and 
significance in the present work. See also Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial 
Models Shape Markets (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2006); Joseph Vogl, The Specter of Capital, trans. 
Joachim Redner and Robert Savage (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 119-121, 139-141.
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‘Economics imperialism’ is a term introduced to describe this process. In the present work, in 
order to avoid the morally loaded term ‘imperialism’, the term dominant economics/economy 
will be used to refer to the above mentioned phenomena. It could be defined as the 
generalisation of specific sets of economic discourses and practices as the dominant form of 
rationality aiming at the organisation and subsumption of the whole the social field. However, 
it should be noted that the notion of ‘economics imperialism’ has not been forged by the 
critics of the above mentioned process but, as Uskali Mäki notes, it has been explicitly 
‘proudly adopted by the imperialists themselves with the purpose of celebrating it.’   A recent 46
influential and representative example of such discourse can be found in the work of Edward 
P. Lazaer from the Graduate School of Business of Stanford University. Now we will analyse 
the explicit thesis, together with fundamental prejudgements implied in Lazaer’s text, to 
understand better the workings of the dispositive of the dominant economics/economy. 
Lazaer, in his text titled “Economic Imperialism”, has proclaimed that the ‘generality’   of 47
economics - that is, its ability to be generalised on other fields of theoretical practice - has 
enabled it to ‘invade intellectual territory that was previously deemed to be outside the 
discipline’s realm’.    This, according to Lazaer, is possible due to economics’ rational and 48
scientific character: ‘Economics has been successful because, above all, economics is a 
science.’   The scientific character of economics is, in turn, validated by the success of 49
!  31
!  Uskali Mäki, “Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39, no. 46
3 (2009): 351. 
!  Edward P. Lazaer, “Economic Imperialism,” NBER Working Paper 7300 (1999): 1.47
!  Ibid. 48
!  Ibid., 53.49
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economics in conquering other disciplines. Here we encounter a crucial motif which will 
reoccur in our investigation of economics/economy. As Lazaer states: 
  
Economists generally believe in the market test. Economic imperialism can be 
judged to be successful only if it passes this test, which means that the 
analyses of the imperialists must influence others. The effort to extend the 
field measures its success by inducing others to adopt the economic approach 
to explore issues that are not part of classical economics. One possibility is 
that scholars outside of economics use economic analyses to understand social 
issues. Political scientists, lawyers, and sociologists come to use the methods 
of economics to answer the questions that are of interest in their fields. 
Another possibility is that economists expand the boundaries of the economics 
and simply replace outsiders as analysts of ‘noneconomic’ issues, forcing non-
economists out of business, as it were, or at least providing them with 
competition on an issue in which they formerly possessed a monopoly.   50
!
Economics is claimed to be scientific or rational because (1) it has proven itself to be 
successful in ‘invading’ and conquering other discourses and practices, (2) its success can be 
judged by means of ‘the market test’ - i.e. by means of economics’ own immanent principles 
- and finally, (3) the victory of economics in the market competition with other disciplines is 
itself a result of following the principles of the market, directed by rational maximisation of 
behaviour, equilibrium and efficiency. 
!  32
!  Ibid., 7.50
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!
Let us work through the details of this reasoning. Economics is successful, and if we ask how 
to ‘establish a criterion against which success can be judged’,   the answer of the 51
representative of the dominant economics (an ‘economic imperialist’, according to Lazaer’s 
terminology) would be as follows. The success of economics can be measured according to 
economics’ own internal principles, that is, checked against the criterion of economic 
rationality, by means of the market test; ‘By almost any market test, economics is the premier 
social science. The field attracts the most students, enjoys the attention of policy makers and 
journalists, and gains notice, both positive and negative, from other scientists.’   From this 52
we understand that: (1) Economic doctrine is true, because it is successful; we can see that 
the mode of rationality embedded in economics has been successful in outstripping other 
modes of rationality implied in other discourses and practices and we can therefore assume 
that this happens by virtue of economics’ scientificity. (2) The test of success is itself ‘a 
market test’; the success of economics can be explained in the terms of economic science - 
economists force ‘non-economists out of business’,   because they win the competition on the 53
free market of ideas. (3) We can implicitly assume, following Lazaer, that economists win the 
competition because they follow the internal rules of their own discipline. They do not win 
because they defend the interests of the dominant classes, because they make use of the state 
power in order to establish a monopoly of a particular school of thought, or because their 
reasoning is based on the power of unexplainable beliefs. They win the competition of ideas 
because they provide rules for successful action and this is possible because economics’ 
!  33
!  Ibid., 6.51
!  Ibid., 1.52
!  Ibid., 7.53
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internal principles are fundamentally in agreement with the intrinsic basic principles of 
human action. 
!
The consequences of these tacit presuppositions, which we will find reoccurring throughout 
our investigation, will prove extremely important for the constitution of economic discourse/
practice. The market in its essence is believed to truly work according to the laws explicated 
by economists and all the deviations from these rules and discrepancies between theory and 
practice are explained, not by the internal contradictions or dysfunctions of the market 
mechanisms, but they are consigned to being treated as a consequence of an external, 
essentially non-market, interference. Moreover, what is implied here is that the whole field of 
scientific practice is indeed ruled by the rules made explicit by economics. The internal rules 
of economic science are in fact the meta-rules of all sciences of human practice and the 
immanent rules of human practice itself. This is the ultimate reason why economics can be 
successfully generalised for use in other fields. 
!
These three rules, three components or three sources of the economic explanation and 
formalisation of social phenomena can be summarised as follows: ‘First, economists assume 
that individuals engage in maximizing, rational behaviour. Second, economics adheres 
strictly to the importance of equilibrium as part of any theory. Third, economists place a 
heavy emphasis on a clearly defined concept of efficiency.’   Economics wins because it 54
offers the most rational, the most equilibrated and the most efficient - in short, the most 
economic - mode of thinking:  
!  34
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!
Because economics focuses so intently on maximization, equilibrium and 
efficiency, the field has derived many implications that are testable, refutable, 
and frequently supported by the data. The goal of economic theory is to unify 
thought and to provide a language that can be used to understand a variety of 
social phenomena. The most successful economic imperialists have used the 
theory to shed light on questions that lie far outside those considered 
traditional. The fact that there have been so many successful efforts in so 
many different directions attests to the power of economics.   55
!
This power is not restricted solely to the realm of the theoretical practice of scientists, where 
the discourse of economics outstrips other ‘competing’ disciplines in explanation of human 
practice. Economics also invades other practices where particular forms of specifically 
informed economic discourse and action aim at modelling other social subfields. Lazaer 
emphasises the importance of economic explanations for practical action, both for predicting 
action and for designing rules and incitements aimed at maximising economically rational 
!  35
!  Ibid., 54. It is often claimed that the concept presented by Lazaer of economics as a science able to produce 55
testable data, and consequently to make predictions, is in contradiction with the idea of economics as dealing 
with the essentially unknowable future, presented by Mises and Hayek, whose works we will analyse in the 
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to an external interference defiling the purity of the market laws); 2) by moulding predictable behaviour in 
subjects by shaping specific institutions that will create a pro-market environment and produce pro-market 
incentives, making the subject adjust to ‘market discipline’. Thus Hayek and Mises make the economic 
prophecy a self-fulfilling one, ‘by making the laws of the market themselves come true. Facts and events are 
interpreted in terms of how they fit into this project; (…) This question can be restated with Kant’s 
philosophical-historical irony: as far as the project of political economy is concerned, it can be said that here 
“the prophet himself occasions and produces the events he predicts.”’ Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of 
Faculties,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991), 177. 
Quoted in Vogl, Specter of Capital, 72.
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efficient behaviour in individuals. He states that bringing puzzling or anomalous behaviour, 
which might appear to contradict the principles of economics into the economic ‘general 
framework (…) allows predictions to be made.’   What is more he claims that economics 56
should not only passively predict future behaviour but also actively shape it by means of 
producing incentives and rules, which explicate and strengthen the rational (i.e. economic) 
character implicit in every action, since ‘the interactions between various agents can be 
modelled and studied’.   57
!
He explains the power of economics not only to study but also to mould and model action, by 
contrasting this imperialistic approach with the classical view of Marshall. ‘Alfred Marshall's 
famous statement that it is not the business of the economist to tell the brewer how to make 
beer is less true today than it was in his day.’   In contrast to Marshall’s relatively modest 58
claims, Lazaer suggests ‘imperialistic economists are anxious to get inside the brewing 
process.’   As we have already heard, the imperialistic economists can be distinguished from 59
the classical approach by the attempts of the former to ‘adopt the economic approach to 
explore issues that are not part of classical economics.’   But, importantly, this refers not only 60
to ‘studying’ but also to the ‘modelling’ of economic action. Moreover, Lazaer is conscious 
that such modelling of practices by economics does indeed take place not only in the sphere 
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!  Ibid.58
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!  The motif of the difference between the ‘classical’ and the ‘dominant’ or ‘imperialistic’ economics, will 60
reoccur in this work, and in this chapter when we will be analysing the specificity of Misesian and Hayekian 
conceptualisations of labour and capital in contrast and continuity with selected ‘classical’ notions.
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of management of private enterprises (e.g. a brewery), but also in the spheres which were 
believed to be immanently organised by different principles than those proclaimed by 
imperialistic economics. He gives an important example of medical care and health:  
!
The impact of economics in this field, particularly the focus on rational 
behavior, has been profound. The concept of opportunity cost is now explicit 
in medical decisions. Many major medical schools and schools of public 
health have economists on their staffs. Economists publish in medical journals 
and there is widespread recognition that economics can be of assistance in 
thinking about the allocation of resources, of pricing and of reimbursement 
algorithms.    61
!
What is assumed here, that the economic structure of action that has always already been 
half-consciously or implicitly present in the questions of management of health, is now being 
made explicit thanks to economic formalisation. But questions of public and personal health 
do not close the list. Lazaer goes on, showing how the principles of imperialistic economics 
can explain, predict and model behaviour in such diverse spheres of human life as family 
relations, education, politics, racial prejudices or urban riots. Even religion does not fall 
beyond the scope of being informed by economic discourse/practice. The exponents of the 
dominant and dominative economics are not afraid that application of economic explanation 
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to religion might be judged as ‘disrespectful’   by ‘the power of higher authorities’.   Rather 62 63
they boldly conquer the sphere of religion and subsume it as a subfield of its own domain. 
!
Economic science-practice appears as potentially all encompassing: ‘It is the obsession with 
theories that are consistent, rational, and unifying that gives economics its power’   - Lazaer 64
says, and this statement should by no means be understood as criticism of the ambitions of 
imperialistic economics/economy. Even the existence of what he conceptualises as 
‘anomalous results’ which seems to elude or contradict principles of economics (rational 
maximisation, equilibrium, efficiency), does not force him to admit that economists should 
restrict their ambitions or ‘adopt the methodology of other fields.’   The three sources or 65
three components of economic discipline remain intact. The principle of maximisation of 
rationality theoretically discovers and practically strengthens patterns of rational 
maximisation of behaviour present in every human action.   The principle of equilibrium, on 66
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!  An example of ‘chauvinism’ in relation to ethnic-linguistic minorities given by Lazaer is particularly 66
illustrative: ‘The approach is (…) used to examine the equilibrium that occurs in countries under a variety of 
circumstances. Minority languages tend to disappear overtime. (…) Chauvinism, where a society forces 
immigrants and minority members to learn the majority language, may be socially optimal because the gains to 
the community as a whole in increased trade swamp the costs borne by minority individuals. Finally, ghettos are 
a natural outgrowth of the attempt to increase trade by associating with those who share a language or culture 
and need not result from constraints imposed by others. The emphasis (…) is on the three key economic 
ingredients. Individuals learn language as a rational choice. They do this taking into account the resulting 
equilibrium and that the equilibrium reflects the actions of optimizing agents. Finally, societies may attempt to 
impose rules, taxes, or subsidies to eliminate inefficient outcomes in language choice and assimilation speed.’ 
Ibid., 51. We can see here a method of explanation and justification of each outcome of the social processes as 
driven by the necessity to maximise rational behaviour, allowing to judge each state as an optimal equilibrium 
and each action as maximally efficient at given conditions. An interesting ambiguity, which later will be 
analysed in detail, allows, however, the criticism of each outcome as not yet sufficiently rationally equilibrated 
and efficient - i.e. as only apparently optimal, and in fact inefficient - and consequently, the postulation of an 
active optimising policy, which will bring about even more rational and efficient equilibrium.
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the scientific level produces a harmonious model able to reconcile and integrate supposed 
anomalies, and on the practical level makes possible optimisation of behaviour at given 
conditions.   The principle of efficiency is a dynamic synthesis of the two: thanks to 67
efficiency working as a measure of behaviour, maximising individual rational action can push 
the whole system of reference towards a higher, more optimal equilibrium which benefits all 
the players - a state in which pursuit by each individual of their own individual interest brings 
about a greater degree of the common good for the social whole.   Lack of such efficient 68
equilibrium can be solely explained as an outcome of a situation in which the three 
unquestionable rules have not been yet made fully explicit.   69
!
Let us repeat. The discipline of economics/economy is successful because it is scientific: its 
scientific and rational character is proven by the fact that it succeeds; the fact that is succeeds 
can be judged by means of the market test; and explained by the fact that it provides the best 
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!  This tendency to build equilibrated or ‘harmonious’ models is illustrated by contrasting the methodological 67
principles of the critics of economics with the principles of explanation propagated by economic imperialism 
which should gravitate towards equilibrium. The principle of equilibrium calls the scholar to bring about rather 
reconciliation than ‘confusion’. This is contrasted with the ideas of the critic, who ‘does not accept the 
economic framework.’ Ibid. 52. In the case of the critic, ‘results from other fields are used to tweak the noses of 
economists for being so naive and using abstractions that do not fit the data. (…) Rather than relying on 
maximizing behavior, equilibrium, and efficiency, this work attempts to show that the standard models are at 
odds with the data. They are often presented as puzzles. Although puzzles and anomalies are useful because they 
provoke thought, they are best thought of as starting points rather than conclusions. Most economists who have 
done empirical research find that they encounter many puzzles along the way. The goal of the scholar is to make 
sense of the data, to reconcile the puzzles, and if completely successful, to bring them into a general framework 
that allows predictions to be made. Success is defined by enhanced understanding, not by increased confusion.’ 
Ibid.
!  ’Third, much of economics is driven by the notion that efficiency is important. Adam Smith's (1776) concept 68
of the invisible hand is a guiding principle in economics. Individuals acting in their self-interest further the 
general goals of society.’ Ibid., 4.  
!  ‘When economists model a situation and the resulting equilibrium is inefficient, usually there are trades that 69
could have occurred that are implicitly or explicitly ruled out. The analyst or his critics are induced to ask what 
the reasons are and what market or other institutions could arise to remedy the situation.’ Ibid. This ‘permits 
economists to make clear, unambiguous policy statements’. Ibid. 
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(the most rationally maximising, the most equilibrated, the most efficient = the most 
economic) principle of thinking and acting in reality. 
!
But, one might ask, what is the importance of the implicit matrix of ‘imperialistic’ thinking 
present in Lazaer’s text. Is it not marginal? As we will see in the course of our investigation, 
the conceptual machinery behind the slogan of ‘economic imperialism’ and the conceptual 
field implied, are not Lazaer’s inventions. Rather they could be read as symptoms of the 
formation of a specific dispositive of economics/economy as the universal method of 
formalisation of human action, aimed at embracing the whole field of human science and 
practice. Signals of the formation of such a dispositive on the conceptual level are evident in 
the workings of many prominent contemporary economists.  The term ‘economic 
imperialism’ has been used - affirmatively - since as early as the 1930s when, in the midst of 
the great crisis of capitalism, William Souter declared that ‘The salvation of Economic 
Science in the twentieth century lies in an enlightened and democratic “economic 
imperialism”, which invades the territories of its neighbors, not to enslave them or to swallow 
them up, but to aid and enrich them and promote their autonomous growth in the very process 
of aiding and enriching itself.’   Another important trace of the formation of this 70
generalising , dominative dispositive could be traced back to the formation of a formal 
definition of economics proposed in the path-breaking book An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science, written by Lionel Robbins. Robbins did not define 
economics materially, by reference to a particular sphere (that of material production, or even 
the sphere of market exchange), but formally as a ‘science which studies human behaviour as 
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!  Ralph William Souter, Prolegomena to Relativity Economics: An Elementary Study in the Mechanics and 70
Organics of an Expanding Economic Universe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), 94. 
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a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.’   This 71
dematerialising definition, which will become a matter of further scrutiny later, has been 
adopted in the last decades by many standard textbooks of economics,   including the one by 72
Samuelson and Temin.   It has been taken up, developed and widened by another influential 73
economist and Nobel Prize winner, Gary Becker, who has contributed to the formulation of 
the notion of human capital,   and the notion of an economic approach to human behaviour 74
aimed at economic formalisation of virtually any kind of human action.   In his Nobel Prize 75
Lecture, Becker imperialistically defined economics as a ‘method of analysis’ or a specific 
‘approach’, which enables us ‘to analyze social issues that range beyond those usually 
considered by economists’,   making it an infinitely generalisable mechanism of 76
formalisation and formation of human action as such. In 1984 another Nobel Prize winning 
economist, George Stiegler, published a text, “Economics: The Imperial Science?”,   in 77
which he summed up the attempts to formulate a successful, generalisable ‘imperial’ 
definition of economics, starting from Robbins onwards. Recently, the approach represented 
by Lazer has been recognised by public authorities (Lazaer himself was appointed chairman 
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!  Lionel C. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan, 71
1932), 15. 
!  For an informative historical study of the process of achieving discursive hegemony by this definition see 72
Roger B. Backhouse, Steve Mademad, “Defining Economics: The Long Road to Acceptance of the Robbins 
Definition,” Economica Volume 76 (2009):  805–820.
!  Paul A. Samuelson, Peter Temin, Economics, 10th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 3.73
!  Gary Becker, Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education. 3 74
ed. (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).   
!  Gary Becker, The Economics Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 75
3-14.
!  Gary Becker, “The Economic Way of Looking at Life,” Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993): 383. 76
!  George J. Stigler, “Economics: The Imperial Science?” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 86, 3 (1984): 77
301-313.
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of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers in 2006) and popularised by 
such best-selling books as Robert Frank’s The Economic Naturalist: Why Economics 
Explains Almost Everything   or Freakonomics,   co-written by Becker’s disciple Levitt. 78 79
Robbins and many other economists who have contributed to the construction of the idea of 
economics as the general and universal formal science of human action, with a potentially 
unlimited (‘imperial’) scope, have explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness in the work of 
one of the founding fathers of the Austrian School of economics, Ludwig von Mises. The 
most systematic outline of the discursive innovation which played such an important role in 
the construction of a formal and infinitely generalisable notion of economics can be found in 
the fundamental work laid out in his magnum opus titled Human Action. A Treatise on 
Economics.   80
!
It would be wrong, however, to treat the problem solely from a purely ‘theoretical’ point of 
view, as if it were a matter for a disembodied and deinstitutionalised study of the history of 
ideas. Mises and his friends, disciples and fellow travellers have participated in the creation 
of institutions for the propagation and implementation of their ideas, by means of influential 
think-tanks, linked to business and governmental centres of policy making, which became 
important discursive-institutional devices in the formation of the political platforms of 
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and the Washington Consensus. The problem of the 
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construction of economics/economy as an imperialistic discourse/practice is not merely a 
matter of a Methodenstreit between professionals in the science of economics, or of 
‘ideology’, without counterparts in other fields of social practice. Already examples given by 
Lazaer indicate that what might seem a purely ‘formal’ or ‘abstract’ definition concerning 
professionals is indeed a ‘discipline’ or a ‘dispositive’ which makes possible peculiar 
formalisation and formation of the actual behaviour of individuals and institutions (hospitals, 
schools, universities, pension systems being ‘economised’ and ‘rationalised’), establishing a 
particular form of economics/economy as the default, generalisable and actively generalising 
formative form of rationality, as the ultimate modelling model, as the practical and theoretical 
rationality, as an actively informing mode of thinking and acting. 
!
1.2. Economic rationality defined against theological prejudgements 
!
What is theology’s importance in the formulation of such an understanding of economics/
economy? What does theology have to say when confronted with such a rationality? It seems 
that religion (practice) and theology (the theory of this practice) cannot merely be a marginal 
discipline. Theology is now rarely considered to be a science, according to the commonly 
accepted standards. Indeed, if we agree with Lazaer that the potency of a discipline derives 
from the degree of its scientificity, then theology, being a non-science (and it must be judged 
as such if the dominant modern understanding of science is applied), must appear as lacking 
any power in confrontation with the actual sciences, especially in confrontation with a 
science with such imperialistic ambitions as the dominant economics. Thus theology must 
appear an easy prey, faced with the prospect of economics/economy treating it as an object 
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that could be economically formalised.   As we have heard from Lazaer, the supposed ‘power 81
of higher authorities’   cannot defend religion against the imperial ambitions of economic 82
theoretical/practical reason. 
!
Thus theology/religion might appear insignificant in the formation of the notion of 
economics/economy as a universal, formative dispositive and generalisable, dominant 
rationality. This would appear to be the case according the understanding of economic 
science in the aforementioned critical text by Ludwig von Mises, in which he defines 
economics as ‘a purely rational and scientific theory of social cooperation’,   dealing with the 83
‘absolutely and plainly human’   sphere of action.  However, this definition of economics is 84
posed by Mises together with a contrasting complement. This is done by defining the science 
of economics in direct opposition to theological and cryptotheological doctrines and social 
movements aiming at the establishment of a theocracy - that is, an organisation of social 
cooperation based on theological prejudgements. The economic system of knowledge and 
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correlative economic practice are, according to the Austrian scholar, by definition, ‘radically 
opposed to all systems of theocracy’.   But the theological, or rather cryptotheological 85
dimension plays an important role, not only in the confrontation between Mises and 
religiously motivated critics of the form of economics/economy he defends,   but also in 86
confrontation with apparently secular enemies. Mises’ famous book is both a systematic 
exposition of his general theory of human action and a fiercely polemical text; the polemical 
blade is turned against three main foes: Marxism, Keynesianism and Nazism.   Interestingly, 87
all these doctrines (and the correlative political programs and social movements), together 
with all the other economic theories and social movements critical of the mode of economic 
thinking and acting advocated by the Austrian School, are classified by Mises as theological 
or cryptotheological.   According to Mises, despite all the possible differences between these 88
critical discourses and political movements, and despite the seemingly secular character of 
some of them, all these theories and practices find their paradigmatic and most easily 
recognisable crystallisation in theocratic social systems and theological doctrines. The fact 
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that ‘present day counterfeit religions, socialism, statolatry, and nationalism’   appeal to 89
seemingly real, this-worldly entities like society, class or race is of minor importance, as long 
as they share the fundamental conceptual matrix of religious thinking, which, when applied to 
the organisation of social life, must lead to the construction of ‘theocratic’   regimes. That is 90
to say, to the construction of ‘a social system which lays claim to a superhuman title for its 
legitimation.’   According to Mises, what enables us to characterise these differing and 91
apparently secular forms of economic theory and political practice as theocratic is ‘their 
craving to organize the earthly affairs of mankind according to contents of a complex of ideas 
whose validity cannot be demonstrated by reasoning.’   What is directly contrasted with both 92
explicitly theological and theocratic and cryptotheological and cryptotheocratic doctrines and 
movements - is what Mises labels as ‘liberalism’.   Liberalism is defined by him as a political 93
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(Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2012).
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practice based on the science of economics. According to Mises, liberal policies are ‘the 
application of a system of knowledge which does not refer in any way to sentiments, intuitive 
creeds for which no logically sufficient proof can be provided’.   As such, the economic 94
system of knowledge and policies of liberalism are - let us repeat - by definition ‘radically 
opposed to all systems of theocracy’.   95
!
Mises states that political application of economic science (‘liberalism’), is always 
necessarily opposed to theocracies. Nevertheless, he takes pains to show that the fact that 
liberalism is anti-theocratic does not imply that liberalism is by definition anti-religious. 
According to Mises, distinction between the anti-theocratic and the anti-religious is made 
possible by introducing a distinction between theocracies which aim at regulating social 
cooperation, and as such are necessarily harmful, on the one hand, and religious feelings, 
harmless for the smooth functioning of the social mechanism, on the other hand. The second, 
harmless kind of religion is a matter of ‘lyrical enchantment’,   which can legitimately appeal 96
‘to earnestness and heroism’   or ‘assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation 97
to others, a preponderance of loving affection’.   Religion in the second, non-theocratic sense 98
is acceptable and might even be compatible with scientific economic theory and liberal 
political practice. This is possible, however, under the necessary condition that religion 
remain treated as a non-rational, emotional matter, concerned with ‘a purely personal and 
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individual relation between man and a holy, mysterious, and awe-inspiring divine Reality.’  99
As such, religion should not ‘make any reference to the arrangement of social 
cooperation’,   being forbidden to ‘pretend to interfere with the conduct of social, political, 100
and economic affairs.’   Such an intervention must remain a sovereign prerogative of the 101
proper science of economics, and consequently, of its political expression, which is portrayed 
as ‘based upon a purely scientific theory of social cooperation.’   There can be no science of 102
things for which ‘no logically sufficient proof can be provided’,   therefore there is no 103
possibility of existence of theology understood, in concordance with its classical definition, 
as ‘the science of things divine’.   According to Mises, if religion’s ultimate standard is 104
‘intuition providing the mind with subjective certainty about things which cannot be 
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in Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism sand Schizophrenia trans. Robert Hurley, Mark 
Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), xii-xiv. For an account of the 
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Mario von der Ruhr (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 128-133; cf. A. Rebecca Rozelle-Stone and Lucian 
Stone, Simone Weil and Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 87-90.
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conceived by reason and ratiocination’,   then the possibility of the existence of a science of 105
theology, must appear contradicto in adiecto. 
!
The reason given by Mises for the impossibility of the existence of such a theological science 
and for the necessity of accepting the science of economics as the sole regulator of social 
interactions, is an interesting fusion of epistemic-theoretical and empirical-pragmatic 
rationales, and can be reconstructed as follows. Religion is defined as a set of beliefs which 
are ultimately based on ‘insight not open to examination by reason and by demonstration by 
logical methods’,   and this, according to the Austrian scholar, is precisely the reason why 106
religious doctrines cannot intervene in the social cooperation without destroying the very 
conditions for social cooperation. If the non-science of theology would be applied to matters 
other than individual feelings, it would necessarily bring about theocracy, and a war of 
competing theocracies, which would block the possibility of social cooperation. Religious 
theses cannot be proven rationally and for this reason, Mises states, people cannot come to an 
ultimate conclusion and agreement based on ‘validity demonstrated by reasoning’.   There 107
are many beliefs and creeds. Each of them aims at regulating social life. And since ‘[t]he 
conflicts of antagonistic (…) creeds and sects cannot be decided by ratiocination, they must 
be decided by arms’,   so that the only solution for bringing about conditions for productive 108
and peaceful cooperation is separation of powers and division of labour between religion, 
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delegated to the sphere of the individual and the irrational on the one hand, and economics/
economy governing the rational ordering of the social cooperation of individuals on the other. 
!
This thesis in turn is based on a chain of arguments. Following it will take us deeper, straight 
into the sphere of what Mises calls ‘the laws of cosmic becoming, viz. the higher productivity 
of the division of labour’.   The basis for Mises’ argumentation is that liberal policies, 109
grounded in the right economic reasoning, bring about higher productivity by means of the 
intensification of social cooperation, regulated by the division of labour, which is itself the 
fundamental universal law: ‘one of the great basic principles of cosmic becoming and 
evolutionary change.’   Higher productivity is achieved through the division of labour and 110
this law applies both to the natural world and natural science, and to human action guided by 
principles of economy and made explicit by economics, although each of these worlds or 
relative levels functions according to a specific intensity of the explicitness of this law. The 
cosmic principle of the division of labour, which brings about higher productivity, is present 
in ‘every living organism.’   Human action gives additional velocity to this cosmic 111
productive process by becoming actively conscious - conscious in action - of its principles. 
The science of economics advances and quickens this consciousness by further formalising 
and explicating the knowledge implicit in the very structure of every action. Thanks to this 
the cosmic principle might now reach its optimum realisation, bringing about the highest 
possible productivity at given conditions. This happens, however, only under specific 
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conditions, which can be brought about solely by policies that apply the rules explicated by 
the right economic knowledge. 
!
Now, let us see how the conclusions drawn by Mises from this reasoning are used to limit the 
‘theocratic’ ambitions of religion, and to formulate the Misesian notion of prejudice, or 
prejudgement, crucial for our exposition. Mises states that theologies applied to extra-
individual matters necessarily lead to wars and revolutions, and that ‘the division of labour 
requires undisturbed peace’.   Therefore, in order to preserve the peaceful conditions 112
necessary for the flourishing of social cooperation, which is in turn necessary for the 
increment of productivity, the power of religion has to be delimitated: religious doctrines can 
refer only to purely individual and emotional matters. What follows is that theology, as the 
‘science of things divine’, must be deemed as nothing more than prejudice, which, when 
applied to the sphere of rational social ordering cannot but disturb and destroy the social 
cooperation organised by the division of labour. Theology as a science which would try to 
intervene into social life on the basis of its own presumptions - which are inherently 
untestable - must be deemed ‘prejudice’ in the strict sense, since it cannot be proven. No 
‘logically sufficient proof’   can be provided to back theological statements. Ultimately, at 113
some point theologically motivated judgements must disclose their non-rational character: the 
fact that they cannot refer to a rationale, the fact that they cannot provide yet another rational 
proof to give grounding to their claims. This is the reason why the fanatical adherents of 
theocracies based on traditional, revealed religions, as well as partisans of apparently secular 
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but inherently cryptotheocratic movements and regimes based on the same mental structures 
(fascists, Nazis, communists, socialists of different creeds), have to ultimately appeal to blind 
faith or force, in the absence of properly rational arguments.   In turn, this appeal, as we 114
have heard, leads to violent wars and revolutions, which disturb peace, which, as we are told, 
is necessary for achieving ever increasing productivity, which is depicted as the immanent 
aim driving nature and social cooperation. This is why all openly religious and all apparently 
secular cryptotheologies must be excluded from the rational conversation on the organisation 
of social cooperation. The essential argument is that theologies and cryptotheologies 
represent prejudgement in a technical and etymological sense: a pre-rational judgement - a 
judgement, which cannot be traced back to another rational judgement but falls back into the 
sphere of prejudice, founding its ultimate grounding in the extra-rational. 
!
What, then, is the reason for scrutinising economic discourse and practice? What is the 
rationale for questioning economics/economy, especially from the perspective of theology, 
which, as it seems, in contrast to economics, cannot be considered a science, since it is based 
on presumptions or prejudices which cannot - ultimately - provide reasons for themselves? 
My intention is to test the concept of economics and its laws presented by Mises against its 
own basic principle of scientificity and see if economics itself does not fall under the 
suspicion of containing theological elements in the foundations in which it is grounded. 
Theocracy and its conceptual correlate theology has been defined by Mises as based 
fundamentally on prejudgement, i.e. judgements for which ‘no logically sufficient proof’ can 
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be provided to back their pretences. Let us then test the general laws of economics/economy 
for the existence of such fundamental prejudgements. 
!
2. The laws of economics/economy and its foundational prejudgements 
!
At first sight, economy seems to be an undeniable fact - a practice into which we are all 
engaged, a practice necessary for the reproduction of our social and biological existence. As 
such it appears to be something obvious and self-evident, something that does not need to 
give reasons to justify its existence.   The discourse of such practice - i.e. the science of 115
economics - claims to be simply a correlate of the right economic practice (‘right’ meaning a 
practice which leads to higher productivity, and thus to an increment in material and spiritual 
human welfare and development.   As Mises states:  116
!
The body of economic knowledge is an essential element in the structure of 
human civilization; it is the foundation upon which modern industrialism and 
all the moral, intellectual, technological and therapeutical achievements of the 
last centuries have been built. It rests with men whether they will make proper 
use of the rich treasure with which this knowledge provides them or whether 
they will leave it unused.’   117
!
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But if we follow the development of Mises’ argument cautiously enough we would see that 
his praise of economic science - a science which seems to leave it up to ‘men’   to use its 118
prescripts - is interestingly immediately followed by a threat: ‘But if they [‘men’ - M.P.] fail 
to take the best advantage of it [i.e. economics - M.P.] and disregard its teachings and 
warnings, they will not annul economics; they will stamp out society and the human race’   - 119
this is how Mises’ magnum opus ends. This argument is echoed in the last book by Mises’ 
most influential disciple, Friedrich August von Hayek, in his statement that ‘[t]he dispute 
between the market order and socialism is no less than a matter of survival. To follow 
socialist morality would destroy much of present humankind and impoverish much of the 
rest.’   120
!
What is the basis for this threat? According to Mises, the teachings and warnings of economic 
science are explications of indispensable laws. Within the Misesian framework these laws 
remain in a very peculiar relationship to the laws of nature, as we have already indicated. In 
the closing section of Human Action, the Austrian economist recalls the ‘unfeeling 
absoluteness’   of ‘the physical laws’,   to justify his claims. We encounter here a motif that 121 122
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recurs throughout the history of the dominant economic discourse.   Mises was not the only 123
prominent economist who used this argumentative strategy to justify the demands of 
economics/economy by reference to the ‘unfeeling absoluteness’ of natural laws. Comparable 
argumentation, using the same expressions, can be found, for example, in the fragment taken 
from the writings of John Stuart Mill as the motto for one of the most popular contemporary 
handbooks of economics, written by N. Gregory Mankiw, Professor of Economics at Harvard 
University, and formerly chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, in the 
time of G.W. Bush’s presidency. In the fragment quoted by Mankiw, Mill states that 
economics is a science that ‘should be taught ex professo.’   This announcement is backed 124
by a reference to the laws of nature, with a special reference to the laws of gravity. J.S. Mill 
compares the one who would like to question the nature of ‘Political Economy’   as being 125
‘unfeeling’,   to the one who neglects ‘the law of gravitation’.   He states that the law of 126 127
gravity is ‘the most unfeeling thing’   he knows, since it ‘breaks the neck of the best and 128
most amiable person without scruple, if he forgets for a single moment to give heed to it.’  129
Importantly, Mises cannot be accused of a coarse ‘naturalism’; the establishment of a definite 
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boundary between ‘society’ and ‘nature’ is, as we will see, essential for his system. The laws 
of economy expressed by economics are not simply compared to the laws of nature in a loose 
manner, as if the laws of gravity might serve as a vague metaphor for the laws of economy 
discovered by the science of economics. Mises takes pains to separate natural science from 
social science, and he tries to establish the criteria for delimitation of the natural course of 
events from distinctively human action. Yet, despite these significant distinctions in his 
system, he claims that the laws of economy should be understood as having the same quality 
of indispensability as the laws of nature. The fact that they are made explicit by human action 
and human science does not change the brute, non-negotiable fact that they do co-constitute a 
specific layer or level of ‘laws of the universe’,   as ‘universal law determining cosmic 130
becoming’.   These laws enforce themselves as indisputable, ultimately, through the 131
question of life and death. Economic laws, as described by Mises, are of such a nature that 
‘man must adjust his conduct if he wants to live’.   He must not question the laws of 132
economy because when he starts to do so he will break his neck, as if confronted with the law 
of gravity, as Mill and Mankiw state; indeed, as according to Mises and Hayek, he would die 
and bring to an end his entire civilisation. 
!
2.1. Ultimate givens as foundational prejudgements of economics/economy 
!
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For this reason the laws of economy must be taken as given - as ‘the ultimate given’.   This 133
term is not a peripheral concept or a façon de parler, but a pivotal point on which Mises’ 
reasoning revolves. ‘Ultimate givens’, according to Mises, are the ultimate grounding of 
every science, including the science of human action, i.e. economics. As such they are 
‘irreducible and unanalyzable phenomena’.   They constitute the limits of the human mind. 134
Mises explains the constitution of ultimate givens in the following way. The human mind 
searches for knowledge, with the aim of ‘tracing back every phenomenon to its cause. But it 
realizes that these endeavors must necessarily strike againstinsurmountable walls. There are 
phenomena which cannot be analyzed and traced back to other phenomena. They are the 
ultimate given.’   We meet here once again a specific amalgamation of purely theoretical-135
epistemic and empirical-pragmatic motifs and rationales. At first glance, it might seem that 
the reasoning presented above appeals in a strictly theoretical fashion only to purely 
‘epistemic’ limits of knowledge. But, if we follow Mises’ principles we would have to admit, 
that there can be no ultimate sufficient, rational or logical proofs given, either for acceptance 
or rejection of the thesis, on the existence of such formal, structural limits to knowledge. In 
other words, there is no sufficient logical reason for forcing the acceptance of the ultimate 
givens and the laws of economics grounded in them. The subject can always demand from 
science a proof for a proof, leading to regressus ad infinitum, which, as Mises states, must be 
avoided. But, one could ask, why must we consider infinite regress undesirable by definition? 
Why must it cease at some point? The implicit reason is not theoretical, but practical. What 
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we see at work here is a certain heuristic device created in order to save time. There is no 
time for such an infinite regress of thought; a practical man, a man who wants to succeed in a 
competitive environment (this means ultimately a man who wants to live), cannot afford to 
waste his time on infinite thinking. He has to take some things as ultimately given, because 
he has to act in order to realise his wishes. Mises gives this argument a historiosophical 
colouring by describing (although without explaining the reasons for) an evolution from 
practical needs, towards the impractical, metaphysical search for absolute ends, and back to 
the practical ends of the ‘acting man’, abandoning the pretences for achieving absolute ends 
and knowledge of such ends. The historiosophical development of knowledge goes from 
using it for practical needs, through a deviation which produces meditations on absolute ends, 
and back again to the economic practical needs:  
!
The archetype of (…) research was: where and how must I interfere in order to 
divert the course of events from the way it would go in the absence of my 
interference in a direction which better suits my wishes? In this sense man 
raises the question: who or what is at the bottom of things? He searches for the 
regularity and the ‘law’, because he wants to interfere. Only later was this 
search more extensively interpreted by metaphysics as a search after the 
ultimate cause of being and existence. Centuries were needed to bring these 
exaggerated and extravagant ideas back again to the more modest question of 
where one must interfere or should one be able to interfere in order to attain 
this or that end.’   136
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!
At some point we should stop the infinite thinking process and accept the ultimately given 
laws, because accepting them will make us successful. The only way to induce the subject to 
accept the laws of economics as ultimately given, is to appeal not to theoretical, but to 
practical reason:  
!
It is contradictory to expect that logic could be of any service in demonstrating 
the correctness or validity of the fundamental logical principles. All that can 
be said about them is that to deny their correctness or validity appears to the 
human mind nonsensical and that thinking, guided by them, has led to modes 
of successful acting.   137
!
‘Man’ must accept the laws - including the laws of the right economics - if he wants to 
succeed; that is, if he wants to prolong and intensify his material and spiritual wellbeing. 
Ultimately, he should accept the pure facticity of economic laws, as ultimately given, if he 
wants to live. However the way in which the ontological status of these laws is defined is 
very peculiar: they are situated beyond the reach of reason and experience, beyond the 
possibility of being rationally demonstrated or empirically experienced.   Again, one should 138
be careful while reconstructing this model in order not to simply conflate the experience of 
empirical wellbeing (or an empirical disaster) for an individual, with the ontological modality 
of the existence of the laws themselves. What is being experienced by a subject are not these 
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laws per se, but only the results which obeying them brings about (or, as we will see at the 
end of the subsection on capital, divinising them in order to be able to obey them in advance, 
even before they fully manifest themselves). The laws - unintelligible in themselves - are 
experienced by means of the results that breaking or obeying them bring to an empirical 
human being (breaking his neck or placing him at the top). The rationale for their acceptance 
comes not from reason, nor, as we will see, simply from the actual experience, but from 
elsewhere: from an appeal, or, if we could venture a harsher expression, a blackmail 
threatening the possibility of the extinction of the empirical existence of the subject in 
question. This threat serves as the ultimate argument. If ‘man’ wants to live he has to accept 
the teachings of economics. The ultimate reason for acceptance of these laws is not their 
truth-content in itself, which remains unachievable and cannot be measured. Rather, the 
ultimate reason to accept the laws of economics/economy is its ‘usefulness both in mundane 
life and in scientific research.’   It brings about the success of individuals and of 139
civilisations. As we will see, Mises tries to clearly delimitate the a priori from the empirical. 
However, the empirical rationale - the proof from success - enters the picture and gets the last 
word. The economic order based on these laws should be accepted because ‘It cannot be 
denied that it works.’   140
!
Moreover, the acceptance of the laws of economy explicated by the economic sciences is 
decided in advance, from the very beginning, independently of the conscious decision of the 
subject. Even before the subject explicitly acknowledges this fact in the light of his 
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consciousness, the economic laws are always already present in the very structure of his 
action. Even before one would admit that one does accept the teachings of economics, and 
even if one would like to explicitly distance oneself from them, one is always already 
accepting and affirming them, by the simple fact that one continues to live. Everybody who 
lives tacitly and passively votes for living, whether he acknowledges this or denies it, and 
thus, according to Mises, he or she implicitly accepts the teachings of economics. 
!
It might seem that there is a manner of conduct or a modality of action that is able to break 
with these indispensable laws by appealing to the renunciation of life. Mises calls this way of 
life asceticism, contrasting the acting man of economics with the vegetative man of 
asceticism.   However, asceticism reconstructed this way does not pose a serious threat to 141
the establishment of all-encompassing economic laws. According to Mises, a truly consistent 
ascetic simply cancels himself out of existence: ‘Once the forces of resignation get the upper 
hand, man dies; he does not turn into a plant.’   And all other ascetics who keep on living 142
make a concession to the laws of economics by the very fact of prolonging their existence: 
!
The enticement of life triumphs. The ascetic principles have been adulterated. 
Even the most saintly hermits made concessions to life and earthly concerns 
which did not agree with their rigid principles. But as soon as a man takes into 
account any earthly concerns, and substitutes for purely vegetative ideals an 
acknowledgements of earthly things (…), he bridges the gulf which separated 
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him from those who says yes to the striving after earthly ends. Then he has 
something in common with everyone else.    143
!
By doing so, by intensifying or even merely prolonging his life - which necessarily implies 
acting according to the principles of economics and accepting its ultimate givens - he does 
participate in ‘man’s innate nature that he (…) seeks to preserve and to strengthen his life’.  144
‘As long as man lives he cannot help obeying the cardinal impulse, the élan vital.’   This is 145
the inescapable law of cosmic becoming: ‘In every living being there works an inexplicable 
and nonanalyzable Id.’   This is why life does not have to give rationales for itself, and 146
science, as reconstructed by Mises, ‘keeps silence only when the question is raised whether 
life itself is worth living.’   The science of economics cannot ‘tell a man whether he should 147
preserve or abandon life’,   but in the majority of cases this is already decided in advance - 148
not by economists, but by life itself, which incessantly aims at prolonging and intensifying 
itself, without any reason. Now it becomes clear that the fundamental reason for accepting 
the thesis of the science of economics lies beyond the sphere of reason itself, it is constituted 
by prejudgements that lie beyond the sphere of scientific judgement: ‘Life itself and the 
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unknown forces that originate it and keep it burning are an ultimate given, and as such 
beyond the pale of human science.’   149
!
In the idea of Id, or élan vital, or the power of life/cosmic becoming, we reach, so to speak, 
the ultimate given of all the economic ultimate givens; the Grund/Abgrund in which all the 
foundations of economic knowledge are themselves grounded. And this inexplicable abyss/
grounding cannot itself be either grounded or explicated by reason. On the contrary, this life-
prolonging force driven by cosmic-economic laws actively repulses all attempts to scrutinise 
it by reason. As such, ‘the ultimate given might be called an irrational fact.’   ‘All this is 150
miraculous in the sense that it is an ultimate given for our searching mind.’   Thus 151
judgements for which no logical proofs can be given, judgements which cannot become 
objects of consciousness, judgements prior to conscious judgements - in short, prejudgements 
- are presented by Mises himself as constitutive of the establishment of the field of economic 
science. 
!
2.2. Humility towards prejudgements  
!
Analogous expressions, which, as I will try to demonstrate later, could be treated as 
symptoms of the workings of a similar mechanism, can be found in the work of F.A. Hayek. 
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Turning to Hayek is important, not only because of the influence his philosophy had and still 
has on the dominant economics, and the challenges it has posed to the unorthodox 
economics,   but primarily because Hayek, in developing the conceptual logic a conceptual 152
logic deeply imbued with the Misesian idea of the ‘ultimate given’ has made the 
cryptotheological character of the foundational prejudgements of the dominant economics/
economy even more explicit, openly praising the importance of theological prejudices for the 
constitution and development of the dominant mode of conducting economics/economy. 
What is more, Hayek has linked these epistemic problems of science directly to the political 
question of consent on the results of the interplay of the market forces. The author of The 
Constitution of Liberty, has advocated the acceptance of the results of the economic process 
by the individual subject - even when no logical reason for this acceptance could be 
demonstrated to that individual, and even if empirical improvement in the economic situation 
of that individual may not be experienced. In his famous essay “Individualism: True and 
False” he explicitly evoked 
!
the necessity (…) of the individual submitting to the anonymous and 
seemingly irrational forces of society - a submission which must include not 
only the acceptance of rules of behavior as valid without examining what 
depends in the particular instance on their being observed but also a readiness 
to adjust himself to changes which may profoundly affect his fortunes and 
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opportunities and the causes of which may be altogether unintelligible to 
him.    153
!
Hayekian argumentative strategy aims at convincing the human subject to ‘submit to the 
products of a social process which nobody has designed and the reasons for which nobody 
may understand’.   Interestingly, Hayek explicitly and openly referred in this respect to the 154
indispensability of an alliance between the model of economics/economy propagated by him 
and other ‘neoliberal’  economists, and religion. What is more, he tried to ground this alliance 
in the embeddedness of both discourses and practices in a similar, or perhaps even the same, 
matrix or meta-order. In his opening address to the first meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, 
Hayek proclaimed, ‘I am convinced that unless the breach between true liberal and religious 
convictions can be healed, there is no hope for a revival of liberal forces’.   The reason for 155
this alliance given by Hayek in his famous Constitution of Liberty is that ‘we must preserve 
that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled and non-rational which is the only environment 
wherein reason can grow and operate effectively’.   We hear a loud echo of the Misesian 156
argument for the acceptance of the things ‘ultimately given’ also in Hayek’s last work, 
posthumously published as The Fatal Conceit: 
!
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like it or not, we owe the persistence of certain practices, and the civilization 
that resulted from them, in part to support from beliefs which are not true - or 
verifiable or testable - in the same sense as are scientific statements, and 
which are certainly not the result of rational argumentation. (…) They did help 
their adherents to “be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue 
it” (Gen. 1:28). Even those among us, like myself, who are not prepared to 
accept the anthropomorphic conception of a personal divinity ought to admit 
that the premature loss of what we regard as nonfactual beliefs would have 
deprived mankind of a powerful support in the long development of the 
extended order that we now enjoy, and that even now the loss of these beliefs, 
whether true or false, creates great difficulties.   !157
!
In the introduction we heard Lazaer claiming economics to be scientific by virtue of its being 
‘testable, refutable, and frequently supported by the data’,   while we found Mises declaring 158
economics to be a purely secular discourse and practice, or even the paradigmatic secular 
science and the consummation of all the previous historical attempts to free men from the 
fear of gods.   Mises claimed that such emancipating knowledge has brought a definite 159
critique of all theological and cryptotheological doctrines. According to Hayek’s teacher, 
these theological doctrines and theocratic movements, in the absence of sufficient logical and 
rational proofs, have had to ultimately appeal to sacrifice: the sacrificium intellectus of their 
!  66
!  Hayek, Fatal Conceit, 136-137.157
!  Ibid., 54.158
!  Mises refers among others to the ancient Hedonism and Epicureanism which, as he believes, has been 159
further formalised by Utilitarianism - see, Human Action, 14-15, 149.
Mateusz Piotrowski
believers, sacrifice of the lives of non-believers, and sacrifice of the interests of every 
individual to ‘unfathomable decrees’,   ‘hidden to human mind’,   bestowed upon humanity 160 161
by an imagined super-human and super-individual being. Sacrifice, according to Mises, is the 
very core of all religious and cryptoreligious thinking.   Only the concept of a super-162
individual and super-human entity (the Communist Party or the Welfare State, etc.) is 
powerful enough to make individuals accept the sacrifice of the ‘secular interests of many or 
even the immense majority of those living today’   to ‘advantages which renunciation of 163
present and visible pleasures will procure.’   As such, Mises claims - and, as we will see 164
later, he is supported in this view by such a prominent analyst of the neoliberal dispositive as 
Michel Foucault - sacrifice is relegated from economic discourse and practice, creating an 
‘absolutely and plainly human’   sphere, ‘a discipline without God’,   and a discipline 165 166
‘without totality’.   What is supposed to be exorcised from this sphere is precisely 167
‘renunciation’   - i.e. the sacrifice of individual interest for the good of a supposed whole 168
(‘totality’), since the economic subject, ‘the subject of interest is never called upon to 
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relinquish his interest’.   Mises declares the judgements of individual subjects to be the 169
ultimate criteria and the driving forces of the market-regulated economic process.  170
Moreover, it is promised that this absolutely secular process, unlike theocracies and 
cryptotheoracies based on sacrifice, will never ‘compel them to sacrifice their egoistic 
designs to the benefit of society.’   The individual value judgement is the basic law of 171
economic action, the foundational economic given, which cannot and should not be further 
analysed.   172
!
Thus, it might come as a surprise that Hayek, taking up the Misesian concept of the ultimate 
given, calls for the adjustment of the subject to an attitude of ‘humility toward the impersonal 
and anonymous social processes’,   even if to the individual these processes ‘appear 173
unintelligible and irrational’,   and even if it hurts the individual’s visible and direct interests 174
and demands of him ‘readiness to adjust himself to changes which may profoundly affect his 
fortunes and opportunities and the causes of which may be altogether unintelligible to 
him.’   Here the argument achieves completion, creating a full circle. Not only does Hayek 175
explicitly praise acceptance of prejudgements or ‘superstitions’   as presuppositions 176
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necessary for the functioning of capitalist economy, but he also calls for the acceptance of 
each result of the market-led economic process, without any reasons for this acceptance being 
demonstrated or explicated to the individual in question. Hayek states that individual 
judgement should be suspended when confronted with an extra-rational and extra-individual 
process that cannot be grasped by any individual mind. 
!
One could ask whether it is not merely a matter of minor inconsistencies inside the Misesian 
system, or a matter of differences between the personal views of a more secular teacher 
(Mises) and his slightly more religiously inclined disciple (Hayek). In this connection it 
might be productive to test a hypothesis, that what we witness here is something much more 
interesting and important than a question of insignificant personal idiosyncrasies. Perhaps the 
concept of the ultimate given, and its elaboration towards the idea of humility in the face of 
the super-individual,   can tell us something important about the structural logics driving the 177
dispositive of the dominant economics. Perhaps going through this test might make it easier 
to answer a pertinent question: Why does the explicit evocation of the necessity of sacrificing 
individual conscious judgements to the extra-individual process, justified by beliefs located 
in the sphere of prejudgements, reemerges in the dominant economic dispositive?  
!
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Here we enter into a sphere of tension. One pole of this field of tension is constituted by the 
image of economics/economy as a purely human and secular discipline. It presents 
economics/economy as the ultimate abolition of all sacrificial systems; and as a practice 
which brings about the ultimate affirmation of human individual, and individual judgement of 
value. The second pole is constituted by an explicit evocation of extra-individual and extra-
rational processes as the ultimate and unanalysable matrix of human thought and action. As 
such this extra-individual matrix is endowed with the power to judge individual efforts and to 
cause the individual to sacrifice his direct interests. We will now try two make this clearer by 
analysing how does these two extremes meet. We will see how do they work together 
constituting the subject of economic productive action.   
!
Below I will try to indicate the workings of the mechanism that both presents productive 
action (‘labour’) as the ultimate given and as tedium, while at the same time exorcising the 
sacrificial dimension of labour, produced by its ultimately given and tedious character. I will 
then discuss the attempt to displace the problem of the sacrificial character of labour through 
the introduction of the concept-device of capital, believed to progressively replace, or at least 
diminish, the importance and extent of ‘labour’. In the next subsection I will also analyse the 
mechanism which actively repels the very possibility that an individual could question capital 
and the capitalist order - an order which, despite its dynamic character, or perhaps by means 
of its uncontrollable dynamism, posits itself as the natural-theological ultimate given beyond 
question. 
!
First, however, we should consider what the rationale might be for proceeding from the 
general, foundational laws of economics/economy towards the specific question of the 
!  70
Mateusz Piotrowski
productive elements of economic processes - i.e. ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. What is it, then, that 
justifies taking the direction from the general to the specific, from laws of economics/
economy towards labour and capital and their amalgamation? 
!
Chapter II Specific subject-matters: labour  
!
This movement of specification is necessary if we are to follow the immanent trajectory of 
the basic categories of the ultimately given prejudgements and outcomes of extra-individual 
processes, as outlined above. When the Misesian idea of the necessity of acceptance of the 
ultimate given and the Hayekian idea of the necessity of acceptance of the outcomes of super-
individual economic processes are traced back to the polemical situation of their emergence, 
we find ourselves in the sphere of social production. That is to say, the sphere in which 
‘capital’ and ‘labour’ function as the fundamental elements. Following these ideas to the 
polemical situation in which they were formulated seems useful, since it enables us to define 
more precisely the default or implied subject at whom the message is aimed, and to specify 
the conceptual field or the presupposed problematic re-constructed by such an 
interpellation.   As we will see below, both Hayek’s and Mises’ pronouncements concerning 178
the necessity of acceptance of the ultimately given presuppositions and results of economic 
processes are uttered not only to subjects of knowledge, not only to a general subject of 
economic activity, or specific subjects of consumption, but also towards subjects of 
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production. Their argument is formulated in order to convince the subject to accept his/her 
own position as a productive subject. This means acceptance of his/her position as: (1) a 
subject who should contribute as much as possible to an overall, total social production; and 
(2) a subject who should take the particular social conditions of the production process and its 
outcomes - including the present form of ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ - as ultimately given. Thus, if 
we want to analyse these fundamental notions in the context of their emergence and 
operation, we have to make explicit the specific politico-rhetorical situation, the implicit or 
default subject re-constructed by this argumentative strategy, and the basic elements which 
co-constitute this (tacit) discursive field. In our case, the field implied in such utterances 
happens to be a specific field of ‘production’ with a correlative ‘productive subject’, related 
to specifically constructed elements: ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. 
!
1. Consumer and labourer  
!
The context of labour and capital - that is, the ‘productive’ context - will have to remain 
blurred as long as we focus our attention solely on the figure of the ‘sovereign consumer’.  179
It cannot be denied that the economic persona of the ‘consumer’ plays a major role in the 
construction of the dispositive of the dominant economics, including the discourses of Mises 
and Hayek. Mises states that: 
!
The consumers patronize those shops in which they can buy what they want at 
the cheapest price. Their buying and abstention from buying decides who 
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should own and run the plants and the land. They make poor people rich and 
rich people poor. They determine precisely what should be produced, in what 
quality, and in what quantities. (…) The consumer is in a position to give free 
rein to his caprices and fancies. The entrepreneurs, capitalists, and farmers 
have their hands tied; they are bound to comply in their operations with the 
orders of the buying public.   180
!
This statement is echoed in the Hayekian approach to ‘True Individualism’, in which 
consumers’ sovereignty, mediated necessarily by the market, appears as the ultimate instance 
of judgement of individual action. Hayek states authoritatively that the works of the 
individual should  be ‘rewarded not according to the goodness or badness of his intentions, 
but solely on the basis of the value of the results to others.’   Furthermore, the value of the 181
results of the actions of an individual for his fellow men, according to Hayek, can be 
appraised adequately solely by means of market prices, when the actions are being motivated, 
measured and managed by the market mechanism.   The results of the market valuation must 182
be accepted as the ultimate judgement of the value of individual action even if this would be 
‘incompatible with a full satisfaction of our views of distributive justice’.   The postulate of 183
acceptance of the market price as the ultimate judgement of the value of the works of the 
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individual is also evident in Mises’ work. Individual effort is judged by one’s ‘fellow men’  184
- constituted through the market - and only activity evaluated in this way can count as 
genuine labour. Action becomes labour only when it is being rewarded and motivated by 
‘extroversive’   or ‘extrinsic’   (in the first place, pecuniary) incentives. Thus, labour 185 186
counts as labour when it comprises ‘rendering services which one’s fellow men appreciate 
either in buying the product or in remunerating the labour expended’.   Otherwise it remains 187
purely ‘introversive’   action. What is implied by the Austrian Scholar, is that labour which 188
is not being (i.e. pecuniarily) recognised by fellow men (qua consumers), cannot be counted 
as truly productive, since it does not enter the genuine sphere of intersubjectivity (i.e. the 
market). 
!
The figure of an external ‘consumer’ constituted by the market is integral to the formation of 
such an argument, but analysis of the cited texts shows that the context of production and 
questions of capital and labour are implicitly present - and pressing - in both of Mises’ and 
Hayek’s texts. This happens not in spite of the figure of the consumer, but precisely by means 
of positioning him as the sovereign enforcing competition on his productive subjects. Hayek 
and Mises in the texts cited try not only to flatter those to whom they speak by praising their 
sovereign powers as consumers, but also to discipline them as producers, by using the figure 
of the ‘consumer’. Mises tries to persuade the subject  he interpellates that the competitive 
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pressure is in fact not enforced by the ‘capitalists’ but rather by consumers themselves. 
Consumers are 
!
merciless bosses, full of whims and fancies, changeable and unpredictable. 
(…) Capitalists, entrepreneurs, and landowners can only preserve and increase 
their operation by filling best the orders of the consumers. They are not free to 
spend money which the consumers are not prepared to refund to them in 
paying more for the products. In the conduct of their business affairs they 
must be unfeeling and stony-hearted because the consumers, their bosses, are 
unfeeling and stony-hearted.    189
!
The figure of the consumer is turned against the productive subject, to lift the burden and the 
responsibility for enforcement of discipline from the shoulders of ‘capitalists’ and to confront 
the working, productive subject, directly with the consumer. This practice of disciplining by 
evoking the figure of the consumer/customer is not merely a theoretical matter used in Mises’ 
and Hayek’s discourse on economics, but also a disciplinary practice implemented on a daily 
basis in the organisation of discursive and technical devices in actual enterprises, as the case 
of the call centre of Millennium Bank exemplifies. In a call centre for the Warsaw branch of 
this eminent bank, messages are displayed on big screens to the workers, encouraging, or 
pressuring them to work faster and more intensely. They are told, ‘My to wszystko 
widzimy’ [‘We can see it all’] and ‘Klienci się od has odwracają’ [‘Customers are turning 
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their backs on us’].   This kind of incitement, which plays the figure of the customer or 190
consumer against the producer should be seen as part of a device described by Frederic 
Lordon, a French economist rooted in the Regulationist School. Lordon indicates that the 
procedure of foregrounding the figure of the consumer offers a justification ‘for 
contemporary transformations in employment practices – from longer work hours (“it allows 
stores to open on Sundays”) to competition-enhancing deregulation (“it lowers prices”) – 
always contrive to catch agents by “the joyful affects” of consumption’.   This practice of 191
playing the consumer against the producer also takes place in Mises’ discourse. Merchants, 
capitalists and farmers, are pictured as those who simply transfer the demand(s) of the 
unspecified consumer to the worker: ‘the sellers of goods and services of the first order are in 
direct contact with the consumers and directly dependent on their orders. But they transmit 
the orders received from the general public to all those producing goods and services of the 
higher orders.’   This is again not solely a purely ‘ideological’ construct but rather a model 192
for and a distorted articulation of actual mutations of the market economy. The figure of ‘the 
general public’ here remains undetermined and blocks the possibility of delimitating subjects 
with differing powers and interests. What is lacking in this picture is, importantly, the figure 
of a specific subject of financial operations: the shareholder. As Lordon shows, the 
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transformation in finance (what scholars call ‘financialisation’)   has led to a growing 193
pressure on producers to bring about higher dividends for the shareholders, while the 
mechanism of managerial shares has become an incentive for the managers themselves to 
profit from and participate in this mechanism by making their employees work more 
intensely.     194
!
While we could agree with Lordon that fragmentation or dissociation  of ‘the figure of the 
consumer from that of the employee’   played an important role in this process, we cannot 195
fully and unconditionally embrace his claim that the dominant economics/economy operates 
solely by ‘encouraging individuals to identify exclusively with the former [the consumer - 
M.P.] while relegating the latter [the producer - M.P.] to the realm of incidental 
considerations’.   Rather, the rhetorical situation in which the subject is addressed in the 196
case of the texts by Hayek and Mises that we have cited above, is one involving a complex 
interplay between these two figures. The consumer is present and presented as aggregated 
consumer demand (‘the general public’), by means of which pressure is being exercised on 
the producers in a competitive market. But in order to convince the subject who is being 
interpellated to accept and actively adjust to the results of the interplay of the economic 
process is (logically) firstly a matter of production. The apparently undetermined economic 
subject to whom Hayek’s and Mises’ cited texts are directed does not operate primarily 
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according to its consumer preferences. Rather, it is addressed as a potentially productive 
subject with a set of assets (skills, machines, creditworthiness etc. and - crucially for Hayek - 
knowledge), which it must make use of in order to meet the requirements of the market 
(determined in the last instance by the demands of his fellow men/consumers). These 
requirements are said to be determined by the wishes of the sovereign consumers; and this 
might include even the subject in question, who is also a consumer after all. However, even if 
the subject of production is also a consumer, the demands of the ‘sovereign consumer’ 
confront him as an alien power: as the aggregated demand of his ‘fellow men’. What is 
implied, although not stated explicitly, is that in order to satisfy their demands as consumer, 
the subject must first serve the demands of others, as an agent engaged somehow in 
production. The purchasing power or wealth he disposes of for his consumption is firstly 
mediated by the productive action he carries out with the aim of satisfying the needs of other 
consumers. As Mises states: ‘To be rich, in a pure market economy, is the outcome of success 
in filling best the demands of the consumers. A wealthy man can preserve his wealth only by 
continuing to serve best the consumers in the most efficient way.’   First he must meet the 197
requirements as a producer, and only then as an outcome of the success of his productive 
action might he become a wealthy consumer realising his wishes. He is not a sovereign 
consumer on a general market, but rather a subject who has to adjust his skills (formerly 
described as his ‘labour-power’) and/or other commodities he has for sale; that is to say, in 
the first instance he is the productive subject to whom Hayek’s and Mises’ discourses are 
here directed. This productive subject implies both the existence of the productive capital of 
the capitalist and the labour power of the worker, and their mutual social composition. 
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!
Therefore, what is at stake here is not simply individual consumption or individual 
production, but social production and the maximum productivity of such production. In his 
cited text, Hayek states that he is concerned precisely with the condition of prolonging this 
self-intensifying social production, and that only prolongation and intensification of this form 
of social production leads to creation of a genuine individual. Thus he situates himself in a 
lineage of  ‘the great individualist writers’,   whose ‘chief concern (…) was indeed to find a 198
set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives 
which determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the needs of all 
others.’   In other words the aim is to create a society in which the subject ‘is to make as 199
great a contribution to the common purposes of society as he is capable of making’,   to 200
‘keep the stream of production flowing and, if possible, increasing.’   This is affirmed by 201
Mises, who states that the function of the most intensely ‘market-like’ mechanism - that is, 
the mechanism of competition - is to ‘assign to every member of a social system that position 
in which he can best serve the whole of society and all its members’.   202
!
The overall beneficial outcome of achieving maximum social productivity - a state of affairs 
in which the drive for individual success brings about the common good of the social whole - 
might be secured only when the spontaneous order of market-institution is secured. For this 
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to be achieved ‘our personal sense of justice’,   which ‘so frequently revolts against the 203
impersonal decisions of the market’,   must be made to accept the results of the market-204
regulated economic process. And this is done when the individual submits his personal 
judgement to the forces of the extra-individual social production which exceeds the restricted 
cognitive abilities of each and every individual. This acceptance is exercised and executed by 
‘the hard discipline of the market’.   205
!
Therefore, we can clearly see that if economics/economy is here considered a discipline, then 
it is a form of discipline not only as a branch of theoretical knowledge but also in all the 
richness of the original meaning of the term - i.e. ‘instruction given’, ‘order necessary for 
instruction’ and ‘treatment that corrects or punishes’.   It would be wrong to consider our 206
problematic as confined to the sphere of purely theoretical, epistemic questions of economics 
without any importance to the economy. The rhetorical situation in which the appeal is being 
made is that of convincing a subject the productive to accept the supposedly unanalysable 
pre-judgements or presuppositions of economics as ultimately given - here interestingly 
converted into the acceptance of the results of the interplay of market forces. Thus, we 
discover that we are dealing with a question (and an implied answer) that does not consider 
only professionals in economics but all economic subjects operating in the market, trying to 
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become wealthy consumers by means of being competitive producers, willing to adjust to 
fluctuations of the market. 
!
This is more explicit and visible in Hayek’s text, as he openly addresses a specific subject in 
the market: a subject who would like to ‘revolt’   against the necessity of ‘a submission 207
which must include not only the acceptance of rules of behavior as valid without examining 
what depends in the particular instance on their being observed but also a readiness to adjust 
himself to changes which may profoundly affect his fortunes and opportunities and the causes 
of which may be altogether unintelligible to him.’   Here discipline refers not only to a 208
disembodied subject of knowledge, but to the actual living, productive subject engaged in the 
workings of the market within whom ‘the craving for intelligibility’   of the social processes 209
is intimately linked to specific claims concerning ‘distributive justice’.   As such, the 210
adjustment required is not simply a cognitive process which would concern only economists 
engaged in the science of economics, but also the subject of production who should adjust his 
or her behaviour to the changes brought about by the actual results of the economic process. 
!
However, as we will see below, a closer reading of the Misesian notion of ‘ultimate givens’ 
also reveals that this concept has been forged not only against the pretences for knowledge of 
professional economists or even social reformers, but also against the claims for a different 
social distribution of consumption and a different organisation of the process of production. 
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Both Mises’ and Hayek’s rhetorical strategies work also against the pretences of those 
workers who would dream of the control of the production process and of transformation of 
the conditions in which their labour is performed. Following the concept of the ultimate given 
to the hidden abode, where it has been forged, will take us precisely to the sphere of 
production. Let us then proceed towards the analysis of the first element of production - 
labour. 
!
2. Labour as ultimately given tedium 
!
Inside the framework of what we will later attempt to define as the dominant economy/
economics both ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ might appear as given. The effort to produce the 
appearance of such givenness in the case of labour can be clearly seen in Mises’ work. 
According to the Austrian economist, labour is fundamentally a ‘datum’.   What he means 211
by this not that it is impossible to transform labour’s technical productivity or to shorten the 
working day. On the contrary, he claims that 
!
in the course of human history, concomitantly with the progressive increase in 
the physical productivity of labour brought about by technological 
improvement and a more abundant supply of capital, by and large a tendency 
towards shortening the hours of work developed. Among the amenities which 
civilized man can enjoy in a more abundant way than his less civilized 
ancestors there is also an enjoyment of more leisure time. In this sense one can 
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answer the question, often raised by philosophers and philanthropists, whether 
or not economic progress has made men happier.   212
!
What Mises states here is that the shortening of the working day is not a result of complex 
interrelations of technical innovations and the social struggles of workers, trade unionists, 
capitalists, factory inspectors, journalists, preachers, etc.,   but simply a direct and automatic 213
outcome of the growing technical productivity. This thesis might be explained by Mises’ 
political hostility to labour unions and to the idea of collective barging and his unwillingness 
to see a possible conflict of interest between the labourers (who, for example, might want to 
get more money for less work) and their bosses (wanting the workers to work more for less 
money). However, for Mises it is also a matter grounded in the fundaments of his theory of 
action and, consequently, in his theory of labour. According to Mises action is always 
triggered by a lack - a lack of perfection which produces uneasiness.   Thus: 214
!
The only method of dealing with the problem of action is to conceive that 
action ultimately aims at bringing about a state of affairs in which there is no 
longer any action, whether because uneasiness has been removed or because 
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any further removal of felt uneasiness is out of the question. Action thus tends 
toward a state of rest, absence of action.   215
!
The same applies to the specific kind of action called labour. The end of labour is external [to 
it. It is labour’s opposite - non-labour. This, Mises says, is the categorical reason that explains 
why the working day is shortened as soon as this becomes technically possible thanks to 
increased productivity. As soon as ‘men’ can avoid labour, they do so. This happens because 
labour, according to Mises, is inherently something they want to avoid. Labour is inherently 
perceived and experienced by human beings as a necessary evil. The labouring subject is 
motivated chiefly by external incentives; if these were absent the subject would prefer not to 
work (i.e. to rest). There are two major external incentives: the need to reduce uneasiness by 
improving one’s conditions (by, say, building a better home for oneself), and the external 
motivator of money. In a developed market economy these two incentives become 
interconnected (one works more productively in order to get more money, for instance, to be 
able to buy or rent a nicer house in a better part of town). Of course, Mises acknowledges the 
existence of some external motivators other than money, which could convince subjects to 
work. These are social prestige derived from one’s position in the production process, 
satisfaction derived from achieving technical mastery over the matter of production, and - 
interestingly - pressure and depression (the worker ‘submits to the disutility of labour in order 
to forget, to escape from depressing thoughts and banish annoying moods’  ). Moreover, the 216
Austrian economist also mentions ‘instances of genuine immediately gratifying labour which, 
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under special conditions, small quantitates provide immediate gratification.’   In other 217
words, he acknowledges that labour could be perceived and experienced as an end in itself, as 
an action without an external end, as an action which is not done solely in order to achieve 
the state of non-action. Nevertheless, he immediately adds that ‘these quantitates are so 
insignificant that they do not play any role at all in the complex of human action and 
production for the satisfaction of wants.’   Thus it can be accepted as a rule that primarily 218
and usually people tend to avoid labouring in the absence of stronger external incitements 
(reduction of unbearable uneasiness, increment of social prestige, technical mastery, 
dispersion of depression and, above all else, money), which could displace their natural drive 
for non-action (rest) and force them to work.   219
!
Therefore, it is pure, given and ultimate ‘disutility attached to labor’   that explains the 220
automatic shortening of the working day. The assumption that labour will always be avoided 
in the absence of external motivators leads to the conclusion that labour is given ultimately 
and necessarily as ‘tedium’.   What Mises aims at, when he tries to define labour as ‘datum’, 221
is presenting ‘the disutility of labour (…) as a phenomenon unconditionally given’.   This 222
argumentative strategy is applied in order to shorten the distance that might arise in the mind 
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of the reader between the unavoidable’ and ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ expenditure of energy 
bound to labour and the specific tedium produced by a particular form labour takes under a 
specific social organisation. The political end of such an argument is openly announced by 
Mises himself. The subject - especially the specific subject of production known as the 
worker - should know that labour in its present form is ultimately given. He should accept the 
way he works and thanks to this acceptance, work more happily. Otherwise the worker 
becomes possessed by resentment. He starts to pity himself ‘as the defenceless victim of an 
absurd and unjust system. He becomes an ill-humored grumbler, an unbalanced personality, 
an easy prey to all sorts of quacks and cranks.’   ‘The worker begins to hate his work if he 223
becomes convinced that what makes him submit to the disutility of labour is not his own 
higher valuation of the stipulated compensation, but merely the unfair social system.’   All 224
this happens when the labourer, ‘[d]eluded by the slogans of the socialist propagandists, (…) 
fails to realize that the disutility of labour is an inexorable fact of human conditions, 
something ultimately given that cannot be removed by devices or methods of social 
organisation.’   Thus, faced with the delusive demands of agitated workers, it is necessary to 225
reaffirm the naturally given and unchangeable - not socially constructed and non-
transformable - character of the disutility of labour.  
!
Labour is and always be tedium and no social reforms can change this state of affairs. Mises 
ridicules a vision of a society of liberated work. In such a world: 
!
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The time which is not required for recreation and restoration of the capacity to 
work, used up by previous working, would be entirely devoted to work. Every 
nonutilization of the full capacity to work would be deemed a loss. (…) 
Everybody would consider his whole capacity to work as a supply of factors 
of production which he would be anxious to utilize completely.    226
!
But such a world, Mises says, is an unrealisable fantasy. Labour - and the disutility present in 
it - is the eternal precondition, independent of any form of social organisation. Labour 
appears as a natural datum present throughout the history of humankind and the progress of 
technology seems not to transform the inner core of labour. Historical technological progress 
merely pushes the external borders of labour, so to speak, from beyond, reducing the field of 
labour by leading to the shortening of the time devoted to it. Labour is thus defined 
negatively as: (1) disutility which is normally and naturally avoided, and (2) as something 
that is progressively and automatically reduced thanks to the development of civilisation (i.e. 
with the development of capitalism), by means of growing technological productivity.  
!
3. Labour as sacrifice 
!
One way to grasp both the specificity of the Misesian-Hayekian approach and the continuity 
between the Austrian and the classical and neoclassical economics in our spheres of interest - 
a continuity based on the participation of the Austrian school in the creation of the dispositive 
of the dominant economics/economy - will be comparison with both ‘classical’ and 
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‘unorthodox’ authors. In the case currently analysed - that is, the case of labour - one could 
say that, in his negative definition of labour, Mises is in accordance with the classical 
political economy of Adam Smith. According to Smith, the working subject 
!
must always give up the identical portion of his tranquillity, his freedom, and 
his happiness. Whatever may be the quantity or composition of the 
commodities he obtains in reward of his work, the price he pays is always the 
same. Of course, this price may buy sometimes a lesser, sometimes a greater 
quantity of these commodities, but only because their value changes, not the 
value of the labour which buys them. Labour alone, therefore, never changes 
its own value.    227
!
A commentary by another, unorthodox, author, who wrote extensively on Smith’s theory of 
labour and who truly hated by Mises  - Karl Marx - might be of some use here, in grasping 
both the discontinuity and continuity between the ‘classical’ and ‘the Austrian’ 
understandings of labour. According to the classical understanding, exemplified by Smith, 
labour must always be a sacrifice - a sacrifice of free time. Labour - and here Smith and 
Mises are in agreement - is done in order not to labour, the end of labour is non-labour; the 
lack of activity is the aim of activity. As we will recall, according to Mises, ’The incentive 
that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of 
his affairs would have no incentive to change things. He would have no wishes nor desires; 
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he would be perfectly happy. He would not act; he would simply live free from care.’   As a 228
consequence, for both Mises and Smith, ‘“tranquility” appears as identical with “freedom” 
and “happiness.”’   This state of eternal rest is ultimately unachievable by any human being 229
(there will be always - Mises says - some uneasiness to be removed, there is no perfectibility 
that can really be achieved). Nevertheless, striving for eternal rest (an absolute end to action) 
is real as the driving force of actual, non-perfect, this-worldly action. The fact that this ideal 
is and must remain unachievable is precisely the reason why acting and labouring will never 
stop, the ideal of eternal peace as the lack of action is what moves action forward - 
specifically labour - and it is a perfect motivator for the never-ending mobilisation of acting 
and labouring subjects. 
!
Marx, for his part, perceives this state of affairs - when labour is perceived merely negatively, 
solely as a means to an end - as being, not a transhistorical ultimate and unchangeable given, 
but merely a historical and non-necessary product of a particular social organisation. Marx 
does not deny the fact that under past and present social organisations of labour, labouring 
indeed has been perceived and experienced as ‘tedium’ and as externally imposed 
compulsion driven by external motivators (threat of direct, political violence; the economic 
threat of exclusion from consumption). As such, by Marx’s account, Smith is right, but only 
to the extent that ‘in its historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour and wage-labour, labour 
always appears as repulsive, always as external forced labour; and not-labour as “freedom 
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and happiness”’.   Smith’s statement is true, to the extent to which it is a correlate of a 230
particular historical form of the social organisation of production. However, it is not 
absolutely true in that it does not take account of some important historically existing forms 
of labour,   it does not give full account of the element of ‘self-realisation’ present in labour 231
even in its present form of wage-labour,   and finally it pays no heed to the future 232
possibilities for liberating labour.   People in the past have produced not only because they 233
were afraid of external violence and exclusion from consumption; people in the present work 
not only because they want to bring labour to an end; people in the future might organise 
labour in such a way that the self-gratifying dimension of labouring for labour’s sake will be 
strengthened. 
!
However, as we will recall, Mises does not believe that such dimensions of past, present or 
future possible labour - dimensions which cannot be reduced to external motivations of 
labour, but rather find an inner gratification in the very activity - are of any importance to 
economics/economy. Labour, according to the Austrian scholar, always was, is and always 
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will be an activity motivated decisively by external incentives, by the will to end our 
labouring. But here a problem arises. If Mises is to hold the view that labour (and action as 
such), is always motivated by uneasiness, and if he is to believe that there can be no true 
tranquillity in action, that labour can have nothing other than ‘a purely negative 
characterization’, then it will have to manifest as a ‘sacrifice’ of that which people really 
value - that is, their free time. But, as we have seen, Mises has defined economics/economy 
as fundamentally opposed to theology/theocracy and all the theological doctrines and 
theocratic regimes as constituted by the necessity for sacrifice. Thus, economics/economy is 
presented as fundamentally anti-sacrificial. What follows is that the element of sacrifice has 
to be dealt with and repulsed if economics/economy is to maintain its economic (that is 
secular, non-sacrificial) self-understanding. 
!
But, as we have seen, this cannot be done solely by reference to the growing technical 
productivity brought about by a more abundant application of capital, which implicitly 
promises the automatic shortening of the working day. While this promise (if it indeed is true) 
might reduce the extent of the sacrificial system of labour from the outside, it cannot 
transform or reform labour’s inner nature, which is inherently one of disutility. With the 
growing productivity of labour, we could labour less, but labour will still inherently be a 
sacrifice. The path Mises takes in order to bypass the problem of the sacrificial character of 
labour leads in a different direction. He adopts a change in valuation, by intensifying the 
‘subjectivist’ interpretation of value. While Marx accuses Smith of treating labour solely 
‘psychologically, as to the fun or displeasure it holds for the individual’,   and criticises the 234
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author of the Wealth of the Nations as being unable to go beyond a passive and unconscious 
expression of the historically and socially conditioned ‘subjective relation of the wage worker 
to his activity’,   Mises pushes this ‘subjectivist’ tendency forward in order to get rid of the 235
problem of sacrifice. Doing this, he follows the ‘marginalist’ or ‘subjectivist revolution’ in 
economics.   According to this view, labour cannot be counted as sacrifice, since it is 236
performed by an individual out of a higher valuation given to his labour by him/herself. The 
individual labours because - according to his/her own individual value judgement - the labour 
will be compensated with a more highly valued improvement of his/her individual situation, 
bringing about reduction of uneasiness and/or a supply of money. What is more, Mises states 
that this individual valuation is, generally and objectively speaking, correct. The application 
of labour (as long as it follows the prescripts of economic science) brings about improvement 
of the situation of the individual in question. As we have heard, a normal labourer (that is, a 
labourer who has not yet been ‘deluded by the slogans of the socialist propagandists’  ) 237
labours thanks to ‘his own higher valuation of the stipulated compensation’.   In other 238
words, the labouring subject labours because it has evaluated labouring in its particular case 
as something that will bring more utility than leisure would have brought - and in doing so, it 
is objectively right. In contrast to the theocratic and cryptotheocratic social regimes, which 
have forced the acting subject to incessantly sacrifice his immediate happiness and individual 
gains for the sake of a ‘higher good’ (unachievable for the individual in question within his 
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lifetime), the labour of a labourer in the secular, economic order ‘results in an immediate and 
recognizable improvement of his conditions. (…) For what the individual must sacrifice for 
the sake of society he is amply compensated by greater advantages.’   That is the reason why 239
‘His sacrifice is only apparent and temporary’.   240
!
We can see now how the promise of compensation is turned against the idea of labour as 
sacrifice. This is an extremely important moment in the Misesian system, confronting us in 
our work with two interlinked significant problems. Firstly, the problem of the nature of the 
hidden, implicit and invisible fundamental laws of economic activity and their relations to 
explicit laws proclaimed by the dominant economic discourse. And secondly, with the 
question of time - or to be more precise, with the question of temporalities, i.e. modalities of 
time - present in such an economic ordering. In the first problem, if sacrifice is merely 
apparent, then what is implied is that there are more fundamental laws beyond the level of 
appearance. In the second, if we are to judge an individual sacrifice as merely temporary, we 
have to be able to indicate a proper time-perspective - a point in time from which sacrifice 
could finally be judged as passing, and a modality of experiencing time in the present, which 
would enable the subject to conceive of its sacrifices as merely transitory. In other words, if 
the merely apparent character of sacrifice is to be demonstrated, then the laws operating 
below the level of the apparent have to be somehow exposed and explicated, in order to 
suspend the individual’s judgement which has a tendency to value labour in its present 
conditions as a sacrifice of happiness and free time. Moreover, if the subject is to be 
convinced that its sacrifice will, in the end, prove itself to be merely temporary, then a 
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specific time-place of judgement and a specifically present temporality of experiencing time - 
which would justify this valuation of sacrifice as merely passing - has to be constructed. 
!
At this point, however, we still lack the tools necessary for a proper analysis of this 
problematic, and we will not be in possession of such adequate tools until the three crucial 
operators of our process - judgement, nature and time - are analysed. What is more, it seems 
that the analysis of labour, as re-constructed by Mises, can take us no further in explicating 
these problems. Labour, according to the Austrian scholar, appears as inherently ahistorical 
and essentially atemporal. Furthermore, it is implied that its importance will historically, 
progressively diminish. This hypothesis of the negative and diminishing character of labour 
seems to express the dominant contemporary view of labour and, in some distorted way, 
seems to express also labour’s actual situation: we rarely consider our societies as societies of 
workers; the institutions which have organised labour as a relatively autonomous and self-
conscious political power confronted with capital (trade unions, workers parties) have 
weakened; the labour share in GDP has progressively diminished or stagnated. It seems that 
with the progress of technology, with the growing importance of non-human factors of 
production, labour can neither explain the nature of the economic laws, nor determine the 
historical changeability and velocity of economics/economy, since it no longer drives the 
progress of the process. 
!
We have seen that in the Misesian conceptualisation, the importance of labour is diminished 
by means of the application of labour’s apparent ‘other’ - capital. According to the author of 
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Human Action it is a ‘more abundant supply of capital’   which automatically reduces the 241
time spent at work, this being a criterion of the progress of civilisation. It is progress of 
capitalism which effectuates and secures all human progress. We can see, then, that both the 
actively determining power of economic laws and their change and changeability have been 
transferred from labour to capital. It is in the concept-device of capital, wherein both the 
problems of time (the progress of time, the progress of history) and the problems of the laws 
governing this process-progress are condensed. Not only is capital pictured by Mises and 
Hayek as a specific outcome of historical evolution, but the very essence of capital appears to 
be progress itself. Thus, if we want to pave the way for a proper analysis of the problem of 
the nature of the implicit laws governing the process of economic development in the 
progress of time, and if we are to see how the dominant economics/economy deals with the 
recurrent problem of labour as sacrifice by means of exposition of the invisible future laws of 
economic processes and by the enforcement of a specific future-oriented way of experiencing 
time, then we must proceed towards the task of defining the second element of production: 
capital. 
!
Chapter III Specific subject-matters: capitalism   
!
1. Capital as a naturally given category 
!
It might seem that the characteristic of givenness, coupled with the absoluteness of 
indispensable and unchangeable physical laws applies naturally to labour, but not to capital. 
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Treating labour as ultimately given appears more natural, because ‘labour’ seems to be 
something we find (even if in differing forms) in all the historical regimes of production. But, 
intriguingly, the dominant economic discourse from its beginnings until the present day has 
often pictured not only labour but also capital as a naturally acceptable and necessary 
category. This transhistorical and retrogressive mode of thinking of capital - a mode of 
thinking which projects historically specific social forms, which have become dominant 
under a specific social regime, back onto the whole history of humankind, picturing them as 
if they have always been there - might be found, for instance, in Robert Torrens’ (born 1780) 
account of the history of capital: ‘In the first stone which the savage flings at the wild animal 
he pursues, in the first stick that he seizes to strike down the fruit which hangs above his 
reach, we see the appropriation of one article for the purpose of aiding the acquisition of 
another, and thus discover the origin of capital.’   A similar transhistorical understanding of 242
capital is implied in the definition of capital given by Gregory Mankiw who, two centuries 
after Torrens, writes in his Principles of Economics that capital is ‘The stock of equipment 
and structures used for production.’   The economy’s capital represents the accumulation of 243
goods produced in the past that are being used in the present to produce new goods and 
services. 
!
However, the ‘Torrensian-Mankiwan’ argument is far more complex than it might seem at 
first glance. Torrens, for his part, does not state that the stone of a ‘caveman’ simply is 
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capital. What is being said here is that capital has its origin in the means of production of the 
‘savage’. In the same way capital ‘represents’ the ‘accumulated’ past history of the means of 
production. What this tacitly presupposes is that here the origin is not undetermined but 
rather remains directed by the end towards which it gravitates - at the end of a fully 
developed stone-tool there is, finally, capital. ‘Representation’ retrospectively establishes all 
the past accumulated efforts as gravitating towards becoming capital. Stones and all the other 
imaginable means of production used by ‘men’ have always already been capital (at least in 
nuce). What is at work here is, therefore, a specific teleology which presumes that the 
progress of societies leads necessarily from a primitive state towards a full-blown capitalist 
society. Capital is already implicitly and invisibly present in all the pre-capitalist cultures and 
in all the useful means of production. Such a refined implied Torrensian-Mankiwian 
reasoning is (implicitly) present in an influential work that tries to grasp the cryptotheological 
nature of capitalism: Derrida’s famous Spectres of Marx. As Derrida says in his cryptic 
language, 
!
Just as there is no pure use, there is no use-value which the possibility of 
exchange and commerce (by whatever name one calls it, meaning itself, value, 
culture, spirit [!], signification, the world, the relation to the other, and first of 
all the simple form and trace of the other) has not in advance inscribed in an 
out-of-use  - an excessive signification that cannot be reduced to the useless. A 
culture began before culture - and humanity. Capitalization also.   244
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Derrida’s attack is directed against Marxists, who he accuses of believing in the existence of 
‘pure use-value’, which supposedly exists, or at least has existed, in some ahistorical sphere 
of natural use, beyond the reach of the capitalist-historical tendencies. However, according to 
Derrida, use-value cannot operate as the opposite of the capitalist exchange-value, as the 
capitalising exchange-value has always been there from the very beginning as a spectre 
haunting all past social formations, or - to use a more Marxian metaphor - as a virtual virus. 
What this implies is that all possible exchanges and, indeed, all the excesses of valorisation, 
all the surpluses of matter and meaning which have exceed the supposed pure utility and 
which gave energy to culture and spirit, have always already been - potentially and 
necessarily - capitalist. The global market has always been there in nuce, already in the 
barter-exchange of shells between primitive tribes of fishermen; already in the very first act 
of substituting one thing for the other in the metaphors of poetry; already in the first real 
sacrifice that substituted the life of one being for the life of the other .   245
!
The specific teleology implied in this retrospective reasoning - which identifies all culture, 
meaning and spirit with exchange, and all exchange with the capitalist form of exchange - is 
the following. There has been exchange (= production of exchange-value = production of 
surplus = production of culture/meaning/spirit) in every historical, human society, thus every 
society is potentially-necessarily capitalist. All the past cultures - by virtue of the mere fact of 
being cultures at all, i.e. by virtue of valorising things beyond utility - have always been 
inhabited by the capitalist virus. Whenever the immunological systems of these societies, 
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aimed at expelling usury and chrematistics as sin - that is, at exorcising the possibility of 
selling time and making money for the sake of making more money - has weakened, the ever-
present virus has attacked and prevailed. When blockages and obstacles have been lifted, 
exchange has immediately matured into the capitalist exchange (which, in truth, it has always 
been), realising its ever present, natural potential. The only condition for the emergence of 
capitalism is ‘negative’ - once the obstructions have been removed, the natural (or cultural or 
eternal or spiritual) tendency to give value, to abstract, to exchange, has been liberated. What 
is implied by this reasoning is that market economy is a naturally developing tendency. In 
order to flourish it needs nothing other than the abolition of the institutions that have been 
blocking its spontaneous growth. When the blockages impeding the growth of the 
unhampered market are eradicated, when the external intervention stops, the liberated, natural 
market-tendency prevails. As a British historian, Ellen Meiksins Wood, has stated, many 
accounts of the origin of capitalism (including many Marxists’ accounts) seem to presuppose 
that capitalism 
!
only needs to be released from its chains - for instance, from the fetters of 
feudalism - to be allowed to grow and mature. Typically, these fetters are 
political: the parasitic powers of lordship, or the restrictions of an autocratic 
state. Sometimes they are cultural or ideological: perhaps the wrong religion. 
These constraints confine the free movement of ‘economic’ actors, the free 
expression of economic rationality.   246
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To highlight what is at stake here I propose that we refer to a terminology elaborated within a 
different milieu, but referring to the same problem: that of specific positive techniques or 
devices necessary for the construction of the peculiar historical dispositive called capitalism. 
Such a useful terminology, which might philosophically strengthen the methodological 
insights presented in the quoted fragment from the work of E.M. Wood, can be found in the 
work of Michel Foucault. Although Wood, like many exponents of the British tradition of 
social history, has remained sceptical of the French ‘postmodernism’,   and despite the 247
actual differences between them, both these authors have shared the conviction that 
capitalism should be understood as a specific positivity, thus rejecting what Foucault calls the 
repressive hypothesis. Foucault famously argued against this hypothesis, which 
conceptualises ‘sexuality’ as something that develops spontaneously, something that 
blossoms as soon as the negative barriers, fetters or shackles are taken off. In contrast, 
Foucault tried to demonstrate that the belief that the deployment of sexuality has come into 
being with ‘only the removing of an obstacle (..) is precisely what needs to be examined’.  248
Thus, both Foucault and Wood try to present the objects of their enquiry - ‘capitalism’ and 
‘sexuality’ - as phenomena that are constructed and produced, things requiring 
‘intervention’,   by means of the construction of ‘stimulations and constraining 249
mechanisms’,   and  the production of ‘incitements’.    250 251
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!
If we were to sum up this kind of critique of the ‘Torrensian-Mankiwian-Derridian’ 
understanding of capital in the briefest possible manner, we could say that such 
conceptualisations treat capital as a naturally given category. Such a ‘naive naturalism’ 
defines ‘the market (…) as a sort of given of nature, something produced spontaneously 
which the state must respect precisely in as much as it is a natural datum.’   Capital and 252
capitalist social order could be conceived as naturally given in a threefold sense.  
!
Firstly, as a natural element in human action and thought. Capital appears as if it has always 
been there as a transhistorical category present in all action and thought in all past social 
regimes. Secondly, capitalism (that is, a social order in which capital predominates) presents 
itself as a natural tendency, which, in order to come to its full potential, requires only 
abolition of artificial blockages, which are typically produced by the intervening state. The 
expansion of capitalism thus appears as a correlate to the limitation of the extent of state 
intervention. As such, capitalism is not understood as a specifically constructed dis-positive, 
requiring a positive framework constituted of customs, disciplines and institutions (including 
the institutions of the state and the traditional legitimations produced by religion). Rather, it 
would be a precondition and a result of natural human development; a natural tendency 
which does not need embedment in an external institutional framework. Thirdly, capitalism 
appears as an order that need not be rooted in any meta-order. Explicit norms and laws of 
capital will not refer to any transcendent or implicit - not to mention unknowable - meta-
laws. As such, capitalism does not need, for example, religion to back its claims. It appears as 
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a completed, immanent naturalism with no need for legitimation in any transcendent or 
transcendental ordering. In the same sense it will appear as a natural product of necessary 
evolution, conceived according to the original meaning of  the word evolvere as unfolding or 
unwinding.    253
!
Thus, in accordance to this naturalist conceptualisation of capital, all history appears as the 
universal natural history of capitalism, realising the ever present tendency of all human 
culture/spirit towards capitalisation. Capitalisation appears as the process of the liberation of 
the market forces from the externally imposed fetters of social institutions. Furthermore, 
these liberated forces appear in no need of being embedded in social institutions, customs, 
traditions and disciplines that would transcend the actual, natural market order in the 
direction of some higher (especially religiously transcendent) order. Thus, capitalism seems 
to be a fully developed and realised naturalism.  
!
2. Apparent critique of naturalisation of capital and capitalism 
!
It seems that neoliberals in the mould of Mises and Hayek are far from holding to such a 
naturalism. They counterpose it with a conceptualisation of capital and capitalism that 
emphasises historicity. This historicity should be understood in two directions: forwards (in 
relation to the unknown future) and backwards (in relation to the contingent, non-necessary 
past). The dimensions of historicity, change, unpredictability, and dynamism are proclaimed 
to be the very essence of the human action as such - the essence of the most dynamic human 
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activity - economy - and the essence of the most dynamic economic category - capital. As 
such, human life itself is defined as the activity of dealing with an uncertain future, economic 
activity of all kinds is essentially speculation on future profits, and capital as such is the most 
refined device to deal with the inherent uncertainty, by avoiding losses and bringing about 
gains. As for the backwards looking perspective, history is presented as an evolutionary 
process, not in the old, metaphysical and static sense (i.e. as the unfolding of an ever-present 
pattern which has always been there in nuce), but rather as an incessant adaptation to 
contingent and ever-changing events. 
!
Schematically speaking, Mises and Hayek claim to reject the ahistorical, ‘necessarian’, 
‘metaphysical’ beliefs. Firstly, they claim that capital is not an ahistorical category of all 
human practice and theory, present throughout the whole history of mankind. Rather, it as a 
specific category, which makes sense only in a particular, historical social system called 
capitalism. Secondly, they state that a negative condition - the lack of state intervention - is 
not sufficient to create a capitalist order. Rather, it requires positive, pro-market state activity 
and the imposition of a historically specific framework of customs, disciplines and 
institutions, which would safe-guard capital’s production and reproduction - an order of 
transcendent or transcendental character, in which the market order would itself be 
embedded. Thirdly, they claim that there is no necessary development from the pre-capitalist 
towards the capitalist stage, as dictated by some unchangeable laws of evolution. Rather, such 
an evolution is the result of contingent, aleatory encounters, governed by unforeseeable laws 
that cannot become a matter of prediction or conscious engineering. As such, the order of the 
laws of capitalist economy/economics is itself embedded in an ultimately unknowable matrix 
or meta-order consisting of the unknown and unknowable future laws. If it has an 
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evolutionary character, it refers to evolution understood non-metaphysically as a process of 
incessant adaptation to unforeseeable future circumstances. Mises and Hayek claim that their 
theory, unlike the mainstream economics, gives account of these characteristics of historical 
contingency and changeability. 
!
Thus it seems that - in contrast to what we have called cum grano salis, a Torrensian-
Mankiwian-Derridian conceptualisation of capital as a naturally given, naturally developing 
tendency and a naturally necessary outcome of the evolution of human history - the Misesian-
Hayekian conception of capital grasps properly capital’s specific historicity, and as a 
consequence understands that capitalism has itself to be embedded in a wider cultural 
framework of positively constructed traditions, creeds, customs, disciplines and institutions, 
which need to be preserved and cultivated, and, on a higher level of abstraction, within a 
meta-order of unpredictable and ultimately unintelligible laws of historical, contingent and 
truly evolutionary becoming. Now we will try to summarise the Misesian-Hayekian critique 
of naturalisation of the category of capital. Their premises are (1) the presentation of capital 
as a historically specific category achieving full validity only in a specific historical context; 
(2) the need for the embedment of capitalism in a wider set of customs, disciplines, 
institutions, etc., which actively shape a pro-capitalist environment, and which demonstrate a 
transcendental character; (3) the existence of invisible and unknowable meta-laws on which 
the laws of the development of capitalism are themselves dependent. 
!
In order to grasp the specificity of the Misesian-Hayekian understanding of capital I will once 
again compare and contrast it with another school of economic thinking, which shares the 
view of capitalism as a specifically structured, historical, social system - although its 
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understanding of historicity and of the nature of the meta-laws which determine the 
development of the historical laws of capitalism and their evolution differs significantly. This 
school of thought is Marxism.   Despite Mises’ hostility and Hayek’s scepticism towards the 254
founder of ‘historical materialism’, his conceptualisation of capitalism as a historically 
specific social system locates Mises and Hayek in the same theoretical camp as Marx, in 
contrast to other, less systematic and more eclectic schools, which have often failed to 
problematise the question of the historicity and specificity of capital and capitalism. This is 
why a juxtaposition of the Misesian-Hayekian conceptualisation of capital and capitalism 
with the Marxist terminology - taking into account both similarities and decisive differences 
between the two - will enable us to see more clearly how capital’s specificity is reconstructed 
by the two prominent Austrian economists. 
!
2.1. Capital as a historical category 
!
Let us then start with the first problem: the question of whether capital is a category 
applicable to all human action throughout history, as the ‘Torrensian’ line of thinking 
suggests. According to Mises, 
!
Looking backward from the cognition provided by modern accountancy to the 
conditions of the savage ancestors of the human race, we may say 
metaphorically that they too used ‘capital’. (…) Some economists concluded 
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therefore that ‘capital’ is a category of all human production, that it is present 
in every thinkable system of the conduct of production processes - i.e. no less 
in Robinson Crusoe’s involuntary hermitage than in a socialist society - and 
that it does not depend on monetary calculation. This is, however, a confusion. 
The concept of capital cannot be separated from the context of monetary 
calculation and from the social structure of a market economy in which alone 
monetary calculation is possible. It is a concept which makes no sense outside 
the conditions of a market economy. It plays a role exclusively in the plans 
and records of individuals acting (…) in such a system of private ownership of 
the means of production, and it developed with the spread of economic 
calculation in monetary terms.   255
!
For Mises, as for Marx, capitalism is an overall, determining ‘context’, a ‘system’, a 
connected whole. Let us then follow the conceptual constitution of capital in Mises’ writings, 
with moderate deployment of a particular strand of Marxist terminology.   The elements - 256
such as ‘a tool’ or ‘money’ or ‘labour’ - might enter into a specific interconnection with other 
elements. This creates a conjunction in which the elements may take hold, achieving a certain 
degree of consistency. A relatively consistent interconnection reproduces itself, by 
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reproducing its own conditions of reproduction and posing its own presuppositions. Now the 
elements form a self-reproducing connected whole, or a system. Existence in such a context 
transforms each of them. The function, power and nature of each element is deeply modified 
when it is connected with other elements and when it starts to co-constitute a system. 
!
This is the case with ‘capital’ and ‘free labour’. They have been joined by an aleatory 
encounter. Now, a capitalist-in-becoming, who happens to own the means of production and 
have free money to invest, is happy to meet a subject-becoming-worker, who happens not to 
have the means of production and is eager to get some money in the form of a wage for his 
consumption. The preconditions, or the conditions that make this encounter as necessary and 
unavoidable as possible, are incessantly produced and reproduced, by creating and 
reproducing subjects owning the means of production on the one hand, and subjects deprived 
of them on the other. The conjuncture is reproduced in such a way that the elements can take 
hold and form an interdependent, ‘self-reproducing’ system. 
!
Of course, some important elements now working as elements of the capitalist connected 
whole have existed before capitalism as a system has been formed (for example, clocks that 
informed the monastic regula vitae, and which were adapted later by the early manufacturing 
systems  ). The genealogy of these elements might go back to the previous social 257
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formations, and each of these elements might have a very different and even relatively 
independent genealogy. Mises, like Marx, acknowledges that both ‘money-capital’ and 
‘wage’ or ‘free’ labour have existed before capitalism came into being as the dominant mode 
of social organisation of production. There were wage-labourers before capitalism, there was 
money before capitalism, there was even ‘capital’ (in the form of usury or merchant 
capital)   before capitalism. These elements have existed - although very differently - before 258
our specific determining context emerged and developed. However, after entering this new 
specific, connected whole, a transformation of elements took place. This happened because 
their nature, power and function is not determined solely by their diachronic genealogy or 
filiation, but also by their synchronic conjunction with other elements.  
!
This transformation became possible not merely thanks to the formation of a specific 
constellation, but more precisely with the formation of a specific interconnection which has 
become predominant. According to both Mises and Marx, in each system there is a ‘specific 
kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and 
influence to the others.’   Marx explains this thesis in the following way, which might seem 259
compatible to a large extent with the Misesian view:  
!
For example with pastoral peoples (…) [c]ertain forms of tillage occur among 
them, sporadic ones. Landed property is determined by this. (…) [A]mong 
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peoples with a settled agriculture (…) where this predominates, as in antiquity 
and in the feudal order, even industry, together with its organization and the 
forms of property corresponding to it, has a more or less landed-proprietary 
character; is either completely dependent on it (…) or, as in the Middle Ages, 
imitates, within the city and its relations, the organization of the land. In the 
Middle Ages, capital itself - apart from pure money-capital - in the form of the 
traditional artisans’ tools etc., has this landed-propiertary character. In 
bourgeois society it is the opposite. Agriculture more and more becomes 
merely a branch of industry, and it is entirely dominated by capital.   260
!
In each system there is ‘a mode of production’ - a specific interconnection that predominates 
over other elements. It was the nomadic connection in the case of ‘pastoral peoples’, while it 
was feudally organised ‘land’ in the case of feudal societies. In the case of our society, what 
predominates over the rest, determining ‘the rank and influence’ of other elements, including 
land-owners and nomadic peoples, is capital.  
!
Being such a dominant form of social relation, capital cannot be reduced to the ‘stock’ of 
materially definable tools or machines (as Mankiw seems to believe). According to Mises, ‘if 
we abstract from the evaluation in money terms, the totality of the produced factors of 
production is merely an enumeration of physical quantities of thousands and thousands of 
various goods.’   But capital and the capitalist market ‘is not a place, a thing or a collective 261
!  109
!  Marx, Grundrisse, 107.  260
!  Mises, Human Action, 263.  261
Mateusz Piotrowski
entity.’   Rather, capitalism is ‘a process’   constituted by the incessant interaction of 262 263
individual processes of evaluations, created by an interplay of the ‘value judgements of 
individuals subjects,   organising their actions by means of a specific device of calculus. 264
Capital is thus a ‘device’ or   a ‘strategy’   used by the economic agents to calculate their 265 266
action in monetary terms in order ‘to make profits and avoid losses’.   As such, it becomes 267
the general or generalised mode of thinking and acting - although not of all action in all the 
past and all the future possible social systems, but only a general category of action and 
cognition in the market economy.    268
!
Capital achieves its full validity as the universally predominant category of acting and 
thinking only in a capitalist economy. In contrast, the money of a merchant in the third 
century BC, for example, or the tool of the ‘caveman’, might appear as ‘capital’ 
retrospectively, but they have existed as elements of very different social systems, determined 
by different dominant connections, these elements had a different power, function and nature. 
An element might appear the same - a stone-tool, a gold coin, a serf working for his master - 
but in the new ‘context’ it is deeply transformed. A good illustration of this thesis might be 
found if we analyse the mutations of the unfree labour of serfs in Central-Eastern Europe. In 
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the feudal system, between roughly the tenth and fourteenth centuries (in the case of the 
Kingdom of Poland), the ‘surplus’ produced by the serfs was directed to the feudal lord for, 
his consumption predominated by its ‘landed-propiertary’ or ‘territorialised’ character. 
However, with the entrance of the economies of Central-Eastern Europe into the orbit of the 
English and Dutch early capitalist economies, serf-labour was transformed. What was 
transformed was not the productivity of labour or the machinery applied (this remained 
unchanged almost to the beginnings of the nineteenth century). Thus, from the point of view 
of technical productivity, serf-labour might appear to have remained relatively unchanged 
and unaffected by entering the network of the capitalist connected whole. What was, 
however, indeed deeply transformed was the socially determining context. After becoming a 
peripheral element of the capitalist system, serf-labour was not directed solely towards a form 
of production that would fulfil the demands of the local, restricted feudal economy. It became 
connected to the chain of supply reaching to the markets of Amsterdam (and to a lesser extent 
London), where demand appeared to be virtually unlimited. Thus, landowners were 
motivated to increase the intensity of their exploitation of serf-labour by extending the 
working day in order to sell more products on the markets of Gdańsk.   Serfdom, which had 269
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been in decline at the end of the Middle Ages, got a ‘second life’ within a different connected 
whole.   270
!
Thus, in accordance with the Misesian and Marxian conceptualisations of capitalism, we note 
that elements cannot be fully understood without their determining context. Therefore, using 
the term ‘capital’ in reference to the means of production in past epochs can only be 
‘metaphorical’.   Otherwise it must be considered a grave anachronism; an interpretation 271
which takes an element (the money of an ancient merchant, a stone of the Palaeolithic hunter) 
out of its own system of thought and practice, abstracting it from the interconnectedness and 
the specific dominant, which determined the rank and influence of each element in its 
connected whole - an interconnected system very different from the one in which we live. As 
Mises claims against the Torrensian-Mankiwian-Derridian argument, only in this specific 
connected whole called ‘capitalism’ might the term ‘capital’ not be used anachronistically. 
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Thus, it appears that the naturalistic conceptualisation, which has conceived of capital as a 
universally valid, transhistorical category of all action, has been successfully rejected.  
!
2.2. Capitalism as a constructed and embedded order 
!
Let us now proceed to the second question: the problem of the social embedment of a specific 
historical system called capitalism and of the construction of a historically specific 
institutional framework adequate for it. Mises, and especially Hayek, did acknowledge the 
need to embed capitalism in a set of customs, disciplines and institutions that would actively 
shape a pro-capitalist environment. This implies not only specific tasks attributed to the 
institutions of the state but also a specific role afforded to religious traditions, their 
transcendent legitimation and transcendental laws.  
!
As for the state, the rejection of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ could be described as a re-evaluation 
of the traditional meaning of the term ‘laissez faire’. As Hayek states in The Constitution of 
Liberty: 
!
The range and variety of government action that is, at least in principle, 
reconcilable with a free system is (…) considerable. The old formulae of 
laissez faire or non-intervention do not provide us with an adequate criterion 
for distinguishing between what is and what is not admissible in a free system. 
There is ample scope for experimentation and improvement within that 
permanent legal framework which makes it possible for a free society to 
operate most efficiently. We can probably at no point be certain that we have 
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already found the best arrangements or institutions that will make the market 
economy work as beneficially as it could.    272
!
Here, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate state activity is not established 
according to the intensity or extension of state action, but according to its aims and 
principles. Illegitimate state activity, according to Hayek, is directed at aims that ‘cannot be 
achieved within the limits of the rule of law’,    and it is governed by principles, striving for 273
the realisation of the concrete aims of concrete social classes (say, the reduction of the 
poverty of the working masses).   Legitimate state activity implements abstract rules or 274
‘formal principles’,   equal for all, irrespective of their material, social position, while not 275
interfering with the market mechanism. Thus, as long as the state’s activity is governed by the 
right principles (establishment of abstract, universal rules, aimed at promoting the maximum 
optimal efficiency of the free market economy), its scope and intensity are virtually 
infinite.    276
!
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Hayek’s formulation seems to express the truth of the dominant economics/economy - that 
there must exist a framework of state institutions and traditions, in which the ‘market’ or 
‘capitalist’ order can itself be embedded - more openly, explicitly and self-consciously than 
many other currents of the dominant economics. It might seem  that Hayek’s thought could 
be situated within a general consensus, prevalent among the scholars critically assessing the 
dominant economics/economy. These scholars try to prove that ‘neoliberalism’ - against its 
own explicit anti-statist rhetoric - promotes ‘pro-market’ state intervention. This does not 
lead simply to ‘rolling back the state’, but to the proliferation of specific regulations,   to 277
construction of new positive juridico-technical mechanisms embedded in the government 
legislation,   and to growing state expenditure in proportion to GDP. This processes have 278
been explained in different terms: as the conservative nanny-state,   the doctrine of the 279
double truth of exoteric anti-statist populism and esoteric neoliberal state-interventionism,  280
or the embedment of neoliberal theory in actual social institutions and class power relations, 
producing a necessary discrepancy between the neoliberal theory and the variety of ‘actually 
existing neoliberalisms’.  All these are problems often raised and comprehensively 281
described in the relevant scholarship. What matters for our current question is that Hayek and 
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Mises acknowledge the fact that capitalism needs ‘positive’   and ‘well-constructed 282
institutions’.    283
!
It seems that Mises and Hayek share this view with the German ‘ordoliberals’, overcoming 
the naturalistic fallacy. Michel Foucault summarised the view of the German ‘ordoliberals’ 
on this matter as follows: 
!
Because, they say, when you deduce the principle of laissez-faire from the 
market economy, basically you are still in the grip of what could be called a 
“naive naturalism”, that is to say, whether you define the market by exchange 
or by competition you are thinking of it as a sort of given of nature, something 
produced spontaneously which the state must respect precisely inasmuch as it 
is a natural datum. But, the ordoliberals say (…) - this is naive naturalism.   284
!
In other words, ‘the market’, in order to come to full being, needs a specific institutional 
environment in which would be embedded. What is more, this environment cannot be 
reduced to explicit state regulations, but it must decisively include also implicit disciplines, 
traditions and customs - in short ‘irrational, or, rather, “unjustified” beliefs’   - and, as we 285
will recall, the validity of such beliefs (prejudgements) cannot be rationally demonstrated. 
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Nor is it (at least apparently) clear that acceptance of such disciplines-beliefs will be 
immediately beneficial for the individual interest of the subject in question; on the contrary, 
acceptance of the results of the market process in accordance with the market discipline 
might require apparent and temporary sacrifice and a willingness to leave behind individual 
interests in the present, in the hope of future gains. Thus, to motivate the individual subject to 
harmonise its interests with the interests of the maximisation of social production,   it is 286
necessary to call upon the meta-order of non-analysable laws.  
!
This is why, Hayek states, ‘we must preserve that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled 
and non-rational which is the only environment wherein reason can grow and operate 
effectively’.   In The Fatal Conceit Hayek gives an even more intriguing cryptotheological 287
description of the ‘extended order’ as ‘transcendent’ in relation to explicitly formulated and 
known laws of economics: 
!
There is no ready English or even German word that precisely characterises an 
extended order, or how its way of functioning contrasts with the rationalists’ 
requirements. The only appropriate word, ‘transcendent’, has been so misused 
that I hesitate to use it. In its literal meaning, however, it does concern that 
which far surpasses the reach of our understanding, wishes and purposes, and 
our sense perceptions, and that which incorporates and generates knowledge 
which no individual brain, or any single organisation, could possess or invent. 
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This is conspicuously so in its religious meaning, as we see for example in the 
Lord's Prayer, where it is asked that ‘Thy will [i.e., not mine] be done in earth 
as it is in heaven’; or in the Gospel, where it is declared: ‘Ye have not chosen 
me but I have chosen you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that 
your fruit should remain’ (St. John, 15:26).   288
!
A subject should rely on that what surpasses its limited understanding in order to be 
maximally productive for the social whole (‘to bear fruit’). Hayek seems to understand this 
economic postulate as a development or ‘addition’ to Christian ethics.   It thus might seem 289
that the market order advocated by Hayek would be a good ally of the traditional Judeo-
Christian religions, since, by acknowledging the necessity of being embedded in a kind of 
‘higher’ order, it seems to acknowledge the superiority of religion. The problem is, however, 
as we will see, far more complex. After bowing his knee before the ‘transcendent’ intuition 
present in religious tradition, Hayek immediately adds that 
!
a more purely transcendent ordering, which also happens to be a purely 
naturalistic ordering (not derived from any supernatural power), as for 
example in evolution, abandons the animism still present in religion: the idea 
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that a single brain or will (as for example, that of an omniscient God) could 
control and order.   290
!
As we will see, the idea of God inherited after the Judeo-Christian tradition will have to be 
deeply modified if it is to be of some use for the dominant economics/economy. This is 
because the anthropomorphic, personal character of the Divine within this tradition still gives 
too much room for possible socialist claims for distributive justice.   The God of the Jewish 291
Bible, or the incarnated God of the New Testament, is still all too human, and can still be 
asked to bring about ‘justice’. A more useful and appropriate image of the economic process-
without-subject - an image which, while possessing a higher degree of rationality than the 
individual, unlike the God of the Bible, cannot be asked to act justly - can be found 
elsewhere. The existence of invisible and unknowable meta-laws on which the laws of 
economics are themselves dependent can, according to Hayek, be explained more fully and 
adequately if we refer to a - rightly understood - theory of evolution. 
!
2.3. Capitalism as an effect of non-necessary evolution embedded in a meta-order!
!
As we will recall, we have contrasted the Misesian-Hayekian conceptualisation of capital and 
capitalism with a conceptualisation that has (1) considered capital to be a trans-historical 
category, (2) treated capital as a tendency, growing naturally - i.e. without need for the 
cultivation of a proper environment, and therefore without the construction of a positive 
framework of traditions and beliefs in which the laws of capitalist economy will themselves 
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be embedded. As such, these theories were criticised as naturalistic. This has led us to a third 
problem, which relates to the question of the ultimate dependency of the explicit economic 
laws on some higher meta-order of unknown, transcendental laws. This critique, however, 
itself refers to the idea of natural, biological, evolution. Thus, it could be said that it simply 
falls back into the ‘necessarian’ metaphysical evolutionism, abandoning the 
‘transcendent’ (or perhaps, more precisely, transcendental) and historicising perspective. 
However, also here we meet a crucial difference between the ‘naively naturalistic’ 
evolutionism and the model of transcendental historicising evolutionism, as proposed by 
Mises and Hayek. As we will see, this difference relies on the supposed ontological primacy 
given by Hayek and Mises to a specific temporality - that of the unknown and unknowable 
future. 
!
In the case of naively naturalistic evolutionism, evolution has been understood as the 
unfolding of an ever-present pattern, and as the actualisation of a tendency which has always 
been there and simply needed to be liberated from its artificial fetters to realise itself 
according to some metaphysically guaranteed necessary laws, whereas evolution as 
understood by Mises and Hayek appears to be conceived as, above all else, an aleatory 
process with unknown and unknowable results. Thus, it might seem that the 
conceptualisation of the evolution of capital and capitalism presented by Mises and Hayek - 
unlike that of ‘Torrensian’ ahistorical economists and philosophers - posits the problem of the 
fragility and historicity of a non-necessary human order in its very centre. This order, in its 
present shape (i.e. capitalism, or the ‘extended order’,   as Hayek calls it) is itself a result of 292
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‘contingent circumstances which could not have been forecast.’   As such, the Austrian 293
evolutionary theory of the history and historicity of capital and capitalism, outlined by Mises 
and refined and developed by Hayek, appears to be in direct contrast and opposition to the 
old ‘necessarian’ evolutionary philosophies of history. Hayek states that 
!
neither biological nor cultural evolution knows anything like ‘laws of 
evolution’ or ‘inevitable laws of historical development’ in the sense of laws 
governing necessary stages or phases through which the products of evolution 
must pass, and enabling the prediction of future developments. Cultural 
evolution is determined neither genetically nor otherwise, and its results are 
diversity, not uniformity. Those philosophers like Marx and Auguste Comte 
who have contended that our studies can lead to laws of evolution enabling the 
prediction of inevitable future developments are mistaken. In the past, 
evolutionary approaches to ethics have been discredited chiefly because 
evolution was wrongly connected with such alleged ‘laws of evolution’, 
whereas in fact the theory of evolution must emphatically repudiate such laws 
as impossible.   294
!
Therefore, ‘all evolution, cultural as well as biological, is a process of continuous adaptation 
to unforeseeable events’.   This is also the essence of the economic practical activity. An 295
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economic subject adjusts not only to the currently given state of affairs, but also, decisively, 
to the future, unknown results of the interplay of the market forces. As such, every truly 
economic subject - not only the one who operates on strictly financial markets speculating 
with financial assets, but every economic subject of action - should be understood and should 
understand itself as a genuine speculator; a speculator in the original meaning of the term - 
i.e. a subject trying to speculate on future events, in order to ‘divinise’ the turn reality (here, 
the market) will take. Such is the fate of each and every economic subject - such is the fate of 
each and every subject of action:  
!
The necessity to adjust his actions to other people’s actions makes him a 
speculator for whom success and failure depend on his greater or lesser ability 
to understand the future. Every action is a speculation.   296
!
This happens because the success or failure of an acting subject depends on following the 
right speculation, leading to an advanced adjustment. If an individual’s divination of the 
future laws of the market proves itself right, the individual subject will succeed and force its 
competitors out of business by achieving a competitive advantage over less far-sighted 
subjects, who adjust themselves to a change sluggishly, only after it actually comes to pass, 
while the more speculative subject is already ahead in the game. 
!
The same applies to populations. If a population survives and triumphs in an ever-changing 
environment, it happens because it manages to adjust itself better to the requirements of the 
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ever-changing reality (now, decisively shaped by the market). Historically, when the rules of 
the extended (capitalist) order were adapted they ‘enabled those groups practising them to 
procreate more successfully and to include outsiders.’   Those sectors of humanity that 297
adapted market-rules won the competition - by means of trade, colonisation and war, 
quickened by the military capacity of trading nations - against those that were reluctant to do 
so.   Such is, according to Hayek, the sense of the verse from The Book of Genesis, ‘be 298
fruitful and multiply’, meaning to subdue the earth and other peoples of the earth by means of 
military colonisation or a higher power of attraction of the market-directed way of life. When 
a population finally, by means of experimentation, attained a trace of the right track (the 
market way) leading in the direction of economic and demographic growth, its efforts to 
survive were quickened.   As Mises says, wherever a society managed to integrate market 299
discipline, allowing for quick adjustment to the changing markets, ‘population figures 
multiplied and the masses’ standard of living was raised to an unprecedented and hitherto 
undreamed level.’   300
!
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However, as we will recall, Mises and Hayek warn that such progress is by no means 
inevitable. The fact that progress is non-necessary is the basis on which the power of the 
threat of the extinction of humankind and of the extinction of a particular society rely. The 
threat works only when we suppose that social development can take a wrong turn (for 
example, when politicians under the pressure of irresponsible social movements intervene 
into the delicate mechanisms of the market, spoiling or even destroying it, and consequently 
endangering the very biological existence of humanity). The existence of the market order is 
fragile, and its triumph relies on that whether human subjects will be obedient the ‘teachings 
and warnings’ of economics. This is ‘no less than a matter of survival.’   If we follow the 301
market discipline, then civilisation will triumph. If we follow the opposite - i.e. the ‘socialist 
morality’   - we ‘would destroy much of present humankind and impoverish much of the 302
rest’,   we ‘will stamp out society and the human race’.   Thus, the prolongation of 303 304
capitalism and its future expansion have no metaphysical guarantee apart from the human 
will to follow the discipline of the market, which maintains the fragile mechanism of the 
extended order.  
!
Just as contemporary humankind can still fall back into regressive modes of behaviour which 
will ultimately bring about its own destruction, or at least diminish the progress of civilisation 
(including the demographic and economic growth), such was also the alternative in the past. 
Many societies have failed in their transition to capitalism. The progress did not have to take 
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place - a society might have remained pre-capitalist. In other words, it seems that neither 
Mises nor Hayek claim that progress has necessarily to occur in the actual course of human 
history. It seems that capitalism itself is a historical effect, ’the product of a long evolutionary 
process’.   Humanity could have remained at a primitive stage of pre-capitalist development 305
in the past. Thus, the same characteristic of non-necessity seems to apply to past history. The 
past was by no means necessary. We tend to forget this when we look back from the present 
perspective, seeing that it actually did happen, and making an illegitimate assumption that for 
this reason it had to happen the way it did. We look at history as a ready-made result, we 
consider it as ‘past’, forgetting about the fact that it is only an outcome of the actions of 
people trying to deal with the essentially unforeseeable future: ‘at no moment in the process 
could individuals have designed, according to their purposes, the functions of the rules that 
gradually did form the order; and only later, and imperfectly and retrospectively, have we 
been able to begin to explain these formations in principle.’   306
!
We can see that, both in our present and in the past, human behaviour is and has been 
dominated by the need to adjust itself to a genuinely unknown future. Adaptation to coming 
changes by divination of yet unknown future laws brings about a competitive advantage to 
individuals and populations in the market and in the natural environment. The process of 
biological evolution - just as in the market process - is therefore dominated by the specific 
modality of time: the unknown future, which determines the behaviour of individuals, 
populations and the whole of humanity, living in an incessant effort to adapt and adjust to 
these yet-unknown laws. 
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!
Our earlier claim, that acquired traditions serve as ‘adaptations to the 
unknown’, must then be taken literally. Adaptation to the unknown is the key 
in all evolution, and the totality of events to which the modern market order 
constantly adapts itself is indeed unknown to anybody.   307
!
Thus, it seems that if the Misesian-Hayekian theory of history is evolutionary, this does not 
mean that it would assume a necessary progress from one lower stage to another higher stage. 
As Mises states: 
!
It was one of the shortcomings of the nineteenth-century philosophies to have 
misinterpreted the meaning of cosmic change and to have smuggled into the 
theory of biological transformation the idea of progress. Looking backward 
from any given state of things to the states of the past one can fairly use the 
terms development and evolution in a neutral sense. Then evolution signifies 
the process which led from past conditions to the present. But one must guard 
against the fatal error of confusing change with improvement and evolution 
with evolution towards higher forms of life. Neither is it permissible to 
substitute a pseudoscientific anthropocentrism for anthropocentrism of 
religion and the older metaphysical doctrines.   308
!
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Consequently, it seems that the necessarian, and ‘metaphysical’ character of the older version 
of evolutionism (based on the idea of evolution as the unfolding of the ever-present pattern) 
is also refuted and replaced by a theory of evolution as a need for continual adaptation to 
unknown and unknowable future laws on the part of those individuals and populations that 
want to succeed. As such, the Hayekian-Misesian conceptualisation of capital and capitalism 
appears as an effective critique of the naive naturalism of the ‘metaphysical’ evolutionism. 
!
3. Capitalism as a natural-theological category 
!
However, a more careful analysis of such a critique of naturalising the understanding of 
capital and capitalism might produce some doubts as to whether Mises and Hayek, while 
indicating important points absent in the ‘Torrensian’ conceptualisation, really do justice to a 
peculiar and ambiguous mechanism present within it. It is also doubtful if Misesian and 
Hayekian accounts of capital and capitalism themselves can be judged as being free from this 
ambiguity. We will analyse them below, contrasting them at some points with unorthodox 
(especially Marxist) understandings of historical evolution, in order to made explicit a crucial 
prejudgement hidden in the ambiguity of the Misesian and Hayekian understanding of 
capital. Thanks to this ambiguity capital is presented as, at the same time, both historical and 
transhistorical; as embedded in a constructed environment and, at the same time, as the very 
principle of the construction of all the historical and natural orders; as the most naturalistic 
and, at the same time, the most transcendent ordering. 
!
We will analyse the ambiguous character of the historicity and naturalness of capital and in 
the following order: 
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!
(1) Firstly, we will see how, while capital is presented by Hayek and Mises as a historical 
category that achieves explicit clarity and full validity only in a specific system called 
capitalism, it is still conceptualised as an ever-present and essentially future-oriented 
tendency, striving from the very beginning towards its self-realisation. 
!
(2) Secondly and as a corollary, we will see that since this tendency is understood as 
spontaneously growing, a consequent criterion for the judgement of state interventions 
emerges, based on each intervention’s compliance with this natural tendency. A good 
intervention is not, then, actually an intervention, but rather the cultivation of a natural 
tendency that strives for its fuller and more explicit actualisation; a bad intervention is purely 
artificial or constructivist, and its anti-natural interference against the spontaneously 
expanding market tendency can bring nothing but disaster. Thanks to this, all the possible 
divergences within the dominant economic theory and practice, as well as all the 
inconsistencies and dysfunctions of the system, can be attributed to external, anti-natural 
interference and to the fact that the capitalist principles, due to the presence of not-yet-fully-
market modes of action and thought, have not yet become fully realised and have not yet 
been converted into explicit rules applicable to all modes of thought and action. This also 
implies that, despite some explicit enunciations of Mises and Hayek, who would like to 
maintain some not-fully-capitalist modes of acting and thinking against the capitalist 
‘imperialistic’ tendency - no such lasting barriers could be established inside their system. 
Thus, we will witness how the expansionist tendency aims at establishing the market as both 
an embedded object and the embedding framework; as both an object and the very principle 
of selection and ordering, changing the framework in which it is embedded into a 
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progressively more ‘pro-market environment’. Capitalism, which was pictured as in need of 
support and justification derived from the wider framework and higher meta-order, now aims 
at becoming the superior meta-order, before which other not-yet-fully-capitalist spheres have 
to justify themselves. 
!
(3) Thirdly, the order and the meta-order appear as functioning according to the same unitary 
laws, which are proclaimed to be ultimately unknown, but at the same time happen to be the 
very laws discovered and conceptualised by the economic theory Mises and Hayek represent. 
This implies a continuity - aiming at full identity - between the rules of the social division of 
labour under capitalism and the biological rules of natural selection. Application of the rules 
of the market appears to be the only way to promote the biological survival of populations 
and humankind as a whole, since it brings to full clarity natural, cosmic laws of maximising 
productivity under a competitive division of labour. A corollary follows that just as capital 
doubles itself as, simultaneously, both a particular contingent historical object and as the 
principle of historicity, and just as capitalism appears as both a human construction and the 
natural principle of all successful constructions, the economic capitalist order, rather than 
submitting itself to a higher order of either the theological or the natural kind, doubles itself 
as at once an order and a necessary meta-order. Thus, the meta-order in which the market is 
supposed to be embedded appears to be a market order itself - nature as the market of the 
markets. The capitalist market is natural and nature is capitalist, while history appears merely 
as a temporary period in which this equation realises itself by bringing itself to a full explicit 
clarity. Thus, the Misesian-Hayekian concept of evolution, despite the assurances of its 
genuinely open-ended and non-determined character, will have to be conceptualised as a 
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specifically necessary progress in which the progress of natural evolution appears as identical 
with the realisation of the laws of capitalism.  
!
Therefore, it will be demonstrated that all the three characteristics of capital as (1) a natural 
tendency, (2) a non-constructed, cultivated, naturally growing order, and (3) the necessary 
meta-order of nature, apply not only to the supposedly naively naturalistic understanding of 
capital and capitalism, but also to its Misesian-Hayekian version. As such their concept of 
capitalism and capital will prove itself to work according to the logic of the dominant or 
imperialistic economics/economy as exemplified in the beginning of this thesis by Lazaer. 
!
After analysis of (1) capitalism as a transhistorical tendency, (2) capitalism as a 
spontaneously growing order, (3) and capitalism as a necessary meta-order character, a fourth 
implication will be formulated. While capitalism according to this approach appears ‘to be a 
purely naturalistic ordering’,   it simultaneously becomes ‘a more purely transcendent 309
ordering’.   While capitalism as conceptualised by Hayek and Mises aims at rejecting the 310
need for finding a justification in a higher order - by instrumentalising religion as 
functionally useful for the justification of capitalism, and simultaneously presenting the meta-
order as itself capitalist and a purely naturally process - it does not reject the matrix 
‘inherited’ from religion. This produces a peculiar doubling: establishing both the explicitly 
known laws of the past and present order of capitalism, and the unknown transcendent future 
laws to which the subject should in advance adjust its behaviour. Despite all the explication 
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performed by the economic science, the future laws of the meta-order are presented, exposed 
and dramatised as inherently implicit and inexplicable - as something that must always 
remain beyond the reach of human mind. However, while the unforeseeable future laws are 
moved beyond the scope of the control of the human being (who can do no more than try to 
foresee them and adjust to them in advance to achieve a competitive advantage), they are 
simultaneously understood as already known by the economists, who assume that the new 
laws will not be in contradiction with the old ones, being equally capitalist as those already 
known. The unknowability is abolished, while at the same time use is made of the quality of 
the unknown, undetermined future to made the subject accept the determined order of social 
production, as necessarily enforced by the ultimately given and ultimately unknowable 
implicit laws. The naturalistic self-enclosure which presents capitalism ‘to be a purely 
naturalistic ordering’,   beyond justification (‘Evolution cannot be just’),   becomes itself ‘a 311 312
more purely transcendent ordering’   - a specific natural theology. Using a term created by 313
one of the most important, albeit as yet hidden, protagonists of the present investigation, 
Walter Benjamin, the laws of economics/economy - specified as the laws of capital/ism - 
could be thus described as genuinely mythical laws,   which become known by their results, 314
when a subject non-consciously acts against them in the failure to ‘divinise’ them.!
!
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3.1. Capital/ism as a transhistorical tendency  
!
For a better understanding of the peculiar ‘natural construction’ of capitalism as both a 
historical object and a transhistorical tendency in Mises’ and Hayek’s discourses, an 
explication of the fundamental category of tendency is necessary. This will also be crucial for 
understanding the prejudgements inherent in the methodological stance taken by the two 
thinkers, and will prepare us for a more concrete analysis of the process and the explicit/
implicit interplay of its crucial operators - judgement, time and nature - which will be 
presented in the second part of this thesis, titled Operating the process.  
!
The idea of tendency is interestingly formulated by Mises in the context of the notion of 
capital. As we remember, capital, according to Mises, is a specific ‘device’   or ‘strategy’  315 316
of thinking and acting - a calculus, enabling individuals to calculate future gains and losses 
and to deal somehow with the essentially unknowable future. Capital-as-tendency from its 
very beginning is necessarily directed towards the future, not only when seen from the point 
of view of our present time (when we look back on the past and retrospectively see capital-in-
becoming in the past means of production, interpreting it as a tendency leading towards its 
future, which is our capitalist present), but also immanently, from the point of view of the 
people who were and are engaged in the realisation of this tendency. This temporal direction 
of capital is implied in its very definitional structure, as determined by its end. ‘Capital’, 
according to Mises, is itself essentially a future-oriented device, directed by the temporality 
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of investment and return and as such, contrasted with ‘income’, which refers to the present 
consumption, 
!
The calculating mind of the actor draws a boundary line between the 
consumer’s goods which he plans to employ for the immediate satisfaction of 
his wants, and the goods (…) which he plans to employ for providing, by 
further acting, for the satisfaction of future wants. This differentiation of 
means and ends thus becomes a differentiation of acquisition and 
consumption, of business and household, of trading funds and household 
goods. The whole context of goods destined for acquisition is evaluated in 
money terms, and this sum - the capital - is the starting point of economic 
calculation. The immediate end of acquisitive action is to increase or, at least 
preserve the capital.   317
!
As we will recall, Mises has stated that such a notion can be non-anachronistically applied 
only to a fully developed capitalist society. However, as a tendency, the capitalist calculation 
is present in the transhistorical structure of all human thought and action: 
!
The reflection which led acting man to notions implied in the concept of 
capital and income are latent in every premeditation and planning of action. 
Even the most primitive husbandmen are dimly aware of the consequences of 
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acts which to a modern accountant appear as capital consumption. The 
hunter’s reluctance to kill pregnant hind and the uneasiness felt even by the 
most ruthless warriors in cutting fruit trees were manifestations of a mentality 
which was influenced by such considerations. These considerations were 
present in the age-old legal institution of usufruct and in analogous customs 
and practices.    318
  
Mises defined capital as essentially a future-oriented mode of thinking and acting. Capital as 
device and strategy is concerned with those resources that are separated from actual, 
immediate consumption, in order to establish a special future oriented fund, set aside to bear 
fruit. This mode of thought and action is concerned with making use of resources in a manner 
that will not deplete them, but will make possible their preservation and, if possible, their 
multiplication in the future. Thus, capital as a method of thinking guiding future-oriented 
action is ‘present’   in ‘every premeditation and planning of action’.   If we were to qualify 319 320
the modality of this presence, we would have to say that it is implicit. Capitalist calculation 
as a way of thinking that guides action is always already somehow understood, before the 
emergence of exact capitalist accountancy and the development of a full blown capitalist 
economy. The notion of capital is ‘implied’   in every action, but still exists only in 321
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‘latent’   form. People are ‘dimly aware’   of the existence of capital whenever they feel 322 323
‘uneasiness’   while performing actions that reduce the possibility of future profits (like 324
when a hunter kills a pregnant animal). Later this way of thinking, these mundane reflections, 
are refined by conscious and exact accountancy. Thanks to this calculation ‘can evolve to full 
clarity’.   The figure of a hunter (uneasy about killing a pregnant hind) finds its explication 325
and refinement, evolving to a full clarity, culminating in the figure of the accounting man. 
This figure has been described, for example, in Benjamin Franklin’s practical, disciplinary 
writings, famously quoted by Max Weber as an archetypal example of the spirit of capitalism. 
An accounting/accountable man should 
!
Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget 
money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is 
six, turned again it is seven and threepence, and so on, till it becomes a 
hundred pounds. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so 
that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding-sow, destroys 
all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, 
destroys all that it might have produced, even scores of pounds.    326
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The accounting man, like his prototype the primitive hunter, still operates with ‘the 
distinction between an economic substance and the advantages derived from it’,   but now 327
the possible future consequences, derived from distinction between ‘capital’ and ‘income’, 
are explicitly conceptualised as such, and measured in precise monetary terms. Hind is 
transformed into money, but the nature of calculation remains the same. What is modified is 
its exactitude. 
!
An increase in exactitude, secured by calculation in strictly measurable monetary terms, 
allows for a more farsighted, more rational use of the present resources; it makes it easier to 
preserve them with the prospect of future gains. Mises explains this by comparing a 
capitalistically thinking and acting subject - the subject of accountancy, able to make explicit 
and exact calculations - with the ‘agriculturist’, still living in the world of dim and implicit 
evaluations. As he says, ‘agriculturists were slow in applying the capital concept to their land. 
Even today in the most advanced countries only a part of the farmers are familiar with the 
practice of sound accountancy.’   The result of this lack of clarity in calculation is, according 328
to Mises, destructive for the very resources in question, that is, the land: 
!
Many farmers acquiesce in a system of bookkeeping that neglects to pay heed 
to the land and its contribution to production. Their book entries do not 
include the money equivalent to the land and are consequently indifferent to 
changes in this equivalent. Such accounts are defective because they fail to 
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convey that information which is the sole aim sought by capital accounting. 
They do not indicate whether or not the operation of the farm has brought 
about a deterioration in the land’s capacity to contribute to production, that is, 
in its objective use value. If an erosion of the soil has taken place, their books 
ignore it, and thus the calculated income (net yield) is greater than a more 
complete method of bookkeeping would have shown.    329
!
Farmers who do not consider their land capitalistically as a means of production act against 
the common good, since they are unable to measure the land in their use from the point of 
view of its ‘objective use value’   - that is, from the point of view of  the contribution of the 330
resource to production and reproduction of capital, measured in solely objective market 
terms, determined by the demand on the side of sovereign consumers and indicated by prices. 
!
‘Farmers’ (here serving as a pars pro toto, as an exemplary of all classes of individuals 
resisting the capitalist progress towards full clarity and explicitness of economic laws) are 
situated in a strange transitory place, as being at the same time not yet sufficiently capitalist, 
while also being from the very beginning always already capitalist. We can see this ambiguity 
(an interplay between the not-yet and always-already) in action when Mises deals with the 
question of land in a chapter dedicated to what he terms the ‘Myth of the Soil’. Interestingly, 
at this point the question of religion re-emerges. The Austrian economist criticises 
‘romantics’,   who ‘condemn the economic theories concerning land for their utilitarian 331
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narrow-mindedness’.   While the romantics believe that farmers themselves have treated 332
labour differently to the capitalists, Mises exposes this as a retrospective mythologisation that 
‘the inhabitants of the cities brought about to the countryside’.   It was the townsfolk who 333
projected on farmers their own longing for ‘nature’ beyond the capitalist utility principle. No 
farmer has ever 
!
considered the soil as anything other than a source of human well-being, a 
means to promote welfare. The magic rites and observances concerning the 
soil aimed at nothing else than improvement of the soil’s fertility and increase 
in the quantity of fruits to be harvested. These people did not seek the unio 
mystica with the mysterious powers and forces hidden in the soil. All they 
aimed at was bigger and better crops.   334
!
We witness here a specific teleological reduction: human well-being is identified as 
something that from its very beginning has been actually understood in capitalist terms. 
According to Mises, the increased productivity - here decisively identified with the increase 
of capital - was the only thing people of all ages ‘aimed at’,   from the very beginning. Their 335
actions were therefore implicitly capitalist, even if the means for that aim were still not 
optimal - such as, for instance, ‘magical rituals and adjurations as the most efficient method 
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of attaining the end sought’,   in comparison to rationalised, economised and technically 336
enhanced farming treated consciously as a branch of capitalist industry. ‘A peasant eager to 
get rich crop may - according to the content of his ideas - choose various methods. He may 
perform some magical rites, he may embark upon a pilgrimage, he may offer a candle to the 
image of his patron saint, or he may employ more and better fertilizer.’   Religious practices 337
do not differ in nature from the application of capitalist disciplines and techniques, since the 
nature of an activity is determined by its aim, and the aim is an increase in productivity. The 
implicit (not-yet-fully-capitalist) practices differ from the explicit (fully-capitalist) only in 
efficiency, and the higher efficiency of capitalist techniques can be attributed to their more 
exact and explicit character. As such a reduction is made possible, according to which ‘magic 
is in a broader sense a variety of technology’    and all technology is understood as capitalist 338
from the beginning. Thus something which might appear different in nature, and what Mises 
calls ‘The Alleged Logical Heterogeneity of Primitive Man’,   now appears to be - in the end 339
- nothing but an imperfect, ‘rather imperfectly logical’   than ‘prelogical’  , less explicit 340 341
form of the uniform capitalist rationality. Religion finds its end (i.e. perfection) in capitalism. 
!
The Misesian perspective on the continuity between magical religion and capitalist 
technology resonate intriguingly with a formulation we find in the works of a German-Jewish 
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scholar, influenced by both the Jewish Messianic tradition and different forms of radical 
Leftism, Walter Benjamin, who in his famous text, called “Capitalism as Religion”, has 
written that  ‘capitalism essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, anguish, and disquiet 
formerly answered by so-called religion.’   In the past the identity between religion and 342
techniques to intensify efficiency had not yet been made explicit.   But even if we 343
acknowledge this proposition - that in the past this identity was still implicit and that it was 
still conceived and practised in ‘religious’ or ‘magical’ terms - and even if we could find 
some elements of rationality in religions that were leading to capitalism, they are now 
determined by the end to which they have led. Benjamin’s account of this situation, if we 
abstract it from the politically and ethically motivated tone, seems compatible with the 
Misesian concept of capitalist teleology: ‘Capitalism itself developed parasitically on 
Christianity in the West (…) in such a way that, in the end, its [Christianity’s - M.P.] history 
is essentially the history of its parasites, of capitalism.’   This is the reason why Benjamin 344
suggests that the ‘boundless, universal polemic’   around the Weberian thesis that 345
Protestantism was the genealogical-historical source of the capitalist spirit is not as important 
as it might first appear. Even if ‘Christianity in the time of the Reformation did not encourage 
the emergence of capitalism’,   now, according to Benjamin, we can state, without much 346
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hesitation, that Christianity ‘changed itself into capitalism.’   Even if capitalism was, in the 347
beginning, somehow influenced by Christianity and required some Christian traditions to 
develop, this does not necessarily associate it with and determine it by its genealogy for all 
eternity. Consequently, it does not have to bow before the authority of its religious ‘parent’, 
even if some might believe that religion somehow ‘gave birth’ to it.   348
!
Now the relation is reversed and the ‘end’ (capital/ism) falls back on its past and subsumes it 
under its rule, reducing it to nothing but its own history - the history of capitalism-in-
becoming. History is therefore merely the time needed for this reductive equation to arrive at 
its full clarification - the time necessary to make explicit something that has always already 
been there implicitly from the very beginning. History is nothing but the time of transition 
necessary for the capitalist tendency to be realised, i.e. brought to a full theoretical 
consciousness/discursive explicitness and to a full practical implementation. Universal 
history is the explication or unfolding of the ‘pure or unhampered market economy’.   Here 349
we can see the prejudgement at work, hidden in the sphere of ambiguity (characterised by 
Benjamin as a crucial characteristic of the mythical  ). Capitalism has been presented in the 350
Misesian critique of the naive naturalism of the dominant economics as a historical category - 
but now it appears as simultaneously a transhistorical category ruling history from the very 
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beginning. As such, it is reducing all historical change - picturing and actually making it - 
into nothing but a step towards the realisation of capitalism.  
!
This prejudgement seems to resolve both the problem of the temporary and of the apparent. 
As for the temporary, it formulates a verdict, creating a singular position of the final 
judgement whence the result of the historical process can be judged. As for the apparent, it 
allows the interpretation of the historical process as the realisation of the deep laws that have 
been hidden beneath the level of appearance and are now being made explicit in the course of 
historical progression. In short, in contrast to Mises’ own declarations about treating capital 
as a historical category, now it appears as both a specific historical object/social relation and 
a transhistorical tendency, as something which - ambiguously - has always been there, and is 
now simply more explicitly acknowledged, and thus can be more fully realised both on the 
discursive and the practical level. Still, this tendency waits to truly be fully explicated, since 
  
The system of market economy was never fully and purely tried. But there 
prevailed in the orbit of the Western civilization since the Middle Ages by and 
large a tendency toward the abolition of institutions hindering the operation of 
the market economy.   351
!
The phrasing of the argument here is very telling. The pure market system is a tendency. This 
tendency is, however, ‘hindered’   by different institutions, in which the capitalist order 352
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remains embedded. When these institutions are ‘abolished’   the tendency is liberated and 353
can be ‘fully’   and ‘purely’   realised. We encounter here two well-known figures 354 355
described by Wood and Foucault: the figures of spontaneous economic growth and of 
external anti-economic and merely political fetters, which are blocking this growth. The 
reluctance of the not-yet-explicit or ‘dim’ modes of thought and correlative modes of action 
to internalise the exact and explicit mode of calculation results not only in strictly technical-
economic problems wherein non-optimal use is made of available resources (as in the case of 
farmers making use of land), but also in problems of a political nature. The not-fully-
explicated mode of thought and action resists the establishment of exact calculation in the 
totality of the social field; ‘the place of the money equivalent of land in the concept of capital 
is still questioned.’   Thus, the tendency cannot be realised in its full purity. Mises explicitly 356
connects this to the opposition of critics of the unhampered market economy. These critics 
indicate that ‘there were and are (…) other civilizations with a different mentality and 
different modes of conducting economic affairs’   (for example, with a different relation to 357
land). A corollary presented by them is the following: ‘Capitalism is (…) a passing 
phenomenon, an ephemeral stage of historical evolution, just the transition from 
precapitalistic ages to postcapitalistic future.’   This produces a political critique of 358
capitalism (exemplified by the German Historical School, Marx, the American Institutionalist 
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School, ‘the bohemians’, the labour unions and ‘the butter producers’ who ‘are with 
considerable success fighting margarine’  ), which in the past and in the present has resisted 359
the tendency to treat elements of production - labour, land or even money - from the point of 
view of its contribution to the production of capitalistically understood value.   These 360
movements intervene and interfere with pure market tendency, conserving or creating orders 
of thought and action that block spontaneous growth towards full explicitness and 
extensiveness.  
!
Let us now consider how the notion of spontaneous growth, and a correlative negative notion 
of interference, work in the Misesian-Hayekian discourse, and how these relate to the positive 
vision of capitalism as an embedded order and its correlative apparent critique of the 
dominant economics/economy, which are condemned for their naive naturalism in these 
matters. This will allow us to see the workings of the prejudgement that enables the 
presentation of capitalism as both an order in need of construction and embedment, including 
justification, enhancement and supplementation provided by the institutional framework, and 
a spontaneously growing order aiming at the embedment of all other modes of social practice 
as its sub-orders. 
!
!
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3.2. Capitalism as a spontaneous order  
!
We have seen that the economic discourses reconstructed here perceive all historical progress 
as identical with the unfoldment of the capitalist tendency immanently present in every 
future-oriented action. All moments or epochs of development are attributed to the unleashing 
of this pure market potential from the fetters established by the anti-market regulations of the 
state or other communities. We find this notion in a concise form in Mises’ opus magnum.  361
We find it also reformulated in Hayek’s work, describing history as an incessant war between 
two principles: the principle of the spontaneously growing extended market order on the one 
hand, and the tendency (of dropouts of the nihilist, bohemian type exemplified by the 
Bloomsbury group member Keynes;   of backward communities; and, decisively, of 362
governments) to impede this natural growth. In contrast, the tendency of debilitating the state 
- the condition of relative ‘anarchy’,   producing the anarchical freedom of individual 363
private property owners, secured by state coercive powers against anti-market sentiments and 
‘recurrent revolts by rapacious or hungry bands’   - is pictured as the main condition of 364
innovation and growth. Progress is associated by Hayek with the epochs when the market-
tendency became more explicit, while regressive tendencies are explained by the 
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reinforcement of anti-market rules by the state.   Hayek depicts a universal history of the 365
conflict between these two principles of progress (i.e. market) and stagnation or regress (i.e. 
anti-market state regulations) as follows: 
!
It would seem that no advanced civilisation has yet developed without a 
government which saw its chief aim in the protection of private property, but 
that again and again the further evolution and growth to which this gave rise 
was halted by a ‘strong’ government. Governments strong enough to protect 
individuals against the violence of their fellows make possible the evolution of 
an increasingly complex order of spontaneous and voluntary cooperation. 
Sooner or later, however, they tend to abuse that power and to suppress the 
freedom they had earlier secured. (…) This sequence has been repeated again 
and again.   366
!
If we could use a metaphor, taken from the sphere of agricultural production and suggested 
by the Hayekian biological rhetoric of ‘growth’, we could say that if the market is a natural 
(that is,  spontaneously growing) system,   then a good state should be understood as a 367
cautious gardener, defending the garden against the trespassers (those who trespass against 
the various property rights) and using the adequate fertilisers (incentives) to increase the 
garden’s immanent tendency to grow. However, the symbiosis of the market/garden and the 
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state/gardener is somehow tentative, since the government, seeing the flourishing market, is 
always tempted to eat too many of its fruits, to cut the fruit bearing trees (like the incautious 
warrior in the example given by Mises), and to replace its natural growth with conscious 
design by applying anti-market regulations, which must eventually cause a crisis in the 
market/ecosystem. The market is, therefore, a naturally growing spontaneous order, which 
needs cultivation and enhancement,   and when cultivated in accordance with its internal 368
natural principles necessarily brings about growth for the whole market/society, understood 
as an interlinked ecosystem. All crises should be attributed not to internal contradictions or 
instabilities - that is, not to a spontaneous disorder emerging from within the eco-system 
itself   - but to the repeated interference of the state - that is, to an external intervention - 369
which does not follow the internal market-tendencies, but rather, driven by hubris, cannot 
resist the temptation to replace the spontaneous growing market order with its own conscious 
design. 
!
This was the case, according to Hayek, with the declining of the peripheries of the market 
economy witnessed by the Austrian scholar at the end of the 1980s. He asserts that when the 
market-tendency is free to spontaneously develop, ‘These peripheries are (…) 
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disappearing’,   giving rise to growth, which enables the economy to provide for the optimal 370
maximum level of population: ‘As long as an increase in population has been made possible 
by the growing productivity of the populations in the regions concerned, or by more effective 
utilisation of their resources, and not by deliberate artificial support of this growth from 
outside, there is little cause for concern.’   But when an anti-market interference comes into 371
play, the population grows beyond the natural measure leading to a disaster, 
!
if materially advanced countries continue to assist and indeed even subsidise 
the growth of populations in regions, such as perhaps the Sahel zone in 
Central Africa, where there appears to exist little prospect that its present 
population, let alone an increased one, will in the foreseeable future be able to 
maintain itself by its own efforts. With any attempt to maintain populations 
beyond the volume at which accumulated capital could still be currently 
reproduced, the number that could be maintained would diminish. Unless we 
interfere, only such populations will increase further as can feed themselves. 
The advanced countries, by assisting populations such as that in the Sahel to 
increase, are arousing expectations, creating conditions involving obligations, 
and thus assuming a grave responsibility on which they are very likely sooner 
or later to default. Man is not omnipotent; and recognising the limits of his 
powers may enable him to approach closer to realising his wishes than 
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following natural impulses to remedy remote suffering about which he can, 
unfortunately, do little if anything.   372
!
This, according to Hayek, refers not only to the particular case of Africa, but can in fact be 
formulated as a general law, according to which, ‘Most defects and inefficiencies of such 
spontaneous orders result from attempting to interfere with or to prevent their mechanisms 
from operating, or to improve the details of their results.’   373
!
Now, although a superficial reading could lead to a conclusion that Hayek advocates a kind 
of political quietism, which abandons any institutional measures and just leaves ‘the market’ 
on its own, this is certainly not the case. The idea of a spontaneous tendency enables Hayek 
to delimitate bad interference form good intervention. The latter - acting as a cautious 
gardener - respects the immanent logic present in the spontaneous tendency of self-ordering 
systems and by their careful cultivation ‘can create the conditions under which they will 
operate.’   As such, if all the achievements of civilisation should be attributed to the 374
liberation and more explicit realisation of the market laws, and all the drawbacks to the 
existence of residuals of non-market traditions or to the introduction of new non-market 
institutions interfering with pure market mechanisms, then it follows that the progress of the 
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economy/society requires the creation of a more pro-market environment in which the 
immanent spontaneous tendency might flourish. This in turn implies the progressive 
purification of capitalism from not-fully-capitalist elements.  
!
The last assertion - that what is necessary is a purification, i.e. a process in which implicit, 
not-fully-capitalist orders would become progressively identical with explicit market laws - 
might go against some explicit enunciations made by the authors previously analysed. Both 
Hayek and Mises have some sentiment for particular modes of thought and action which, in 
Misesian terms, could be understood as those forms of life in which economic calculation in 
monetary terms has not been made fully explicit. This cannot, however, change the tendency 
implicit in their thought that aims at overcoming the barriers between the fully-market and 
non-market or not-fully-market spheres and at subsuming the latter under capital. To detect 
such a tendency is not equal with saying that certain statements that go against the general 
logic of their thought are unimportant, especially from the political or strategic point of view. 
Playing the inconsistencies between some moderate declarations of the two Austrian scholars 
against the expansionist or imperialist tendency present in their thought, in order to promote 
political moderation of radical, neoliberal tendencies, is a justifiable aim for a political 
polemicist. Such a polemicist could find useful, for instance, a quotation from Hayek 
defending some institutions of the welfare state or the importance of traditional religious 
ethics still different from the ethics of the market, or a quotation from Mises defending the 
necessity of maintaining a sphere of autonomous or semi-autonomous artistic or scientific 
practice. Such a political aim of moderating neoliberalism by making use of some assertions 
of neoliberal authors is not, however, the aim of the present enquiry. As we have indicated in 
the first section, the present research is above all an attempt to reconstruct the model or ‘the 
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ideal form of thought’   of the Misesian-Hayekian system in order to achieve maximal 375
‘systemic integrity of that system’.   The reconstruction of systemic integrity does not 376
necessarily mean that we are to neglect elements of dysfunction, or even contradiction, 
elements of implicitness, or even obscurity, or moments of discrepancy between the official 
discourse and the actual practice - all immanent in the ideal form of a system of thought. On 
the contrary, such a reconstruction should include the bringing of contradictory tendencies to 
a fuller expression, or exposing the inherent lack of clarity, the constitutive or even functional 
ambiguity of a mode of thinking. However, when exposing such systemic inconsistencies, we 
must be able to determine if concrete enunciations going against an immanent and powerful 
tendency present in a system of thought have a degree of integrity strong enough to reduce 
the power of a tendency aiming at overcoming the obstructions which these enunciations try 
to establish. If this is not the case, such declarations cannot impede the development of the 
logic of thought. Indeed, this seems to be, as we will see below, the case with Mises’ and 
Hayek’s enunciations that defend some elements of non-market orders - they cannot establish 
systemic, lasting blockages and distinctions that would stop, or at least impede, the progress 
of the imperialist tendency of the dominant economics/economy. Therefore, for our current 
purpose, we must focus our attention not so much on arguments taken from Hayek or Mises 
that could be useful in providing a rationale for prolonging the existence of some not-fully-
market state institutions or religious traditions, but rather on reconstructing the logic of the 
Misesian-Hayekian thought. Such a process of reconstruction would imply bringing to the 
fore a specific transformation in the nature, power and function of these non-capitalist or not-
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fully-capitalist (in this case religious or governmental) forms of action - a transformation 
effectuated by expansion of the imperialistic logic of the dominant economics/economy. This 
means grasping this decisive, although not easily graspable, transformation of the wider 
institutional framework or setting in which the market is embedded and on which it is 
dependent - a transformation into a progressively more pro-market environment. This will 
make it easier to understand how capitalism as reconstructed by Mises and Hayek could 
function as a highly ambiguous entity - a selected phenomenon aiming at becoming the very 
criterion of natural selection. 
!
Exposition of this prejudgement, which enables an understanding of the capitalist order as 
identical with the meta-order, will prepare us to proceed towards the question of the laws of 
capitalism as the necessary laws of the evolutionary meta-order. Let us then consider the 
progress of that ‘imperialistic’ tendency. A tendency which aims at overcoming the barriers 
between fully-market and not-fully-market spheres. A tendency which transforms nature, 
power and function of elements aiming at establishing capital/ism as both an embedded 
object and the embedding framework - as an ambiguous spontaneous order in the process of 
incessant construction. We will analyse the example of Hayek’s attitude towards both the 
traditional discursive and habitual framework provided by the tradition exemplified by 
positive, revealed religions, and the official framework of state-funded institutions (in this 
case, social assistance). Concerning religion, while the exhortation to treat everybody as 
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one’s neighbour is, according to Hayek, unrealisable in the extended order,   still he seems 377
to believe that such a morality could, and even should, be cultivated among smaller groups 
and within the family. Concerning the state, Hayek seems to acknowledge the importance of 
some state institutions that would ‘supply services which otherwise would not be supplied at 
all (usually because it is not possible to confine the benefits to those prepared to pay for 
them).’   However, with a closer look we will witness an interesting process: while religious 378
or state institution do not disappear in the Hayekian framework, their nature, function, and 
power are deeply transformed as they enter the force field of the dominant economics/
economy. While constituting the framework in which capitalism is believed to be embedded 
and upon which it is understood to be dependent, they are progressively transformed into 
elements considered dependent on capitalism as ‘sub-orders’,   in an incessant need to 379
justify themselves as producing a pro-market environment by integrating the supposed laws 
of the market into their own operation. 
!
As to the function of religion, capitalism might be considered a human construct in need of 
justification within a non-constructed order. It seems that the order in which capitalism would 
be embedded must have an implicit religious structure, and - decisively - must be determined 
!  153
!  In other words, Christian ethics as social ethics - i.e. as a system of ethics that would intervene into the 377
social organisation of production - is unrealisable and incompatible with the capitalist extended order explicated 
by economics, which alone can bring the increase of productivity and population growth. An attempt to 
implement Christian social teaching would bring nothing but disaster: ‘For those now living within the extended 
order gain from not treating one another as neighbours, and by applying, in their interactions, rules of the 
extended order - such as those of several property and contract - instead of the rules of solidarity and altruism. 
An order in which everyone treated his neighbour as himself would be one where comparatively few could be 
fruitful
 
and multiply.’ Ibid., 13. Note that Hayek on this point is in agreement with Mises’ argument against the 
‘theocratic’ ambitions of religion to intervene into the sphere of social production and reproduction according to 
its own religious principles. 
!  The Constitution of Liberty, 332.378
!  The Fatal Conceit, 18.379
Mateusz Piotrowski
by positive and revealed religious traditions. It might appear that if Hayek claims that the 
social order must appear as rooted in a wider framework that transcends individual 
cognisance, this implies that this framework, or a transcendental justification of explicit 
capitalist laws, must be derived from and determined by existing, positive, religious 
traditions, preceding capitalism. In other words, it might seem that the market rules do indeed 
still decisively require support from not-fully-capitalist institutions, especially of an explicitly 
religious type, and that these religious traditions providing ultimate justification are in a 
superior position in relation to the worldly, capitalist order they justify. However, if we 
scrutinise the matter more carefully, we will see that inside the Hayekian framework, the 
religious systems of practice and thought do not appear as the sole, indispensable and optimal 
sources that might provide this transcendental justification. Furthermore, even if traditional 
religion might be considered as one of the historical-genealogical sources of the emergence 
of capitalism in the past, and even if now it could still serve as a source of justification for the 
capitalist ordering of society, this by no means secures the superiority of such a religious 
justifying order over the capitalist order it justifies. Rather, as we will see, capitalism itself 
falls back on and subsumes its sources (including sources of justification) and aims at 
presenting itself as both the thing justified and the justifying highest order, subduing its own 
former source of justification. Capital/ism appears as an embedded object/order becoming 
progressively identical with the embedding framework/meta-order providing transcendental 
justification for itself.  
!
We can see clearly in Hayek’s famous essay on individualism, in which he states that 
religious formulations concerning social life are too dim to guarantee an optimal justification 
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for the capitalist order, as they allow for both pro-market and anti-market interpretations. 
What the market needs for its preservation are not ‘vague ideas’,   but 380
!
a set of precepts which will give us definite guidance. (…) That religion itself 
does not give us definite guidance in these matters is shown by the efforts of 
the church to elaborate a complete social philosophy and by the entirely 
opposite results at which many arrive who start from the same Christian 
foundations. Though the declining influence of religion is undoubtedly one 
major cause of our present lack of intellectual and moral orientation, its 
revival would not much lessen the need for a generally accepted principle of 
social order.   381
!
Therefore, Hayek asserts, capitalism itself can and should provide a grounding for itself, 
without relying on positive religious traditions. This ground is itself grounded in a self-
justification of the market by means of the explication of its internal principles. Even if these 
principles have been ‘implicit in most of Western or Christian political tradition’,   now they 382
can and should be made explicit: ‘It is therefore necessary to restate these principles fully.’  383
This means that now these laws can and should be formulated and exposed as explicit rules - 
without, however, losing their hidden, implicit and not fully explicable, transcendental 
dimension.  
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!
This refers not only to the sphere of theory but also to the implicit presence of what Hayek 
calls ‘ideology’   as embodied in social practices. If these rules of behaviour are to become 384
unquestionable second nature, then they should not only be explicitly expressed discursively 
but also integrated into habitus, into the embedment of the market, creating a progressively 
more pro-market environment. When this is achieved, ideology would explicitly express the 
need for accepting the implicit indemonstrable rationale of the rules of the market and the 
unknowable results of the market process as ultimately inexplicable givens, while at the same 
it would become more and more rooted in the everyday practices of institutions, communities 
and individuals. As William Connolly rightly notes in his reconstruction of Hayek’s thought: 
!
A successful market economy (…) requires the incorporation of neoliberal 
ideology into the behavior of entrepreneurs, courts, bankers, workers, families, 
schools, citizens, the media, and state officials. (…)  the impersonal processes 
of regulation work best if courts, churches, schools, the media, music, 
localities, electoral politics, legislatures, monetary authorities, and corporate 
organizations internalize and publicize these norms.    385
!
The two dimensions of explicit ‘publication’ and of ‘internalisation’ into implicit habits 
reinforce each other. It is possible to construct a market ideology able to generate both its 
explicitly pro-market principles and the implicit, inexplicable dimension. If traditional 
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religion cannot provide such norms, which must be at the same time both explicit enough to 
be univocally pro-market and implicit enough to not be open to further analysis and to 
transcend human reasoning, then it becomes no longer indispensable. Although religious 
prejudgements might be useful for providing supplementing justification and embedment for 
the market process, the market process itself can constitute both the sphere of explicit 
judgements and inexplicable prejudgements. Now, in the face of capitalism’s self-justifying 
and self-embedding power, religion seems to lose its autonomy. Even if religion does not lose 
its purpose altogether, in the eyes of the dominant economics religion’s principal validation 
derives from the fact that it justifies, supplements and enhances the market process. 
!
Posing such a hypothesis is, however, by no means equal to stating that the dominant 
economy/economics simply abandons the fundamental ‘matrix’ of religion. If we deploy 
once again Benjaminian terms, according to which the mythical element of law is its 
dimension that cannot be known by the subject of the laws (apart from in the act of 
punishment for its contravention), then we can state that capitalist laws have themselves 
become mythical enough that they can provide a justification that explicitly exposes the very 
unknowability of the past and future laws as their final sanction, as a final reason to adjust to 
them in an act of submissive ‘divination’. Thus, one could state, quoting Benjamin, that 
capitalism needed the mythical element present in religious laws only ‘until it could draw 
from Christianity enough mythical elements in order to constitute its own myth.’   386
!
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In the face of such a tendency, the explicit enunciations of Hayek do not present themselves 
as sufficiently grounded. Hayek may acknowledge the fact that ‘if we were always to apply 
the rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them.’   He 387
might also declare that ‘we must learn to live in two sorts of worlds at once.’   But these 388
declarations do not change the fact that they the [Hayekian system does not provide us with 
an explanation of how we could construct systematic blockages that would protect the 
‘micro-cosmos’ of the communities? from the encroachment of the logic of the capitalist 
market. This is because, these micro-communes are, in the same time, conceptualised as 
something that should produce a pro-market environment and because the prolongation of 
existence of not-purely-market modes of acting and thinking is deemed to be the sole cause 
of all the drawbacks and crises in the market economy. It seems that within the Misesian-
Hayekian system no lasting barriers can be established that would be powerful enough to 
block the expansion of the imperialist tendency aiming at the subsumption of all others orders 
of thought and action as capital’s own sub-orders. 
!
Taken from the Marxist lexicon, the term subsumption, which attempts to give an account of 
the differing modes of integration of pre-capitalist or not-fully-capitalist modes of production 
into the capitalist connected whole, seems especially useful, as it indicates that, while the 
process of subsumption changes the rank and influence of the subsumed element, it does not 
have to lead to its disappearance. Nor must it lead to a simple application of the more 
progressive laws of fully-developed capitalism in a not-fully-capitalist order in a manner that 
would then establish a unitary, ‘flat’ plane integrated smoothly by universal, explicit laws 
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operating according to a single logic.   The term subsumption suggests that apparently 389
archaic and anachronistic modes of action and thought are linked to the new connected 
whole, and their most anachronistic and archaic elements might even be intensified and 
strengthened, not despite their connectedness with the capitalist ‘system’, but because of this 
connection. 
!
We saw the workings of this logic, which transforms the nature, power and function of an 
‘element’ without necessarily constituting a unitary plane directed by unitary laws (for 
example, the explicit laws regulating the relation between the capitalist and the free wage-
labourer), when we analysed the mutation of the forms of social organisation that preceded 
the formation of capitalism and exploitation (serfdom) after they entered the force field of the 
capitalist connected whole (becoming so-called secondary serfdom). This should make us 
cautious and cause us to ask if also in the case of a specific mode of thought and action, 
which also preceded the formation of capitalism as the dominant social regime of production 
- a mode of thought and action called ‘religion’ - the process of subsumption is not much 
more complex, and as such cannot be reduced to simple disappearance of the subsumed 
discipline. 
!
This means that a qualitative acceptance of Benjamin’s thesis, which describes the attempt to 
picture/establish the capitalist order as self-justifying, does not have to imply that capitalism 
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has indeed fully succeeded in its pursuit of a final, unquestionable self-justification, and that 
it indeed does constitute a universal plane governed by unitary laws. Hayek himself has 
acknowledged that providing such an indisputable justification for ‘men’s submission to the 
impersonal forces of the market’   is a difficult task - not only for religion and but also for 390
the ‘economic doctrine’.   Nor does the qualitative acceptance of the Benjaminian thesis 391
imply that the need to find some non-capitalist or not-fully-capitalist resources of 
justification, supplementation and enhancement (in religious and other forms of social 
practice and thought) has come to a definite end, or that religions have ceased to function as 
modes of practice and thought that could be not only autonomous but even critical and hostile 
towards the dominant economics/economy. Nor, finally, does this acceptance imply that 
traditional religions have simply disappeared. Rather than disappearance we witness a 
specific mutation that, as it has been stated, changes the rank and influence of religion (and 
other modes of thought and action), when they enter the gravity field of the capitalist 
connected whole. 
!
We can observe the process of the subsumption of the justifying order under the justified 
order and the reversal of their relation (non-market-order becoming in need of justification as 
a result of its creation of a pro-market environment) if we analyse Hayek’s attitude towards 
religion in a more detailed way. The author of The Fatal Conceit on his part sees the main 
merit of religion in its providing a justification (by persuading the subject to accept the 
preconditions and results of the interplay of the market forces), an enhancement (by 
motivating and mobilising the subject to actively discipline its life and foretell the future 
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turns of the market) and a supplementation of the market’s extended order (preserving a more 
gemütlich subsystem, wherein values of altruism could still be exercised without endangering 
the smooth functioning of the economic mechanism).   What is most important for our 392
current aim - that is, for the reconstruction of the conceptualisation/realisation of capitalism 
as an embedded order aiming at becoming the embedding meta-order, at once a human 
construction and a spontaneous order - is to analyse how a tendency to treat religion and 
other forms of thought and action as justification, enhancement and supplementation of the 
dominant economics paves the way for expansion of the imperialistic tendency, which 
changes the very status of the supposed source of justification. If the main value of a social 
practice (say, religion) lies in justifying, supplementing and enhancing the smooth 
functioning of the market-order, then its autonomy and superiority is weakened, leading to a 
state in which the justifying, without necessarily disappearing, becomes demoted to the 
justified. A mode of action and thought is justified to the extent to which it supports the 
highest (capitalist) order as its justification, supplementation and enhancement. A sub-order 
might justify its existence by participation in creation of a progressively more pro-market 
environment. In such an environment the market becomes at once (1) an object of cultivation, 
and (2) the ultimate criterion of selection. Selection, organised by market measures enables 
for evaluation of the extent to which the sub-orders are realising this aim and to what extent 
they produce a rationale and justification for their own existence by applying the market rules 
to themselves. 
!
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This problem (how the structure in which capitalism seems to be embedded, and from which 
it derives its justification, becomes itself in need of justification before the capitalist tribunal, 
where it is judged and measured by the extent to which its existence can be justified in 
capitalist terms and the extent to which it is successful in the formation a pro-capitalist 
environment) might become clearer if we briefly consider the second order analysed by 
Hayek - the order of the state. At face value, Hayek’s account on the necessity of the 
existence of state institutions might appear as a moderation of the radical line of the dominant 
economics, but with a closer look we will discover a decisive transformation which, without 
abolishing the above mentioned institutional devices, fundamentally changes the way they 
work. This will help us to grasp both the lasting existence of the old elements and their 
mutation in the context of the capitalist connected whole, which aims at picturing/
establishing itself as becoming identical with the supreme meta-order. As we will recall, 
Hayek allows for the existence of some institutions that would realise some functions 
unrealised by the pure free market. This might look like acceptance of some elements of the 
welfare state or a mixed economy, but this is not the case, since the function, power and 
nature of these institutions, as modified in the determining context of the actual dominant 
economics/economy (commonly described as ‘neoliberal’), becomes very different, when 
compared to their power, nature and function in the so-called ‘welfare’ system. That this 
question has been frequently analysed in relevant scholarship   allows us to treat it briefly 393
and to concentrate primarily on matters more pertinent to our investigation. 
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What is decisive at this point is to indicate the crucial criteria that, according to Hayek, 
enable us to distinguish between the bad functioning of such state institutions (still based on 
the old welfare model, which leads to non-market interference with the spontaneous 
mechanism of the market) and the good functioning (when the extent of state intervention 
might be even wider and more intensive, but the power, nature and function is transformed 
accordingly to the demands of the market). Hayek himself acknowledges this vital difference: 
!
In many fields persuasive arguments based on considerations of efficiency and 
economy can be advanced in favor of the state’s taking sole charge of a 
particular service; but when the state does so, the result is usually not only that 
those advantages soon prove illusory but that the character of the services 
becomes entirely different from that which they would have had if they had 
been provided by competing agencies.   394
!
Analysis of this short fragment might help us to preliminarily determine two intimately 
interlinked criteria - the criterion of means/form and the criterion of content/end - which 
establish the distinction between the non-market interference and the positively valued pro-
market state action. The way this distinction is made will help us to understand better the 
process of subsumption, guided by an attempt to transform other social orderings into a 
market environment, which needs a justification prior to the market, and the market itself into 
a self-embedding, self-justifying and spontaneously self-constructing order. The analysis of 
this (apparently insignificant and purely technical, but ultimately very telling) fragment from 
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The Constitution of Liberty could be done in terms of (1) means-method-form and (2) end-
task-content. The first problem is dubbed as (1) the ‘considerations of efficiency and 
economy’,   while the second is implicit in the problem of (2) ‘the character of the 395
services’.    396
!
The first question, the question of economic efficiency, refers to the problem of form, the 
question of the purely formal structure of abstract universal laws present implicitly in every 
action, explicated by economics, and formalised in the institutional legal framework of a pro-
market legal order. This legal framework, described by Hayek as ‘the rule of law’,   is 397
understood as a purely formal ‘general rule’,   which abstracts from any ‘specific ends’  398 399
and ‘the particular wishes or values of the government.’   As we will see in the second part 400
of our enquiry, the Hayekian conceptualisation of the rule of law as a purely formal structure, 
focused merely on means, is deeply rooted in the Misesian concept of the value free and 
purely formal science of economics. For Mises, economics is decisively a science of means 
not ends.   It is precisely this formal characteristic that enables it to formalise and inform the 401
matter of all other social practices. From the standpoint of such formalisation, the only 
problem is the problem of formal calculation; ‘the only question which arises is whether the 
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benefits are worth the cost.’   What is implied in this statement is that the best method of 402
counting the costs and of evaluating efficiency is the one provided by the dominant 
economics/economy, which enables us to choose the right means to achieve indeterminate 
ends, by means of calculating costs against benefits. This might refer to the question of 
monetary costs, expressed in monetary units. However, the category of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ 
is potentially much wider, since as a purely formal category it, does not determine either the 
units of measurement, or the standard, or the final aim against which the costs are to be 
measured. Within this purely formal structure of measurement the units might refer to 
monetary profit, but also to, for example, social profit derived from the effects of a social 
policy measured against the aim of upgrading the condition of the poor, or an emotional 
profit derived from religious activity, in which the final aim sought is termed ‘salvation’. The 
expansion of the imperialistic method of evaluating inputs and outputs (costs and benefits) - 
as exemplified by Lazaer, by theorists of human capital, such as Becker, and by scholars 
dealing with religion, such as Azzi and Ehrenberg - shows that neither the specificity of the 
subject in question (e.g. a politician designing the most efficient social policy, a believer 
choosing the most efficient religion), nor the specificity of the sphere in which calculation is 
executed (e.g. religion or social assistance), nor the units in which costs and profits, inputs 
and outputs are calculated (e.g. time spent in church versus the possibility of being saved; 
time spent in assisting an unemployed person versus his/her employability), are decisive. 
What matters is not the matter or content but the form of calculation, measuring present costs 
against future benefits, thus explicating and establishing an abstract, universal form as 
something that is believed to be implicitly present in every human action, enablingthe 
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informing and subsumption of non-capitalist or not-fully-capitalist sub-orders under the 
discipline of economics/economy. All ‘economy’ and ‘efficiency’ is progressively identified 
with the understanding of economy and efficiency propagated by the dominant economics/
economy. 
!
In the first move a sharp distinction between form and content, between a determined, formal 
method of calculation and an undetermined end, is established. Such a decisive separation 
between abstract laws and concrete, determined ends, plays, as we will see later, a major role 
in the Misesian-Hayekian system. However, Hayek importantly adds that such a formal 
method, focused solely on finding the right means to undetermined ends, does not suffice; 
‘the rule of law is a necessary, but not yet a sufficient, condition for the satisfactory working 
of a free economy.’   Correct action is determined not only according to its formal structure 403
but also according to its content and, ultimately, according to its final aim. Hayek 
acknowledges that a purely pragmatic and formal criterion (maximisation of behaviour aimed 
at achieving a particular, undetermined aim) does not guarantee that an action will actually be 
a pro-market action.   As we have read in the fragment quoted above, the character of the 404
services could become entirely different, the action could mutate into an anti-market one, 
even if it seems to achieve its aims and even if it actually could be efficient. Despite his 
hesitation (signalled by expressions such as ‘illusory’,   which could suggest that the 405
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efficiency of anti-market means will ultimately prove itself to be merely apparent), Hayek 
tacitly acknowledges the existence of means that would be efficient for achieving a particular 
aim but, at the same time, will be unacceptable from the perspective of the aims of the market 
economy. He states that there are some non- or even anti-market means that ‘must be rejected 
even if they provide an effective, or perhaps the only effective, means to a desirable end.’  406
Thus we can see that inside the Hayekian framework the question of formal efficiency (the 
question of whether determined means are optimal for achieving undetermined ends) is not a 
sufficient criterion for judging an action. Rather - even if this goes against some explicit 
enunciations of both Mises and Hayek who, at the surface level of their discourse, try to 
reject the idea of economics as a science of ends - what provides us with a complementary 
and necessary criterion for such judgement is an end or ‘task’. Hayek describes this final aim 
as ‘the task of gradually amending our legal system to make it more conducive to the smooth 
working of competition’.   In other words, the aim of the action of governmental institutions 407
(and this is generalisable to all social sub-orders) is the smooth functioning of the market 
order itself. ‘In consequence, a government that is comparatively inactive but does the wrong 
things may do much more to cripple the forces of a market economy than one that is more 
concerned with economic affairs but confines itself to actions which assist the spontaneous 
forces of the economy.’   Now it becomes possible to judge an action as pro-market even if 408
intensive state activity is involved, since it is ‘is the character rather than the volume of 
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government activity that is important’   and the character is determined by the final end - the 409
cultivation of the spontaneous growth of the market order itself. 
!
If we now look back at the analysed fragment we will understand why Hayek ends it by 
stating that the best way to provide such state-funded services, created in the absence of the 
purely market activity of private entrepreneurs, is when these services are ‘provided by 
competing agencies’.   The state might create a quasi-market (in the spheres that would 410
otherwise not be profitable enough to become a field of action of private entrepreneurship); it 
could even provide the customers with additional purchasing power and then leave the 
provision of services for these newly created customers to private or quasi-private agencies 
aiming at monetary profits. Hayek gives the example of support for the poor, but many other 
sub-fields from healthcare to pension schemes and higher education could be added) this 
would require the conscious construction of a quasi-market designed by the state, and 
application of market formalisation effectuated by the outsourcing of the functions to private 
‘competing’ agencies. The efficiency with which such a quasi-market institution works, 
would be judged by means of two interrelated criteria: that of proper formalisation 
(guaranteed by application of the form of calculation) and that of the final end (that the action 
is itself pro-market, leading to a situation wherein ‘the market mechanism will work as 
effectively and beneficially as possible’  ). The form/means and the content/end are 411
determined by the capitalist calculation, with the aim of strengthening the market itself. 
Within a sub-order transforming into a state-designed quasi-market, subjects’ action is 
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measured by means that imitate the measurement of performance in other fields of capitalist 
production and, furthermore, it is measured against the final aim of capitalist production. 
What gives the first formal criterion of measurement its imagined consistency is its reference 
(direct or indirect) to the second criterion - that is, the final aim. Moreover, even if the 
reference to the final aim remains indirect, implicit or not-fully-conscious, and the formal 
calculation is done without strictly monetary exchange, the activity is dimly imagined as 
being formalised in the image of the capitalist calculation operating on a competitive market. 
Even if their activity takes place only within a quasi-market, the performance of subjects is 
measured according to a calculation of performance that imitates the calculation of 
performance applied in other fields of capitalist production, and it is measured against the 
market’s final aim - that is, against the extent to which subjects assist, supplement and 
enhance the spontaneous growth of the market. 
!
Apart from the example of social assistance, Hayek also gives the example of education. 
Both examples are very telling, if analysed consistently. In the case of social assistance, the 
subsumption would require a system that measures its performance (motivation, behaviour 
and results). In the case of universities and other educational institutions, it would require 
specific measurement of the performance of students, teachers and scholars. Now, the 
performance of institutions is measured not only by means of calculation (this is still 
insufficiently determined) but, decisively, it is also measured and judged against the criterion 
of the task or end (how effective they are in creating a pro-market environment). The 
necessity of measurement by means of specific calculations produces a specific ‘market’ 
bureaucracy measuring action in relation to a final aim. This might be done directly and 
explicitly in relation to the actual labour market (measuring the decisive characteristic of 
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‘employability’ of students or customers of social assistance) or indirectly and implicitly, 
when the sub-order of thought and action is shaped in the image of the imagined 
‘market’ (like in the case of measuring the frequency of citations of a researcher and his rate 
of success in applying for state-funded grants in competition with other scholars on a quasi-
market). The final aim might be recalled directly (as f.e. progressively flexible adjustment of 
human capital to the ever-changing demands of the market), or only indirectly (the university 
becoming more productive in producing knowledge by means of the application of measures 
that imitate the market). 
!
Like in the case of ‘industry’   in the “Middle Ages’,   which had ‘a more or less landed-412 413
proprietary character’,   being ‘completely dependent’   on the dominant social relation 414 415
(i.e. on the feudally organised ‘land’  ) or indirectly imitating it in an attempt to reproduce 416
‘within the city and its relations, the organization of the land’.   The function, power and 417
nature of non-capitalist orders in the system in which the capitalist relation is the 
predominant one, might be conceptualised analogically. The other modes of action and 
thought might become ‘completely dependent’ upon or imitate the (imagined) market 
relations in their proper sphere. What is transformed in this process is what Hayek describes 
as the decisive character of a particular order of thought and action. Social assistance might 
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still provide us with statistics concerning employment and unemployment, but the character 
of its activity in the workfare model, declared to be aimed at disciplining its customers 
towards becoming entrepreneurial market subjects, is decisively different to its character 
within the welfare model, which declared its mission to be service to citizens endowed with 
specific social rights.   Thus, the proliferation of evaluations and measurements often 418
described as bureaucracy is not an accidental anti-market tendency but an effect of the 
attempt   to subsume differing modes of thought and action under the imagined market 419
rules. 
!
If we were to analyse the process of creating specific sub-orders or quasi-markets presented 
here, we could derive important systemic implications that would help us to determine the 
problem of the ambiguity of capitalism, which is presented at once as both an embedded and 
justified object/order and also the embedding and justifying meta-order. If one would wish to 
derive consistent consequences from the process described above by Hayek, one could come 
to a vision of the field of ‘the market economy’ as a complex composition of differing orders; 
of markets and quasi-markets created by the conscious design of the state; of fully and not 
fully capitalist spheres; of differing ‘markets’ themselves being embedded, immersed and 
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steeped by ‘non-market’ official and unofficial institutions, habits and traditions. This 
confronts us with the problem of the existence of a mixed economy. If we were to briefly 
consider the consequences of such a confrontation for the understanding of the past, present 
and future of capitalist ordering we could describe them as follows. (1) Regarding the past, it 
would problematise the story of the emergence of the market itself, asking the question of 
whether the market has been in the past promoted by not-purely-market means, thus 
legitimising quite a different narrative of the emergence of capitalism than the one presented 
by Hayek.   (2) Regarding the present, it would acknowledge that the supposed unitary 420
‘market’ is in reality a mixed economy, essentially comprising of orders, which are 
themselves working according to differential logics. This interpretation is fostered by many 
scholars, especially those focused on the difference between the specific logic of the financial 
markets on the one hand and ‘industrial’ capitalist production in the other.   It calls into 421
question the idea of a unitary ‘market’, a market which is itself constituted and developed by 
means of the application of unitary market rules. Rather than picturing the economic reality 
as a flat and univocal plane governed by unitary and universal market ‘general rules’,  422
equal for all participants - rules functioning as a purely formal mechanism impartial in 
relation to the ‘material position of particular people’   - we would be confronted with a 423
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complex hierarchical set of differing orders, with different thresholds of access.   (3) Finally, 424
regarding the future, this would foster the development of a ‘mixed economy’. Such a mixed 
economy would be composed of differing market and non-market orderings governed by 
differing logics (a logic of cooperative distribution; a different logic of agricultural 
production on individually/family owned farms; a different logic governing the production of 
the time-horizon of the production of knowledge; a different logic of ‘social credit’; and so 
on). It would also foster correlative development of a relevant ‘mixed’ economic science, 
which would explicitly bring the existence of such a mixed economy to the light of 
consciousness, facilitating the description, management and creation of such orderings, which 
could not only operate according to different logics but would also be directed towards 
different aims. As such, the idea of a mixed economy would become a conscious political 
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of the central bank can be continually refinanced and never repaid because they are liquid, and therefore not 
presented for repayment; they remain liquid, however, because they are required for the clearing operations of 
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postulate brought to a fuller consciousness, undermining, or at least questioning, the 
postulates of ‘imperialistic’ economics. If we become more conscious that a pure 
unhampered market economy is not possible, and nor is the pursuit of such an economy 
desirable, we could - some critics say - more consciously work on creating a complex 
ordering which would ‘involve different types of ownership structure and resource allocation 
mechanisms, all coexisting in a mixed economy.’   425
!
In short, this would imply that (1) there is no such thing as a pure market tendency impeded 
by external fetters, but rather that ‘non-market’ incentives and institutions are crucial for the 
emergence of the market itself; (2) the actual ‘market’ - or rather institutions we tend to 
describe as constituting the ‘market’ - are very different from the picture presented by the 
dominant economics; rather than being constituted by universal laws equal for all they are 
composed of differing and often hierarchal modes of organisation; (3) that it is not possible, 
or necessarily desirable, to aim at subsumption of other social orderings under the so-called 
market order. Summing up, this would lead to a conclusion that there was no, there is no, and 
that there could not and should not be such a thing as a pure or unhampered market economy. 
!
This is not, however, the road taken by Mises or Hayek. Even if they do acknowledge that 
‘The system of market economy was never fully and purely tried’   and even if they do 426
consider it as a tendency that needs justification, embedment, supplementation and 
enhancement, still they end up with the idea of market laws as (becoming) identical with the 
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laws of nature - nature conceived as ‘the market of the markets’. Thus, as we will see below, 
the difference between the Misesian-Hayekian concept of capital as embedded and 
constructed historical order and the ‘naively naturalistic’ concept of capital and capitalism as 
natural datum is not as decisive as it might seem. Thus, the so-called naturalistic fallacy 
would apply not only to coarsely naturalistic or positivistic discourses, but also to those 
exponents of the dominant economics/economy who, like the Austrian neoliberals or the 
German ordoliberals, have explicitly declared their distance from such naturalism. As we will 
recall, Michel Foucault has described the stance of the ordoliberals towards naturalism by 
summarising their discussion on competition as follows:  
!
For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of nature. The 
game, mechanisms, and effects of competition which we identify and enhance 
are not at all natural phenomena [.] In reality, the effects of competition are 
due only to the essence that characterizes and constitutes it. The beneficial 
effects of competition are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural given 
that it brings with it. They are due to a formal privilege. Competition is an 
essence. Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle of formalisation. 
Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure. Its effects are only 
produced if this logic is respected. This means that pure competition is not a 
primitive given. It can only be the result of lengthy efforts and, in truth, pure 
competition is never attained. Pure competition must and can only be an 
objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy. 
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Competition is therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a 
natural given that must be respected.   427
!
Although the stark contrast between ‘art’ and ‘nature’ and between ‘natural given’ and 
‘historical objective’ might suggest that we are here confronted with fundamentally different 
conceptualisations of the market process, in fact the difference between the ordoliberal 
conceptualisation or the Misesian conceptualisation, which emphasise a gap between ‘theory’ 
and ‘history’, and the Hayekian conceptualisation, which underlines the difference between 
biological and cultural evolution, and, finally, between all these conceptualisations and the 
‘naive naturalism’ of the dominant economics/economy, is not as fundamental as it might 
seem. The primordial terms of both rhetorics (eidos and ‘nature’) are ultimately 
interchangeable. In the ‘naturalistic’ phrasing, the natural implicit tendency has to be made 
explicit in the historical process through which capital/ism is transformed from a particular 
and non-dominant order into a virtually infinitely generalisable and dominant meta-order, 
which becomes progressively purified, and this purification is identified with historical 
progress. In the phrasing that uses the idiom of eidos, the essence is being progressively 
formalised in such a manner that the historical conditions are being modified in order to make 
possible and enhance a fuller manifestation of the primal eidos. In both cases the right, 
successful action is possible only when the internal logic of the process itself - of cultivating 
the spontaneous order, of making explicit the implicit essence - is respected. This allows also 
the delimitation of good pro-market institutional action from bad anti-market interference. 
Good pro-market action simply develops what has always been there (ideally/naturally) - the 
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essence or the nature of the process, which through history comes to its fuller realisation. 
Thus, the essential/natural market laws are being brought to a higher level of explicitness by 
the right economics/economy, which makes the particular historical institutional 
circumstances more and more identical with the ideal (natural, eidetic) laws. The laws 
therefore become purer and more homogenous and unitary - more explicitly identical with the 
laws explicitly proclaimed by the pro-market economists. What this implies is that the rules 
of the market economy are unitary and do indeed function in the way described by the pro-
market economists. If they contradict the principles of rationality, efficiency, equilibrium and 
free competition, then they simply lose the quality of truly market rules.   428
!
Now we are more able to grasp the pivotal ambiguity on which revolves the idea of 
capitalism as simultaneously the embedded order and the embedding order. The problem of 
this crucial ambivalence in Hayek’s discourse - the problem of the ambiguous relationship 
between an embedded order and the embedding order - is presented with lucidity by an 
important proponent of critical evolutionary institutionalism in economics, Geoffrey M. 
Hodgson. According to Hodgson: 
!
The fundamental dilemma here is this: does the market correspond to a 
particular type of order, or does it correspond to the general context in which 
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the evolutionary selection of (all) orders takes place? (…) In one passage, 
Hayek (The Fatal Conceit, 38-47) proposes the former interpretation. He 
sketches a history of the emergence of the market, suggesting that it is not 
itself the context of evolution but an evolved order: a specific outcome of 
evolution itself. However, this interpretation leaves open the nature of the 
context in which the selection of the market takes place. To assume that the 
market is itself selected in a market environment is either incoherent or 
suggests the important but unacknowledged possibility of a nested set of 
market structures in which selection occurs: a market for markets.   429
!
We are therefore left with an ambiguity: ‘If the market is the context of selection, then the 
origin of this framework is itself unexplained. If the market is an object of selection, then for 
its selection to be real it must exist alongside other nonmarket forms.’    430
We might hypothesise that it is this pivotal ambiguity that enables Hayek to avoid answering 
the Hodgsonian question, and that it is this pivotal ambiguity that makes a room for the 
workings of a crucial prejudgement which presents the market order as simultaneously a 
particular, historical, embedded order in the need of incessant construction, justification, 
enhancement and supplementation, and a general, eternal, ideal/natural principle of selection 
on the level of the market-order. What is tacitly presumed - in the manner of a prejudgement 
that decides on the verdict before the process has come to an end - is that nature is itself a 
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market in literal, not metaphorical sense. Thus, the market is ambiguously presented as a 
particular object that is being selected by virtue of its compliance with the principle of 
selection ruling at the level of the meta-order. It could be said, after Hodgson, that the 
Hayekian system is reconstructed as ‘based on the single and ubiquitous economic 
arrangements of markets and private ownership.’   Even if in reality we are still confronted 431
with historical non-ubiquity (encountering non-market or not-yet-market orders, state 
interference, anti-market revolts, etc.), still all genuine progress throughout history can be 
identified with the progressive identification of all orders with the ideal form of nature as the 
market of markets, the meta-order that is believed to itself be governed by the laws of the 
market. Historical process as progress is merely the time necessary for the implicit eidos/
nature to become more fully and explicitly identical with positive, historical laws. The 
correct, progressive (read: pro-market) outcome of such natural selection is in advance 
decided by a prejudgement that perceives the implicit and evolving structures of the meta-
order as working according to the same market logic as the explicit, existing market order. 
Therefore, if the market is deemed to be the only order that can bring true progress and, 
moreover, the only way to bring about the survival and success of individuals, the population 
and humanity as a whole, then all phenomena that clearly bring about neither success nor 
survival (like the de-growth and starvation in the Sahel) can automatically be explained by a 
hypothetical selection of non-market processes and attributed to a non-market, external 
interference. What is more, this thesis might be reversed; according to Hayek and Mises an 
individual or a population wins the evolutionary competition achieving competitive 
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advantage because it has discovered the market rules or rather ‘stumbled upon such rules 
earlier.’   432
Implications derived from this thesis is of great importance. I will try to develop them in the 
analysis of the third crucial ambiguous prejudgement, which reconstructs capitalism as an 
outcome of essentially unforeseeable process - simultaneously identical with the meta-order 
of necessary evolution. 
!
3.3. Capitalism as a necessary evolutionary meta-order 
!
As we will recall, in their critique of the dominant economics Mises and Hayek distance 
themselves from the ‘necessarian’ or ‘meta-physical’ understanding of evolution, contrasting 
it with their own conceptualisation, which emphasises the essentially unknowable character 
of the future results of the evolutionary process. Thus, it seems that the explicit laws of the 
known market order are themselves rooted in and dependent on the unknowable matrix of the 
unforeseeable laws of a meta-order that transcends human cognisance, not only because of its 
present complexity but, decisively, because it comes from an essentially unforeseeable future. 
Therefore, formulation of any kind of the laws of evolution is declared to be incompatible 
with the conceptualisation of evolutionary processes proposed by Mises and Hayek, which - 
in contrast to the old metaphysical evolutionism - appears to present biological and historical 
becoming as open-ended. However, in the previous subsection of this thesis we have 
suggested that, while the meta-order is presented as genuinely unknowable, there is a non-
explicit and non-explicated prejudgement that suggests that the outcome of unpredictable 
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evolution will be in fundamental compliance and continuity with the market order, since in its 
essence/nature the meta-order of nature is (becoming) identical with the market ordering 
itself. Nature is the market of markets and the only way to prolong and extend the biological 
existence of humankind is to act according to market rules. This ambiguous characteristic of 
the Misesian and, even more so, the Hayekian reconstruction of the evolutionary process of 
explicating the implicit and necessary laws of capitalism might become clearer if we compare 
it with the Marxian-Engelsian understanding of the analogy between socio-economic and 
biological evolution. According to Hayek: 
!
There may exist just one way to satisfy certain requirements for forming an 
extended order - just as the development of wings is apparently the only way 
in which organisms can become able to fly (the wings of insects, birds and 
bats have quite different genetic origins).   433
!
Now, if we go through this apparently modest sentence we may be able to unfold and expose 
some prejudgements concerning the laws of capitalist ordering and the laws of the meta-order 
in which the capitalist order is embedded. Hayek talks about the laws governing the dominant 
mode of economic activity by referring to biology. He states that there is only one way to fly 
- for this a creature must have wings. The wings of different species might have different 
‘genetic origins’   (different orders of filiation, to use the Althusserian terminology applied 434
previously), and they might function according to differing mechanics (the wings of a bird 
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have a very different anatomy to the wings of a fly). Functionally, however, they are 
identical. Hayek compares this to the evolution of the economic process. Let us assume that 
the formation of social cooperation requires creative adaptation to natural and social 
circumstances. If we are to organise the production, distribution and consumption of goods 
and services in a human order, specific institutions need to emerge - just as a species has to 
generate a specific type of wing if it is to fly. One could thus assume that, just as there are a 
variety of modalities in which different species fly, there could exist a variety of successful 
(market and non-market, capitalist and not-strictly-capitalist) ways to organise production, 
distribution and consumption in the social cooperation of human beings. The socio-economic 
order is, then, analogous to organisms with differing structures - even if they might be co-
present in a complexly interlinked single ‘environment’ and even if they have the same 
‘end’ (self-reproduction) they may be aiming at achieving this end by relatively varied 
means. Thus, the economic system described and propagated by Mises and Hayek would be 
just one of many possible and actual systems making possible the self-reproduction of human 
beings. This will become clearer if we recall Friedrich Engels’ deployment of the 
evolutionary conceptual field to the question of economics in the preface to Marx’s Capital. 
Engels criticises those economists who believe that 
!
the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether 
they are applied to the present or the past. But this is exactly what Marx 
denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist… On the contrary, in 
his opinion, every historical period possesses its own laws… (…) In short, 
economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in 
other branches of biology. (…) social organisms differ among themselves as 
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fundamentally as plants or animals. Indeed, one and the same phenomenon 
falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different general 
structure of these organisms, the variations of their individual organs, and the 
different conditions in which these organs function. Marx denies, for example, 
that the law of population is the same at all the times and in all places. He 
asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of 
population… With the varying degrees of development of productive power, 
social conditions and the laws governing them vary too.   435
!
It is not our task here to reconstruct the full picture of the Marxian or Engelsian 
understanding of evolution (for example, the idea of development from lower to higher stages 
implicit in Engels’ summary), nor is it to determine to what extent they are adequately 
aligned with reality. Our sole task is to compare it with the Misesian-Hayekian concept of the 
laws of evolution in order to grasp the specificity of the latter. The crucial difference is that 
while Marx understands capitalism as an epoch-organism among other organisms, trying to 
‘illuminate (…) the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death’  436
of this peculiar social organism, Hayek posits capitalism also on a different, higher level. For 
Hayek capitalism is both an epoch-organism among other epochs-organisms, competing with 
other modes of ordering social life, and also the natural environmental meta-order in which 
selection is eternally taking place, determining the outcome of selection. Analogically to 
there being only one way to fly (to have wings), there is only one way to secure the biological 
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existence of the human race (to follow the market rules). Only when a correct selection is 
performed in a manner that follows market laws is the human order in compliance with the 
matrix of the meta-order, which, in turn, happens to be implicitly capitalist. Thus, Hayek does 
not conceptualise capitalism as a particular way of solving the problem of the economic 
reproduction of society, but as the only way to solve it, necessary for the biological and 
cultural survival of individuals, populations and humanity at large. In his comparison, 
capitalism does not stand for a type of wing but for wings as such, for the function and power 
of flight per se. This is why he states that there ‘may exist just one way to satisfy certain 
requirements for forming an extended order.’   Capitalism is located not only among 437
competing social orderings but at the level of the very principle of competition. It is not only 
an organism embedded in the environment but the general environmental context itself.  This 
implies a tacit prejudgement about the unity and givenness of the laws of capitalism as the 
eternal-natural precondition for the emergence and selection of all laws, and as an outcome of 
successful selection. Even if Hayek praises diversity and competition this refers only to a 
diversity in the strategies of individuals, populations and humankind, bound to operate within 
the implicit market-of-nature understood as the ultimately given meta-order. As Hodgson 
notes:  
!
Hayek sees selection as operating on a plurality of different groups or 
agencies, but seemingly always within a given (market) structure. Thus, he 
ignores the possibility that selection may also be working at the level of 
structure and substructure, creating a diversity not simply of groups and 
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agencies but also of types of economic system or subsystem, as well as a 
variety of market forms.   438
!
Hayekian necessarian evolutionism is in fundamental accordance with Mises’ understanding 
of the laws of capitalist ordering, which are conceptualised as necessary preconditions, 
constituting an ‘environment that he [man - M.P.] cannot alter.’   This (according to Mises 439
and contrary to Marx and Engels) is the reason why capitalist meta-laws are validly 
applicable to all economic history.   The only difference lies in their explicitness, in the 440
extent to which they are being theoretically and practically realised. The prejudgment at work 
here is the following: capitalist laws are presented as the ever-present laws of nature to which 
particular historical systems of all ages have in the past, in better or worse ways, tried to 
adjust themselves. This better or worse adjustment to ultimately given laws resulted in the 
greater or lesser success of different social systems. The success of the market order is 
therefore determined in advance by the fact that the meta-order of nature - nature as the 
market of markets - is itself in fundamental compliance with the laws of capitalism. We could 
prejudge a successful history as striving towards the final aim by means of the only 
successful, and therefore only possible, way. (Consequently, unsuccessful ways have to be 
judged as automatically self-cancelling by the mechanism of competition; when a society or 
an individual chooses the market way it succeeds and as a consequence it outstrips other less 
successful and less market-like individuals and populations that did not realise the market 
!  185
!  “Hayek, evolution and spontaneous order,” 430.438
!  Human Action, 265. 439
!  Mises explicitly asserts that the statement that capitalist law ‘was not valid in ancient Rome or in the empire 440
of the Incas’ (Ibid., 68) is as irrational as the belief that ‘exorcism was an appropriate means to cure sick cows.’ 
Ibid.
Mateusz Piotrowski
principles in practice explicitly enough.) History itself is the time necessary for history to 
come to an end by bringing to full clarity the principle implicit in ‘the laws of cosmic 
becoming’   - the principle of higher productivity that brings more productive entities to 441
success and eliminates the less productive ones from the competition.   
!
What is presupposed here is therefore a fundamental unity of the inner nature of nature and 
the nature of the market - and what is presented as the nature-essence of the market-nature is 
competition. ‘Competition is a procedure of discovery, a procedure involved in all evolution 
and it is decisive for determining who will last and multiply, since it is through further 
competition, not through agreement, we gradually increase our efficiency.’   Value, and 442
higher efficiency of the market order, derives from its internalisation and realisation of the 
natural essential principle of evolution (competition), which enables it to outstrip other modes 
of social organisation and other orders and to become more and more explicit, a more and 
more dominant mode and order, winning the competition in the drive for domination, because 
it realises more explicitly what has always already been there as the essence of natural 
evolution. Therefore, despite all the differences between biological and cultural evolution, a 
fundamental identity prevails and realises itself in the course of history. This process of 
necessary realisation is the universal history of progress. The necessity is a practical one: if 
history is to remain a history of humankind - not merely a history of nature without human 
beings, or the history of manlike creatures that have regressed towards a more primitive stage 
of development, in which not-yet-market orders prevail - it is necessary that humanity 
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interiorises and expresses the discipline of the dominant economy/economics. Otherwise it 
will regress culturally or even become extinct biologically. The purely practical aim of 
history is to progressively realise this necessary unity of the order of nature and the market 
order, by means of constructing social orders more and more aligned with this natural eidos. 
!
Hayek express this in a strangely ironic (perhaps not fully consciously ironic) form. After 
quoting A. M. Carr-Saunders’ statement that ‘Those groups practising the most advantageous 
customs will have an advantage in the constant struggle between adjacent groups over those 
that practise less advantageous customs’,   he quotes Sir Karl Raimund Popper arguing that 443
‘cultural evolution continues genetic evolution by other means’.   The maxim of the latter 444
might be read ironically, not only because it resonates with the famous aphorism of Carl von 
Clausewitz on war as the continuation of politics by other means, but also, more importantly 
for our current aim, because the alleged continuity of the evolution of nature in the evolution 
of culture, identified with the unfolding of capitalism, is highly ambiguous. Although both 
Mises and Hayek try to distance themselves from crude versions of Spencerian Social 
Darwinism   - emphasising that the social division of labour organised by capitalism does 445
not use the same means as the biological war for survival and that economic competition 
requires an undisturbed peace and produces such peace as its necessary product   - what 446
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matters for our enquiry is not the problem of the relationship of capitalist competition to 
violence and war (and the interlinked motif of doux commerce analysed famously by 
Hirschmann),   but the question of the continuity between biological and cultural evolution, 447
aiming at achieving unity between the natural ultimate given and the ideal ‘historical 
objective’ towards which the process gravitates as its final aim.  
!
The ironic meaning of the assertion that cultural evolution (identified with the development 
of the capitalist extended order) is a continuation of biological evolution by other means is 
best grasped if we illuminate it with a term taken from the tradition to which the present 
research is indebted - the tradition of German-Jewish thought, constituted by the constellation 
constituted of the Marxist materialism and theology. The notion to which I would like to refer 
is that of Natural-History (Naturgeschichte). This concept can be traced back to Benjamin’s 
famous work The Origin of The German Tragic Drama, can be found later in Adorno’s 
discussion on “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte” from the early 1930s, and later still in his 
seminal Negative Dialectics from 1966.   The Adornian interpretation of the Benjaminian 448
term was formulated in order to grasp how history is being both ‘ideologically’ pictured and 
‘actually’ practiced as if it is governed by natural laws, ‘the iron laws of commodity 
society’.   Conversely, nature is conceived as something that ‘undergoes a vast, far-reaching 449
process of transformation when subjected to the formidable powers of human labor and 
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industry.’   Adorno, both in the 1930s and in the 1960s, directly links this understanding of 450
Natural-History to Marx, emphasising that the Marxian idea of the laws of capitalism as the 
laws of nature, should be thought of as critical. This is the reason why he calls Marx an 
ironical Social Darwinist for whom ‘what the Social Darwinists praised, and what they would 
like to go by, is to him the negativity in which the chance of voiding it awakens.’  451
According to Adorno’s account of Marx: 
!
Where the realm of freedom had begun, they [the ‘natural laws’ - M.P.] would 
no longer apply. The Kantian distinction of a realm of freedom from one of 
necessity is transposed, by means of the mobilization of the Hegelian 
mediating philosophy of history, onto the sequence of phases. Only such an 
inversion of the Marxist motives as that of Diamat, which prolongs the realm 
of necessity with the assertion that it would be that of freedom, could 
degenerate into falsifying the polemical Marxist concept of natural lawfulness 
from a construction of natural history into a scientific doctrine of invariants.   452
!
The ‘necessary’ character of the laws of historical, economic progress - as emphasised in the 
Stalinist Diamat and present both in implicit and explicit form in the dominant economics (in 
conceptualising the laws of capitalism as the ultimately ‘given conditions’   and the 453
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‘environment that he [man] cannot alter’  ) - is taken up critically by Marx. Adorno quotes a 454
fragment from Marx, which might read like an ironically reversed ‘Hayekian’ picture of the 
‘unconscious’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘natural’ character of the market-process: 
!
Much as the whole of this motion appears as a social process, much as the 
single moments of this motion take their departure from the conscious will and 
from particular purposes of individuals - the totality of the process does appear 
as an objective context arising by natural growth. It is indeed due to the 
interaction of conscious individuals, but neither seated in their consciousness 
nor subsumed under them as a whole.   455
!
That socio-economic laws are being reconstructed (that is, both ‘ideologically’ pictured and 
‘actually’ established in the form of an objective appearance/semblance  ), this fact, in a 456
continuity between the necessarian violence of the laws of ‘nature’ and the laws of ‘society’, 
does not cast the laws of capitalism in a rosy light. Natural-History, the ‘spontaneous’ 
continuity of human history as incessant competition, as intensification of the explicitness of 
competition present in nature, is conceptualised by the author of Negative Dialectics as ‘the 
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history of the progressing mastery of nature’,   which ‘continues the unconscious history of 457
nature, of devouring and being devoured.’   458
!
The passing, historical order presents itself as a necessary and eternal meta-order of nature by 
prolonging the element of violence pictured as the essence of natural evolution in the form of 
specifically organised competition. This naturalisation of the ‘so-called law of nature’, which 
‘is merely one of capitalist society’,   presents and establishes  humanity as ‘subject to 459
natural laws (…) hypostatized as immutably given by nature.’   This effect of natural 460
immutability is, however, achieved by peculiar ends. What appears as the natural essence of 
nature is precisely change, mutability and dynamism, and the ultimate unknowability of this 
dynamic. This specifically reconstructed dynamic is posited in the very centre of this system 
of thought/practice and it is embodied in the concept of capital as a future-oriented factor of 
change, creating a dynamic society that is the best explication of natural dynamism and 
evolutionary unforeseeable competition - confirming the necessary character of such 
specifically organised competition. The unknown laws of the ever-changing meta-order are 
prejudged as being eternally in compliance with the laws of capitalist competition, 
understood as the very essence of change, unknowability and future. This is how the 
appearance - the objective appearance - of the natural, evolutionary necessity of the laws of 
the capitalist ordering is produced. 
!
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Summing up, we can state after analysing three characteristics of the dominant subject matter 
of our enquiry - that is, the three characteristics of capital/ism - that in the Misesian-Hayekian 
model capital is reconstructed in fundamental accordance with the dominant economics/
economy, despite their apparent critique of it. The dimension of historicity, social embedment 
and contingency within the Misesian-Hayekian framework exists to reinforce the 
characteristics of capital/ism as a transhistorical, spontaneously growing, self-embedding and 
ultimately necessary meta-order of nature. As such, the model of economy/economics 
proposed by the Austrians does not go beyond the paradigm of the dominant economy/
economics as exemplified by Torrens, Mankiw and Lazaer. The Austrian model includes the 
critical features of the dominant economics/economy that we analysed at the beginning of 
this chapter in our interpretation of Lazaer’s text. In accordance with Lazaer, the science of 
economics in the Misesian-Hayekian system derives its scientificity from the imperialistic 
proof from success (biological multiplication and the correlative threat of the biological 
extinction of humankind). This success is believed to be measured according to economics’ 
own principles and to be an effect of following the rules explicated by economics itself 
(success as an effect of following the rules made explicit by the pro-capitalist economists, 
which should be interiorised as implicit discipline, embodied in the social practices of 
subsumed sub-orders, and as explicitly expressed ideology). Finally, the aforementioned rules 
are treated as explicitly becoming (as they implicitly already have been from the very 
beginning) the rules of all human action and all nature’s activity (the market laws as the 
enhanced laws of the cosmic becoming of nature, which is understood as the market of 
markets). 
!
4. Towards a natural theology of capitalism 
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!
Given what we have covered so far, it might seem that such evolutionary prejudgement, 
together with other characteristics, must lead to the reconstruction of economics as realised 
naturalism, as a purely naturalistic ordering, thus leaving no place for any kind of theology. 
The matter is, however, far more complex. This is evidenced by Hayek himself, who - being 
more self-conscious than many other exponents of the dominant economics/economy - 
explicitly proclaims economics/economy to be not only a ‘purely naturalistic ordering’,  461
but, simultaneously and intriguingly, also ‘a more purely transcendent ordering’.   We have 462
already indicated the strangely transcendental character of the laws of capitalist ordering in 
the Austrian conceptualisation of economics/economy while analysing the Misesian category 
of the ultimate given and the Hayekian idea of humility towards the results of genuinely 
unknowable processes. This strangely theological dimension is also? present in Adorno’s 
critical reading of the?] concept of Natural-History, which, as Richard Wolin rightly notes, 
‘can best be translated in philosophical parlance by the concept of “myth.”’   Below I will 463
briefly try to explicate the cryptotheological - or, to use a more precise Benjaminian term, 
mythical - dimension of economic Natural-History, which cannot be reduced to pure 
naturalism. Special attention will have to be dedicated to a specific reconstruction of the 
temporal character of mythical laws, and especially to the specifically reconstructed 
temporality of the unknown future and the prejudgement linked to it. The investigation will 
be ordered by increasing explicitness, starting with (1) an analysis of the cognitive dimension 
of the problem; (2) we will then proceed towards its moral dimension; and finally, (3) we will 
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analyse explicitly the theological dimension, which is concerned not only with the cognitive 
relationship of the subject to the (un)knowable world, and not only with the moral 
relationship of the subject to its fellow men, but also to the relationship of the subject to an 
extra-individual and quasi-divine entity. 
!
It has been said that what is crucial for organising both the relationship of the subject to the 
world of nature - linked to cognitive judgement and its moral relationship with other human 
beings, linked to the moral judgement of action in the field of the economy as reconstructed 
by Mises and Hayek - is its specific temporal dimension. Therefore, before we can analyse 
cognitive and moral dimensions, leading us towards a natural theology of the dominant 
economics/economy, we must briefly analyse specific temporalities of the dominant subject-
matter of capital (and implicitly of its dominated counter-part, labour). In our schematic and 
simplified picture of these temporalities we will follow some insights provided by three 
German-Jewish thinkers: Benjamin, Adorno and Rosenzweig. If we were here to develop 
Rosenzweigian thought in the direction of the ironically mythical characteristics of the 
specific laws that seem to govern the temporalities of the past, present and future in 
capitalism, we could do this in the following way. 
!
(a) According to Adorno, myth signifies ‘what is eternally present, what human history 
endures as a pre-given “being” that is structured by fate.’   This refers to a specific presence 464
of the mythical past, something which, ironically paraphrasing Franz Rosenzweig, we could 
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call the everlasting primordial mythical world.   In the case of capitalism, this ever-present 465
past could be interpreted, if we were to apply Marxist terms, as the ‘original sin’   of 466
primitive accumulation, constituting the basic ‘elements’ of the capitalist order: accumulated, 
free money - ‘capital’ - on the one hand, and the free ‘wage-labourer’ deprived of means of 
production and reproduction on the other. This eternal past would also include a reoccurring 
of its original sin in the constitutive act of repeating primitive accumulations, which, by 
‘extra-economic’ means, (so-called accumulation by dispossession, political violence, 
redefinition of property rights, etc.) disconnects the workers from the means of production, 
creating ‘free’ means of production and ‘free’ workers.   467
!
(b) The present, the mythical ‘ever renewing world’,   in the case of capitalism could be 468
understood as the continuous economic reproduction of the conditions of possibility for 
capitalist production, based on the fact that ‘the sale and purchase of the labour-power, as the 
constant result of the capitalist process of production, implies that the worker must constantly 
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buy back a portion of his own produce in exchange for his living labour.’   This is what 469
Marx calls the ‘eternalisation’ (Verewigung)   of the conditions of capitalist reproduction, in 470
the act of economic production. 
!
(c) As for the third temporality, which is of the utmost importance here, the mythical 
dimension of the mythical future of ‘the eternal supra-world’   resides in the laws that exist 471
essentially as future, unknowable and undetermined, but which nevertheless do not cease to 
concretely determine the present and the past. Such an idea of the active eternal future is 
implied in the Benjaminian concept of the mythical laws that cannot be known in advance, of 
invisible borders that might be fully experienced and become known only in the act of 
punishment for trespassing them. 
!
4.1. Cognition 
!
Let us then start with an analysis of the cognitive dimension of the problematic. On the 
cognitive level the mythical laws indicated above are - simultaneously - ‘more purely 
transcendent’ and ‘purely naturalistic’, and both these dimensions reinforce the necessary 
character of the laws; the naturalistic ordering presents them as undeniable necessary laws of 
nature, while the ‘transcendent ordering’ presents them as unpredictable and thus 
!  196
!  Capital, 1063.469
!  For an important commentary on the incessantly produced effect of the ‘absolute contemporaneity’ of 470
capitalist society, by means of the incessant production of the conditions of its social reproduction, see Étienne 
Balibar “The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism,” in Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, 
(London: New Left Books, 1970), 272.
!  The Star of Redemption, 283-440.471
Mateusz Piotrowski
uncontrollable laws of the transcendental eternal future. However, while both the natural 
necessity and the transcendental unknowability of the laws, guaranteed ultimately by their 
future character, are used in order to make the subject accept and adjust to them in the act of 
speculative divination, the unknowable laws are ambiguously conceptualised as known in 
advance by the dominant economic prejudgement. The apparently unknowable apophatic 
laws are still ambiguously represented as functioning accordingly to the logic of the known 
natural economic laws discovered by the dominant economics, determined by the known 
essence of competition and believed to bring - in the end - a necessarily beneficial result for 
the social whole. Despite the declared unknowability of the laws for any human subject, the 
economic subject is persuaded to believe that the unknown laws must ultimately turn out 
good in the future, even if now they appear to be causing suffering - thus leading the enquiry 
in the direction of the moral dimension of the problematic. Let us now briefly analyse the 
ambiguous logic that presents the laws as unknowable and undetermined, while 
simultaneously turning this indeterminacy into an argument for acceptance of and active 
adjustment to a determined social order. The first characteristic, the dimension of constitutive 
‘unknowability’ is reconstructed in the Misesian-Hayekian system of thought in the 
following manner: 
!
This is the constitutional limitation of man’s knowledge and interests, the fact 
that he cannot know more than a tiny part of the whole of society and that 
therefore all that can enter into his motives are the immediate effects which his 
actions will have in the sphere he knows.   472
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!
In other words, according to Hayek there is a constitutive limit which undermines the 
pretences for knowledge of the laws of economics, and consequently undermines any 
possibility of control of the totality of the economic process (and this absolutist condition - to 
fully control the totality - is treated by both Hayek and Mises as indispensable for any 
socialist or social democratic planning). If we were to systematise the critique implicated 
here, we could distinguish between the synchronic and diachronic structural impossibility of 
totalisation. In the first case the word ‘immediate’ has a spatial and in the second a temporal 
meaning. As for the synchronic impossibility, it refers to the present infinite, spatial extension 
of the economic plane; i.e. to the fact that in the present, there is an innumerable multiplicity 
of events that cannot be consciously taken into account by any individual or collective 
subject, thus transcending the mental capabilities and consequently the capacity for planning 
of any subject, be it an individual or a collective political sovereign. Concerning the 
diachronic impossibility, even if we could theoretically and hypothetically imagine a 
cybernetic, statistical tool powerful enough to count all the present data, and control, plan and 
design an economic process (and this, some might say, could overcome the first problem of 
spatial impossibility), it would still be unable to get rid of the constitutive fact that the future 
must remain unknown and essentially unknowable. Therefore, ‘the planner’ would remain 
constitutionally unable to plan and design future events, which ultimately transcend his or her 
mental capacities. As a consequence, what is (apparently) rejected and undermined by the 
transcendence of the present and the ultimate transcendence of the eternal or ever-
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approaching future? is the idea of any kind of synoptic view. No subject can occupy the 
God’s viewpoint.   473
!
An analogous conceptualisation of the cognitive problem of totality in the economic field can 
be found in Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the famous figure of ‘the invisible hand’. 
Although Foucault does not explicitly refer to Mises or Hayek at this crucial point of his 
influential lectures on neoliberalism, nevertheless he strongly retrojects the Austrian critique 
of the ‘totalising’ planning onto his own reading of the fragment of The Wealth of the Nations 
and onto the discussion of one of the most controversial passages of political economy. Even 
more interestingly, Foucault rejects the idea that the invisible hand could be interpreted as 
what ‘remains of a theological conception of the natural order.’   Foucault sceptically refers 474
to the concept according to which, ‘through the notion of the invisible hand, Smith would be 
someone who more or less implicitly fixed the empty, but nonetheless secretly occupied place 
of a providential god who would occupy the economic process.’   It is important to note that 475
while reading The Birth of Biopolitics we should carefully distinguish those moments when 
Foucault is merely reporting the ideas of the authors he is interested in from those moments 
when he speaks for himself. This is not an easy task with such a personage as Foucault; the 
French scholar, while not treating his research as apolitical and not being afraid of taking a 
stand, nevertheless tries to elude being caught up as a straightforward critic or defender of 
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neoliberalism. However, when we refer to the issue discussed in the quoted fragment there 
can be no serious doubts that Foucault is not only reporting the ideas of the economists, but is 
also taking his own stance in the debate about the possible theological structures at work in 
the liberal and neoliberal concept of economic ordering.   He explicitly endorses the belief 476
in the economy as a process that cannot be totalised by the human mind and which, 
consequently, forces ‘man’ to resign from the cryptotheological pretences of humanism, 
pretences for a godlike synoptic view with consequent pretences for the control of economic 
forces. Thus, according to Foucault, a discipline correlative and adequate to such a field of 
forces, a discipline of ‘economics is a discipline without God, a discipline without totality’.  477
Economy constitutes ‘an indefinite field of immanence’,   a fully immanent plane without a 478
transcendent point that could be occupied by a godlike figure, and economics mirrors this 
fact. If Foucault’s claims were true, then the possibility of the existence of any kind of 
theology, including a ‘natural theology’, of economics/economy would have to be rejected. 
The plane of economics/economy would present itself solely as a ‘purely naturalistic 
ordering’   cognitive dispositive ‘without any transcendence’.   479 480
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Such a problematisation of the field corresponds to a specific problematisation of the 
correlative subject (what Foucault calls ‘the problematic of economic man’  ), strongly 481
influenced by the Misesian idea of the subject of speculation, contrasted with the totalitarian 
subject of planning. The subject of speculation inhabits the field of the apparently atheistic 
economy in which no kind of totalising view is possible. It is not only politically prohibited 
but also cognitively impossible, due to a double political and epistemic-ontological 
constitutional limitation, which blocks the possibility of any political totalitarianism and any 
cognitive totalisation. As Foucault notes, reconstructing (a very Misesian) subject understood 
as the subject of speculation in the indeterminate and uncontrollable future-oriented 
temporality:  
!
The situation of homo economicus could (…) be described as doubly 
involuntary, with regard to the accidents which happen to him and with regard 
to the benefit he unintentionally produces for others. It is also doubly 
indefinite since, on the one hand, the accidents upon which his interest 
depends belong to a domain which cannot be covered or totalized and, on the 
other, the benefit he produces for others by producing his own benefit is also 
indefinite and cannot be totalized. His situation is therefore doubly 
involuntary, indefinite, and non-totalizable, but all these involuntary, 
indefinite, uncontrollable, and non-totalizable features of his situation do not 
disqualify his interest or the calculation he may make to maximize it. On the 
contrary, all these indefinite features of his situation found, as it were, the 
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specifically individual calculation that he makes; they give it consistency, 
effect, insert it in reality, and connect it in the best possible way to the rest of 
the world. So, we have a system in which homo economicus owes the positive 
nature of his calculation precisely to everything which eludes his 
calculation.   482
!
This fragment is loaded, carrying two crucial prejudgements. These prejudgements operate in 
the sphere of ambiguity, they might sound as though they contradict one another, but in the 
actual functioning of the dispositive of the dominant economics they rather reinforce one 
another, working towards the same final aim. As for the first prejudgement, what is assumed 
here is unknowability of the social field. The subject cannot know the totality of the present - 
much less foresee future events. The power of the future seems undetermined. Thus, one 
could think that such a purely unknown and purely transcendent future would be 
disconnected from the actuality of the present, rendering it void of any power to actually 
shape and determine the present action of the subject. However, the unknown future invades 
the present and determines it, forcing the subject to calculate and to behave according to the 
determinate rules explicated by the dominant economics. We cannot know the future, we 
cannot know what the future laws of the order would look like, therefore - and this reasoning, 
that this ‘therefore’ is rather a leap of faith than a chain of reasoning is decisive - we should 
act according to the essence of the laws of the economy as explicated by the dominant 
economics. And the essence of the economy, according to the Austrian economics, is 
competition (being a continuation of biological, evolutionary competition by different 
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means). The very fact that the present and, decisively, the future must remain unknown 
enforces not only undifferentiated speculation (which could be for example a cooperative 
speculation) but also a peculiar, determinate competitive speculation. In contrast to a 
competitive speculation, a mode of speculation based on cooperation, according to Hayek, 
!
makes hardly any sense when the problem is to adapt to unknown 
circumstances; yet it is this adaptation to the unknown on which the 
coordination of efforts in the extended order rests. Competition is a procedure 
of discovery, a procedure involved in all evolution, that led man unwittingly to 
respond to novel situations; and through further competition, not through 
agreement, we gradually increase our efficiency.   483
!
The assumption that in relation to the unknown future only competition - not cooperation - 
makes sense remains valid only if we presume that we already know the essential laws 
guiding this unknown future. Indeed, according to Hayek, this essential law is - when 
explicated - capitalist competition. Thus, the subject should speculate competitively, against 
other agents, because competitiveness is the most efficient means to the final end (which is 
increasing efficiency itself). This might sound merely negative (an unknown future, negation 
of the actions of others), but the result is believed to be ultimately positive and productive for 
all, as the phrase ‘our efficiency’   suggests. Thus, Foucault rightly emphasises ‘the positive 484
nature’   of indeterminacy as reconstructed by the dominant economic dispositive. It is 485
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positive firstly in the sense that it constitutes an incentive for incessant productive action. It 
not only blocks and forbids, but also produces subjective activity: the active adjustment, in 
the face of the unknown future, of a subject who could never be sure if s/he has been 
productive and competitive enough, if s/he has rightly ‘divinised’ the turn of the market and, 
consequently, if the investment of subjective skills and energy will turn out to bring sufficient 
profit in the future. This indeterminacy is productive, positive and determining, since it 
disciplines and motivates the subject towards incessant, specifically determined production. 
But there is also a second sense of ‘positivity’ indicated by Foucault, a sense that we will try 
to explicate in the next subsection. This sense refers to belief in the morally positive character 
of the results of the right (i.e. economic) action. While it is said that the ultimate results in 
such a non-totalisable field cannot be grasped cognitively and that the spatial extension and 
the temporal unknowability produce a veil of ignorance, covering the consequences of 
individual action, still these actions are believed to bring an overall positive, moral result. 
!
4.2. Morality 
!
Now we are able to grasp the problem as not only cognitive but also moral. The second sense 
of the word ‘positive’ refers to justification of the gain of the individual and to a belief in the 
ultimately beneficial result that the pursuit after such gain must produce for the social whole. 
Thus a morally acceptable relationship between the individual action and the collective result 
is established and an actively motivating disciplin, set of mores, emerges. Here is where we 
find the second prejudgement in the height of its power. Although the future result of the 
market process has been presented as genuinely cognitively ungraspable, still this result is 
prejudged - judged in advance - as necessarily beneficial for the individual and the social 
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whole, and as such as morally positive. The first prejudgement claims that ‘the will of each, 
the interest of each, and the way in which this interest is or is not realized are bound up with a 
mass of elements which elude individuals.’  . The second prejudgement, which immediately 486
follows the first, claims that ‘At the same time this individual interest, without him knowing 
it, wishing it, or being able to control it, is linked to a series of positive effects which mean 
that everything which is to his advantage will turn out to be to the advantage of others.’  487
Foucault describes this as ‘a directly multiplying’   ‘mechanism without any transcendence 488
in which the will of each harmonizes spontaneously and as it were involuntarily with the will 
and interest of others.’   This is why the subject of economics, according to Foucault, lives 489
at the antipodes of ‘renunciation, transcendence, and the voluntary bond’.   This apparent 490
exclusion of transcendence seems to eliminate the possibility of the existence of a 
transcendental singular subjective position. As such, it has not only cognitive consequences, 
eliminating the possibility of a sovereign, commanding view in the field of economy/
economics, but it also seems to eliminate the possibility of moral interpellation to sacrifice 
individual interest for the good of the apparent whole. If economics is a directly multiplying 
mechanism, this eliminates both the necessity and possibility of conflict between the 
individual and the whole, thus eliminating the possibility and necessity of sacrificing 
individual interest at the altar of the (supposedly inexistent) super-individual entity of the 
total social process. However, a more detailed analysis will expose that the analysed 
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mechanism - while presenting itself as cognitively agnostic, morally neutral, and 
theologically atheistic - is in reality far more complex. This happens because, although the 
faculty to cognitively grasp and morally judge is denied to human beings, it is not simply 
liquidated, but rather transferred to an extra-individual entity - the capitalistically organised 
market - which inherits both the cognitive and moral characteristics of a deity, being 
omniscient and absolutely just, not according to human measures but its own internal 
measures. 
!
The aim of the present subsection is to explicate the moral dimension contained in the 
cognitive prejudgements of the dominant economics/economy. This explication will lead us 
in the direction of the cryptotheology present in the analysed subject-matters, showing how 
the leaps of faith lead from cognitive presumptions (concerning the relationship of the subject 
with the economic world: the im/possibility of grasping the future-oriented total process), 
through moral presumption (concerning its relationship with other subjects: the im/possibility 
to judge future-oriented individual action in relation to the social whole), and finally towards 
a cryptotheologcial presumption (concerning the relationship with an extra-individual entity, 
imbued with the power of cognitive evaluation and moral judgement). This third 
cryptotheological relationship, uniting both cognitive and moral dimensions by producing a 
singular transcendent position - a time-place whence the totality of the social process can not 
only be cognitively grasped but also morally evaluated, according to the laws established by 
the cryptotheologcial process itself - will be analysed in the next subsection of this part of our 
investigation. 
!
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Now let us see how the cognitive-ontological argument for the impossibility of totalisation 
(that it is impossible to totalise the social field because of its spatial and temporal extension, 
which transcends human cognisance) contains a not fully explicable argument against the 
moral consequences of an attempt at such totalisation (‘thank heaven people are only 
concerned about their interests, thank heaven merchants are perfect egoists and rarely 
concern themselves with the public good, because that’s when things start to go wrong’,   as 491
Foucault says summarising Smith) and how this pushes our investigation towards theology. 
Explication of these prejudgements will become easier if we try to reconstruct the political-
polemical situation in which they emerge. 
!
The subject who is being addressed is, for some reason, prone to evaluating its effort as 
something that might not bring positive results for himself or for the social whole. This is the 
reason why this subject is reassured by the dominant economic discourse that, despite the fact 
that the economic laws are unknowable and that the future must remain unknown, ‘in this 
apparent chaos we see nonetheless, through a general law of the moral world, the efforts each 
makes for himself serving the good of all’,   or, as Hayek puts it, that the subject acting 492
according to the market discipline ‘can both serve his own advantage and also make a larger 
contribution to the aggregate (in terms of the same units of calculation that most others 
use)’.   Now, one could ask, why should a subject begin to evaluate its efforts as irreparable 493
sacrifice or even pure waste in the first place? Furthermore, why does s/he need to be 
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reassured that the sacrifice is only apparent and temporary? Why does s/he need to be 
persuaded that the overall result will be beneficial for the social whole? If we reject Mises’ 
explanation, which accuses the socialist propagandists of spoiling the natural harmony 
between the labourer and his labour, as over-simplified, we can then turn to the Hayekian 
explanation. We have already seen this explanation suggested in certain cited passages from 
The Fatal Conceit, concerning the necessity to restrain the impatient urge to take action 
against suffering (e.g. against the suffering of the victims of starvation in the Sahel), which 
would interfere with the market rules, thus impeding the growth that would spontaneously 
solve the problem, if only sufficient time were allowed for it to do so. Perhaps the clearest 
explanation of the problem of whence the dissatisfaction and the doubts of the subject arise, 
regarding the value of his/her present efforts, is given by Hayek in his methodological essay 
titled “The Trend of Economic Thinking”, written in the midst of the crisis of the 1930s:    
!
The existence of a body of reasoning which prevented people from following 
their first impulsive reactions, and which compelled them to balance indirect 
effects, which could be seen only by exercising the intellect, against intense 
feeling caused by the direct observation of concrete suffering (…) occasioned 
intense resentment. It was against the validity of such reasoning in general that 
the emotional revolt was directed. Thus, temporarily, social enthusiasm 
succeeded in destroying an instrument created to serve it because it had been 
made impatient by the frequent disappointments which it had occasioned.   494
!
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What causes dissatisfaction and what can lead to a revolt, which would eventually spoil the 
functioning of the interconnected whole, is ‘the direct observation of concrete suffering’,  495
which occasions ‘intense resentment’.   As William Connolly notes, situating Hayek’s 496
argument in the political context of the Great Depression and the interventionist reactions to 
it, 
!
Hayek worries that too many people will rebel against ‘obeying’ the dictates of 
the market when unemployment is high or another disruption occurs. They 
will act democratically to overturn market principles. The pursuit of short-
term interest and the practices of citizenship must both be filled with 
neoliberal ideology if the regime is to flourish. Otherwise short-term suffering 
will promote long-term irrationality.   497
!
Now, in order to make ‘those who had become impatient’   to patiently wait (or even 498
willingly adjust to their conditions, and to the future results of the market process), a counter-
move emerges. It not only produces a limitation of the field or scope of the subject’s 
cognition (subjective ‘vision’) but also a limitation of the scope of its moral responsibility, in 
order to block the pretences of the subject to intervene in the social processes against the 
‘spontaneous’ tendencies of the market. As Hayek notes in his essay on individualism, the 
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economic subject ‘should have a clearly delimited area of responsibility’,   and the best way 499
to ‘inform the individual what is his sphere of responsibility within which he must shape his 
own life’   is to construct a set of ‘rules which, above all, enable man to distinguish between 500
mine and thine, and from which he and his fellows can ascertain what is his and what is 
somebody else’s sphere of responsibility.   Caution is needed at this point. At first sight it 501
might seem that what we encounter is a purely cognitive constitutional limitation, which 
seems to be eternally founded on the supposedly unquestionable fact that the subject ‘cannot 
know more than a tiny part of the whole of society and that therefore all that can enter into 
his motives are the immediate effects which his actions will have in the sphere he knows.’  502
If that were the case, the subject would always be disinterested with everything that exceeds 
his sphere of vision, but Hayek explicitly underlines the fact that specific social institutions 
(especially the institution of ‘several property’,   which limits the responsibility of the 503
subject to its own property or to the tasks delegated to him/her by the owners of such 
property) have to be constructed in order to limit the scope of vision of the subject. What is 
implied by this is that there exist actual incitements that could stimulate the subject to go 
beyond the sphere of its limited vision and limited responsibility. The most dangerous of 
these incitements is, according to Hayek, the suffering of oneself or others. Such an 
immediate impulse does not have to end with the immediate reaction, but might lead the 
subject towards a specific will to knowledge motivated by suffering and aimed at a structural 
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reconstruction of the social order. Thus, the immediate suffering could produce pretences for 
a commanding view of the social process, situating the subject beyond the finite scope of its 
own vision, which was previously limited by the specifically constructed concept-device of 
‘self-interest’.  
!
This complex  move leads from the immediate impulse generated by suffering towards the 
will to construct a theoretical mediation somehow capable of grasping theoretically and 
modifying practically the structural coordinates of the social process. In the counter-move 
designed to block this move, the infinite spatial and temporal extension of the social field 
reinforces the finitude of the cognitive scope of vision and the finitude of the moral scope of 
responsibility of the subject. Foucault describes this counter-move as one in which the 
cognitive impossibility of totalising the involuntary results which our actions have on other 
people in the economic system and, as a counterpart to this this, the impossibility of 
controlling the fact that ‘the most distant event taking place on the other side of the world 
may affect my interest, and there is nothing I can do about it’,   lead to a conclusion: I am 504
not responsible for the impact of my economic action on others beyond the limited sphere of 
my responsibility, since I cannot control it. Furthermore, since I cannot control the impact the 
actions of invisible others have on myself, all I can do is try to adjust to them. The 
commanding view (identified by Foucault, Mises and Hayek with the totalitarian will of 
totalisation) seems to be impossible. There is a constitutional cognitive limit, an 
indispensable veil of ignorance that prevents the subject from going beyond its own limited 
view. But this cognitive constitutional limit is not enough, since the suffering of others 
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(perhaps produced also by my economic action) and my own suffering, produced by the 
economic action of others, might produce a will to go beyond this limit and strive 
consciously to end suffering and perhaps even to aim at producing such theoretical and 
practical conditions that would make possible a conscious realisation of the common good - 
and this must be avoided. Therefore:  
!
Invisibility is not just a fact arising from the imperfect nature of human 
intelligence which prevents people from realizing that there is a hand behind 
them which arranges or connects everything that each individual does on their 
own account. Invisibility is absolutely indispensable. It is an invisibility which 
means that no economic agent should or can pursue the collective good.   505
!
Conscious pursuit of the collective good, motivated, as Hayek suggests, by the impulse to get 
rid of suffering, is not only impossible (the subject cannot do it) but also explicitly forbidden 
(the subject should not do it), and we can infer that if something needs to be forbidden, then 
an actual temptation to do what is forbidden must exist. We could infer that statements 
claiming that ‘being in the dark and the blindness of all the economic agents are absolutely 
necessary’   and that ‘the collective good must not be an objective’   are so explicitly 506 507
emphasised that there must be an actual urge. This urge produces a will to totality, making the 
subject want to achieve a point whence the social processes could somehow be ‘seen’ and 
conscious action aimed at the common good could be taken. Therefore, to block this actual 
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urge it is not sufficient to assume that invisibility exists as an ultimately given constitutional, 
natural limit of cognition, blocking the very possibility of striving for mental totalisation. 
Invisibility has to be actively morally and politically produced in order to impede the 
totalitarian pursuits of subjects. To block this actual urge, an invisibility, a specific veil of 
ignorance, has to be woven, concealing the consequences of economic (consumer or 
productive) activity. 
!
Here we can see the first signal indicating a moral dispositive, a morally valued positivity, 
which not only scientifically judges totalisation as something cognitively impossible but also 
as something morally disastrous. The idea of achieving a commanding view, motivated by 
suffering and aimed at the structural reconfiguration of the socio-economic field (pictured by 
Foucault, in a somehow exaggerated manner as an absolutist claim to ‘all or nothing’), is 
rejected not only because of its cognitive or theoretical impossibility, but also because of its - 
known in advance and (pre)judged as destructive - practical consequences for the social life. 
Hayek asserts that the ‘attempt to render a situation just whose outcome, by its nature, cannot 
be determined by what anyone does or can know, only damages the functioning of the 
process itself’.   At face value, this sentence might be interpreted as a purely scientific 508
judgement of the nature of human cognition, determined by the ontological primacy of the 
unknown future, which ‘cannot be determined by what anyone does or can know’.   The 509
primacy of such temporality would thus simply render vain the category of justice, a category 
which Hayek understands as always being cognitively limited by its being immersed in the 
past temporal modalities of the known laws. As a past-determined category, justice can refer 
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solely to the already known laws of the community and as such is incompatible with the 
essentially unknowable and future-oriented processes of biological and economic evolution. 
This gesture of moral neutralisation, although it produces real effects neutralising and 
disarming a certain morality - does not end the process. As it has been suggested, what is 
presupposed in the Hayekian reasoning is not only that we can know in advance the results of 
anti-market action (we can prejudge non-market action as something that ‘only damages the 
functioning of the process’  ) but also that we can positively prejudge the results of the 510
unhampered spontaneous functioning of the market process. Thus, an anti-market conscious 
attempt for the common good is not only ridiculed because of its impotence, not only 
denounced for bringing about a morally unacceptable result (that is, long-term suffering, 
death and the regression of human culture), but it is also condemned from the perspective of 
the morally superior result guarded and ensured by following the market-discipline. The 
rejection of such discipline leads to morally unacceptable results. The prescripts of the 
Austrian economics must be accepted ‘from the perspective of any philosophy that looks 
unfavourably on the human suffering and death that would follow the collapse of our 
civilisation.’   What is presumed is not only that alternative economic actions (identified as 511
‘interference’ with the spontaneous market process) must ultimately lead to death, suffering 
and regression, but also that action done in accordance with the dominant economics must 
‘eventually redound to the benefit of others’.   Therefore, one who follows one’s interest as 512
reconstructed by the dominant economics acts not only in accordance with nature, but also in 
accordance with morality. He or she acts ‘altruistically’, not because he consciously strives to 
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do so but because ‘the extended order circumvents individual ignorance (...) in a way that 
good intentions alone cannot do - and thereby does make our efforts altruistic in their 
effects.’   513
!
In order to understand how the strange entity of the capitalist extended order is endowed by 
the dominant economics/economy with the power to circumvent individuals, achieving divine 
characteristics of omniscience and absolute justice, we must analyse in preparation how both 
the function of providing a cognitive ‘mental grasp’ of the social processes and the function 
of judgement, providing an objective and unquestionable moral evaluation of individual 
action in relation to society are denied to human beings and transferred to the economic 
process itself. Let us start from the first ‘negative’ move, which denies not only the 
possibility of formulating a cognitive mental grasp but also the possibility of formulating a 
moral judgement of the economic process. According to Hayek: 
!
If market coordination of individual activities, as well as other moral traditions 
and institutions, results from natural, spontaneous, and self-ordering processes 
of adaptation to a greater number of particular facts than any one mind can 
perceive or even conceive, it is evident that demands that these processes be 
just, or possess other moral attributes [.] derive from a naive 
anthropomorphism. Such demands of course might be appropriately addressed 
to the directors of a process guided by rational control or to a god attentive to 
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prayers, but are wholly inappropriate to the impersonal self-ordering process 
actually at work.   514
!
Thus a certain morality is being disarmed, producing ‘an important consequence for 
anthropomorphism and animism of all sorts - and thus for socialism.’   What is rejected is a 515
specific moral idea, which, according to Hayek, is a remnant of a specific religious idea. This 
idea, we might add, is at its root the idea of a God who is able to say, ‘I have indeed seen the 
misery of my people in Egypt. I have heard them crying out because of their slave drivers, 
and I am concerned about their suffering. So I have come down to rescue them from the hand 
of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land into a good and spacious land, a land 
flowing with milk and honey’ (Exodus 3, 7-8) - an idea articulated again in the epistle of the 
leader of the Jewish Christianity, Jesus’ brother James: 
!
Now listen, you rich people, weep and wail because of the misery that is 
coming on you. Your wealth has rotted, and moths have eaten your clothes. 
Your gold and silver are corroded. Their corrosion will testify against you and 
eat your flesh like fire. You have hoarded wealth in the last days. Look! The 
wages you failed to pay the workers who mowed your fields are crying out 
against you. The cries of the harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord 
Almighty. (James 5, 1-4). 
!
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This is precisely what is rejected by Hayekian naturalisation. Picturing the economic process 
as evolutionary and stating that ‘evolution cannot be just’   is aimed at demonstrating to the 516
subject that ‘such demands for justice are simply inappropriate to a naturalistic evolutionary 
process’.   This move not only denies a certain Judeo-Christian idea of justice (which has 517
led to a belief in the possibility and necessity of creating relationships of solidarity not only 
in family or in a small community but also at the level of a just extended order, the idea 
described by Hayek as an ‘ancient, and now obsolete, ideal of general human behaviour’)  518
but also posits the capitalist meta-order of the market as morally neutral, as something 
beyond justification, as a pure natural fact, an ultimate given beyond good and evil, which 
does not need to give any further justifications for itself, appearing as pure facticity.  
!
The impossibility of bringing about justice, of rendering a situation just, is derived from the 
impossibility of cognitively grasping and morally judging the process, and this impossibility 
is ultimately grounded in the always-future-oriented character of that process. As Hayek 
states, ‘moral desert cannot be determined objectively, and in any case the adaptation of the 
larger whole to facts [is M.P.] yet to be discovered’.   Thus, the market directed distribution 519
of rewards - if measured by an understanding of justice based on past and present known 
results - might be ‘in one sense a morally indifferent way of allocating its parts’.   However, 520
it would be premature to identify Hayek’s stance that ‘moral desert cannot be determined 
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objectively’,   with absolute cognitive and moral agnosticism. The faculty of objective 521
judgement is denied to human beings but it is given to a specific entity - the market. The 
faculty of omniscience - knowledge of all actual circumstances and all future results, which 
makes it possible to formulate an adequate moral judgement of the individual works and to 
take into account its overall result for the social whole - is not simply liquidated, but rather it 
is transferred from ‘a single brain or will (as for example, that of an omniscient God)’   to 522
the extra-individual and non-personal market process. The objective cognitive evaluation and 
moral judgement is expressed in the actual prices presently paid for the products and services 
of the individual. 
!
Thus, if the common interest is really our interest, we must not give in to this 
very human instinctual trait, but instead allow the market process to determine 
the reward. Nobody can ascertain, save through the market, the size of an 
individual's contribution to the overall product, nor can it otherwise be 
determined how much remuneration must be tendered to someone to enable 
him to choose the activity which will add most to the flow of goods and 
services offered at large. Of course if the latter should be considered morally 
good, then the market turns out to produce a supremely moral result.  !523
!
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Now, a superficial reading would focus on the purely agnostic fragments (‘Nobody can 
ascertain (…) the size of an individual's contribution to the overall product’),   but Hayek 524
emphatically underlines that there is an instance that has the cognitive capability of 
objectively ascertaining individual contribution to the social whole, and as such has the moral 
capability of providing a morally justifiable remuneration for the individual. ‘Nobody can 
ascertain (…) save through the market’.   The chain of reasoning is the following: if our 525
interest should be identified with the capitalistically understood pursuit to individual success 
and if this pursuit identifies itself with the common interest, believed to be the only way to 
bring about wealth - and, indeed, more wealth for all - then ‘the market turns out to produce a 
supremely moral result.’   Therefore, ‘if the common interest is really our interest, we must 526
not give in to this very human instinctual trait, but instead allow the market process to 
determine the reward.’   In other words, there is no other moral choice than to refrain from 527
an attempt to bring about justice, to accept (i.e. let the market act and judge action on its own) 
and actively adjust (i.e. let the market act through us in our pursuit for our own interests 
defined accordingly by the market discipline). The market methods of evaluation are not our 
methods of evaluation, and market justice is not our justice. Human efforts to judge the works 
of others are rejected as cognitively impossible (we are unable to evaluate all the innumerable 
circumstances and, even less so, to evaluate what the future, unpredictable result of their 
works will be) and as morally dubious (these efforts are ultimately driven by past-oriented 
resentment). The faculty to take account of all possible circumstances and to formulate an 
objective judgement of man’s works is thus withdrawn from conscious human judgement and 
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from the animistic projection of a personified God who would intervene in order to bring 
about justice, and assigned to the objective impersonal mechanism of the market, which 
generates ultimate evaluations of human action in the form of actual prices.  	
The market result not only justly evaluates individual contribution to total social productivity, 
but also brings about such justice that benefits the social whole by maximisation of this 
contribution. As Mises states: 	
The utilitarian economist does not say: Fiat justitia, pereat mundus. He says: 
Fiat justitia, ne pereat mundus. He does not ask a man to renounce his well-
being for the benefit of society. He advises him to recognize what his rightly 
understood interests are. In his eyes God’s magnificence does not manifest 
itself in busy interference with sundry affairs of princes and politicians, but in 
endowing his creatures with reason and the urge toward the pursuit of 
happiness.’  	528
!
As we will recall, at first the dominant economics/economy appeared agnostic in reference to 
the possibility of achieving a cognitive grasp of totality; naturalistically neutral in reference 
to morality and its organising principle of justice; and atheistic in reference to the existence 
of a non-human entity endowed with power to cognitively grasp and morally judge human 
action. Such was the claim of Foucault, who tried to picture economics as the ultimate anti-
totalistic knowledge, accepting the finitude of the human mind and the non-transparency of 
the economic world, abandoning pretences for total knowledge and absolute justice, inherited 
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by science and politics after religion, and as such claiming to situate itself beyond all 
theology. He states:!
Thus the economic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable. It 
is originally and definitively constituted from a multiplicity of points of view 
which is all the more irreducible as this same multiplicity assures their 
ultimate and spontaneous convergence. Economics is an atheistic discipline; 
economics is a discipline without God; economics is a discipline without 
totality.   529
!
Note that all the characteristics of economics given in the last sentence are negative. 
Economics is presented as cognitively agnostic (‘a discipline without totality’  ) and 530
theologically atheistic (‘a discipline without God’  ). However, a specific positivity, which 531
we encountered at the beginning of this subsection, enters the picture under the name of 
‘spontaneous convergence’,   ‘constituted from a multiplicity of points of view’.   We 532 533
recognise here ‘a directly multiplying’   ‘mechanism without any transcendence in which 534
the will of each harmonizes spontaneously and as it were involuntarily with the will and 
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interest of others.’   This mechanism promises to draw an ultimately morally positive result 535
out of the apparent chaos of the non-totalisable multiplicity of present events and the 
unknowable future. Against Foucault’s claims, let us now conceptualise a specific and 
ambiguous transcendent position; this specific transcendent time-place is produced, and how 
access to this beatific vision is not only denied but also given, both to professional 
economists and to lay men from the street, in ambiguous images visualising invisibility and 
in paradoxical figures making the ungraspable totality of capitalist speak through personified 
commodities, confessing its ‘practical faith’. Explanation of this ambiguous state will, again, 
require an inquiry into a specific temporality and specific prejudgement bound to it. 
!
4.3. Power 
!
Evolutionary naturalism presents the results of the interplay of market forces as undeniable 
and necessary in their pure facticity, beyond any need for justification. However, in the 
previous subsection we have seen that in order to understand the peculiar nature of this 
necessity we must take into account its moral dimension. The results, the judgements of the 
market process, are presented as necessary not simply in the sense of a ‘necessary evil’ that 
would have to be accepted because of the sad fact that it cannot be changed. Rather, Hayek’s 
claim is more ambitious. He states that this evil - including individual suffering - is only 
apparent and temporary; it is an evil which in the end will prove itself to be necessary since it 
is the only way that leads to a greater good. If we want to understand the presumptions on 
which this reasoning is based we need to analyse how the characteristics of both the 
‘apparent’ and the ‘temporary’ come back into play. 
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!
As for the apparent, a genuine economist, according to Hayek, has access to the deeper layers 
of the laws of the economic world, operating beyond the level of the apparent and visible (an 
economist, in contrast to a ‘non-economist’  , an ‘ordinary thinker’   and  ‘the man in the 536 537
street’,   is able to see ‘interrelations between things which he [the non-economist - M.P.] 538
does not see’).   This discrepancy between science and popular knowledge is something 539
more than a theoretical problem. As Hayek states, ‘the economist - unlike the practitioners of 
the other sciences - is almost expected to apologise if he disagrees with the more hastily 
reached conclusions of lay thought.’   The reason for this is that the ordinary man is ‘likely 540
to feel injured’   by what economics implies, as the economist advocates the necessity of 541
‘means which nobody wanted or understood, and which in isolation might be regarded as 
some of the most objectionable features of the system.’   The most objectionable features of 542
the system, for the lay person, are, as we might assume, those that cause ‘concrete 
suffering’,   and this suffering might lead to impatient, ‘hastily’   reached conclusions, 543 544
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leading to anti-market action, which makes it impossible for the as yet hidden, deeper laws of 
the market to come to the surface and to bring about their ultimate positive results. 
!
What the lay, non-economic subject lacks is, therefore, a proper perspective intimately bound 
to time. The economist on his part is able to reassure the subject to wait for this ultimate 
moment, when the not-apparent laws of the economy will appear visibly (or even better, to 
try to actively adjust in the present to these unknown future laws). What enables the 
economist to judge the suffering of the individual as merely apparent is the specific position 
he occupies. This position should be understood also in the temporal sense. The economist 
can formulate the above mentioned assertion not only because he know the laws of the 
economy, which operate beyond the level of the apparent and the immediate in a spatial 
sense, but also, and decisively, because he is able to wait and to predict that if we patiently 
leave the economic forces to freely operate, if we cultivate their natural growth, without 
interfering with them (or better still, quicken their growth by means of proper incitements-
fertilisers), then the suffering will ultimately come to an end. The economist not only 
occupies a specific position but also a specific time-place. By means of a theoretical short-
circuit he can situate himself at the end-point of the process, in a time-place from which the 
present suffering can be judged in advance as already compensated for by the fact that it is 
leading to a higher and greater good. 
!
As we will recall, access to such a time-place (‘a point where the whole is completely 
transparent to a sort of gaze’  ) has been emphatically denied, because the emergence of 545
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such a transcendent position would undermine the secular character of the economic field. 
Access to this apparently inexistent transcendent time-point, which enables cognition of the 
process and judgement of individual action in relation to the process, is therefore given in 
paradoxical ‘mental pictures’.   The most famous of these pictures is of course that of the 546
invisible hand dispensing a providential harmony between apparently conflicting moments, 
justifying the most objectionable moments of the social system as not merely factually 
unavoidable but ultimately beneficial. In order to avoid accusations of focusing on a concept-
image formulated at the end of the eighteenth century, in the supposed prehistory of scientific 
economics (a charge that could also be refuted by showing how often the allegory of the 
invisible hand is evoked by Hayek and Mises themselves  ), we will now turn to a an 547
illuminating, influential and contemporary rendering of this concept-image, based on an 
analogous ambiguity, expressing a similar prejudgement, and giving access to a paradoxical 
time-place whence the deep laws of the capitalist order, unknown by any subject, might be 
seen and emphatically expressed. This concept-image, working on the threshold of scientific 
argumentation and popular imagination, can be found in the famous economic tale “I, the 
Pencil”   by Leonard Read, commented on by the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton 548
Friedman. Reference to this tale in the present seems justifiable, as it is has become one of 
the most popular ways of explaining the idea of spontaneous order. A brief analysis of this 
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allegorical tale might help us to examine the ambiguous nature of the explicit exposition of 
the supposedly ever-implicit order - the visualisation of the invisible laws - and the conscious 
exposure of unconscious activity, and prepare us for confrontation with the theological 
dimension of the dominant economics/economy. What interests us in this tale is the 
ambiguous relationship between (1) what is unknown by the subjects of action, (2) what is 
actively being made invisible, and, finally, (3) what is explicated and exposed by the strange 
subject of utterance, occupying ‘God’s position’.!
(1) Regarding the first point, what is actually invisible are the conditions of production under 
the capitalist division of labour. ‘I am a mystery’,   says the Pencil in Read’s tale. ‘I insist 549
that only God could make me’,   it adds. Man cannot ‘direct these millions of know-hows to 550
bring me into being.’   Man cannot control the economic spontaneous process. This process, 551
however, without conscious control nonetheless leads to an overall benefit. As Milton 
Friedman explains, ‘the magic of the price system’,   coordinating the division of labour and 552
gathering elements from all corners of the world to produce a pencil, is the best way ‘not only 
to promote productive efficiency, but even more to foster harmony and peace among the 
peoples of the world’,   without the conscious pursuit of such a goal on the part of human 553
subjects. 
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!
(2) What remains truly invisible or untold in the allegorical parable, what is actively being 
made invisible to the reader or listener (situated by Friedman in the position of the consumer/
user of the pencil), what is being backgrounded by the weaving of a veil of ignorance, are the 
actual conditions of production. This might include, for example, the coercive political power 
of, say, an authoritarian Latin American or African regime, necessary to make the workers in 
a coal mine, mining for the element necessary to produce a pencil, work for a low enough 
wage to ensure a good profit for the intermediaries and the owners of the means of 
production, while lowering the price for the consumer, ‘so you could have it for a trifling 
sum’.   554
!
(3) Finally we meet the most paradoxical and ambiguous question: who speaks? Who speaks 
is the pencil itself, a personified commodity. It is capital itself - as a socially specific set of 
relations materialised in the specific means of production and the specific products - that 
appears to speak for itself, since access to the paradoxical point from which the totality of 
mediation of the capitalist division of labour can be cognitively grasped is denied to the 
human subject. It is the personified commodity that is trying to convince the human subject 
to ‘Have faith that free men and women will respond to the Invisible Hand. This faith will be 
confirmed. I, Pencil, seemingly simple though I am, offer the miracle of my creation as 
testimony that this is a practical faith, as practical as the sun, the rain, a cedar tree, the good 
earth.’   Now, economists like Read and Friedman serve merely as translators, as vessels, 555
providing a human mind and mouth for capital’s ventriloquism. If it is true what the pencil 
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says - being a fetishist partial object, a pars pro toto of capital as such - that ‘only God could 
make me’   and, what is more, that ‘not a single person on the face of this earth knows how 556
to make me’,   then the economist who offers his mouth and mind to the materialised capital 557
is in a very strange position. He occupies God’s place, a transcendent singular position from 
which the whole of the social process under a specific division of labour can be seen, 
mentally reconstructed and emphatically expressed. 
!
The theoretical possibility of the existence of such a transcendent time-place as is given in 
allegorical images in Read’s/Friedman’s tale is explained systematically in “The Trend of 
Econmic Thinking”. Although it is sometimes believed that Hayek was an advocate of a 
complete economic agnosticism, denying any possibility of totalisation and any possibility of 
cognisance and prediction of the economic laws, and although some explicit passages from 
Hayek’s writings might confirm this assertion, the actual theoretical model proposed by him 
is much more ambiguous. Hayek, in his polemic with the German Historical School 
oneconomics, distances himself from ‘the historical’ approach, which is based on the 
‘treatment of practical problems as something unique, determined only by their own 
historical development’.   The Austrian economist pictures the Historical School as being 558
agnostic in reference to the possibility of the existence and cognisance of economic laws, and 
as a school that rejects any possibility of prediction based on such knowledge. In contrast to 
this agnostic approach, Hayek states that, a genuine economist, 
!
!  228
!  Ibid.556
!  Ibid.557
! “The trend in Economic Thinking,” 18. 558
Mateusz Piotrowski
By combining elementary conclusions and following up their implications 
(…) gradually constructs, from the familiar elements, a mental model which 
aims at reproducing the working of the economic system as a whole. Whether 
we use as a basis facts which are known from everyday experience or facts 
which have been laboriously collected by statistical or historical research, the 
importance and the difficulty of this further task remains the same, and the 
only test of its usefulness as a tool of interpretation is whether, by impeccable 
logic, it yields a model which reproduces movements of the type which we 
observe in the modern world.   559
!
What is assumed here is not only logical coherence and rationality immanent in the practical 
economic activity (the assumption that there is an ‘impeccable logic’   in economic action) 560
but also that this rationality can be grasped in its totality (‘as a whole’)   and reproduced as a 561
‘mental model’   by the science of economics. Therefore, according to Hayek, ‘Economics 562
provides an insight into the nature of the economic system as a whole’.   Emergence of the 563
short-circuit that enables the economist to prejudge the objectionable features of the system - 
including the suffering of the man on the street - is explained by the possibility of 
reproducing the movement of the social whole in the form of a mental model in the mind of 
the economist. 
!  229
!  Ibid., 21. [my emphasis - M.P.]559
!  Ibid.560
!  Ibid.561
!  Ibid.562
!  Ibid., 22.563
Mateusz Piotrowski
!
The sharp contrast between professional economists and lay people might suggest that access 
to the end-point of the economic process, where the beatific vision of the harmony of the 
system of the division of labour can be experienced, is reserved only for the priests of the 
economic order. It might also foster a hypothesis of ‘double truth’,   according to which we 564
understand that what we encountered here is simply a kind of elitist double morality, which 
clearly distinguishes between the exoteric ideology produced for the masses and the esoteric 
knowledge held by the cynical, disillusioned intellectuals. This hypothesis could be 
interpreted as an analogue?of the pre-Marxian and pre-Hegelian critique of religion not as a 
socially objective appearance, but as the cynical intrigue of aristocrats and clergy, here 
replaced by politicians, businessmen and economists. Neither the elements of conscious 
cynicism and cynical consciousness, nor the characteristic of neoliberalism as a conscious 
political project, nor, finally, the distance of Hayek and Mises from popular movements 
trying to democratically limit the ‘spontaneous’ growth of the market, and Hayek’s and 
Mises’ consequent limited support for non-democratic regimes securing the state against the 
encroachment of such anti-market democratic movements, should be easily denied. The 
matter is nevertheless far more complicated, and it cannot be explained simply by cynicism 
and the doctrine of double truth. Although the necessity to limit the democratic power of 
social movements (by means of authoritarian state coercion if necessary) is explicitly 
expressed by Hayek, and although the proposition to limit the scope of the vision of the 
subject to matters directly connected to its own interest (defined in terms of his private 
property or the field of responsibility given to it in the process of production by the private 
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property owners) could be linked to this, the mechanism requires more to function than just a 
limitation of the subject’s vision. 
!
This question might appear minor but it expresses the fact that the mechanics of the economic 
dispositive cannot be reduced to its negative (agnostic, amoral, atheistic) moments, as it also 
includes important positive characteristics, which ambiguously promise access to cognition 
of the totality of the social process - that is, to the viewpoint of objective moral judgement 
and to the transcendent position occupied by a non-human entity endowed with omniscience 
and absolute moral prerogative, making the synthesis of cognitive and moral judgement 
possible. We encounter an implicit tendency towards this in Hayek’s call for not only the 
creation of a veil of ignorance, which would limit the power of vision of the subject in order 
to eliminate his interest in both direct suffering and more far-sighted visions of social reform, 
but also for the construction of such an explicit and implicit ideology of the market that 
would ‘cause them [the economic subjects - M.P.] voluntarily to contribute as much as 
possible to needs which lay outside the range of their vision.’   The subject is motivated to 565
pursue ‘his own’ (specifically, historically constructed) interests, and the motivation for this 
comes not only from the promise of individual but also of collective ultimate gain. Although 
it is explicitly proclaimed that ‘no economic agent should or can pursue the collective 
good’,   the moral aim that the subject ‘is to make as great a contribution to the common 566
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purposes of society as he is capable of making’ is explicitly formulated and expressed, and 
paradoxical concept-images of the ushering in of ultimate common good, through apparent 
and temporarysuffering, are produced. 
!
The subject is therefore not simply kept in cognitive darkness and moral disinterest as to the 
result of his/her action for the benefit of the social whole, but moreover the invisible social 
totality is visualised. What is more, it is explicitly pictured as an extra-human power 
circumventing individuals, ‘being mere tools of concealed, even if impersonal, market 
forces’,   and it is asserted that even ‘capitalists who are suspected of directing it all are 567
actually also tools of an impersonal process, just as unaware of the ultimate effects and 
purpose of their actions’.   The preceding passages, while they might sound as though they 568
have been written by Marx or Adorno, with a critical intention, are actually written in praise 
of the power of the economic process, which brings about a sublime effect produced by the 
juxtaposition of two incomparable entities - finite and limited human beings and the infinite 
process that incessantly transcends them. We can see, then, that the counter-move of the 
economic dispositive is much more complex; it refers not only to denials of omniscient 
knowledge, absolute justice and divine power but also to knowledge of the totality 
(cognisance), the absolute objectivity of justice (morality) and an encounter with an entity 
that exceeds both human cognisance and morality, being itself in possession of absolute 
knowledge, justice and power (theology). Such an experience brings about a specific 
ambiguous sublime pleasure derived from both the destruction and ‘personal humiliation’ of 
the human, personal and finite, when faced with the extra-human, impersonal and infinite, 
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and also a simultaneous identification with this infinite knowledge, justice and power (even if 
that which is being transcended and destroyed in the experience of suffering is the subject in 
question itself).   Just as the ‘anti-market’ movement is constituted by two poles (a practical 569
immediate reaction to direct suffering and the will to produce such a theoretical position that 
would enable structural changes to be brought about, modifying the meta-laws of the 
economic process), the same applies to the ‘pro-market’ counter-move. The access to the 
synoptic time-point is denied but, ambiguously, it is also given - even to the ‘laity’. The 
subject is therefore not only blinded by the invisibility, not only is it forbidden to react to 
direct suffering, and not only is it denied access to the point from which could be seen a 
wider perspective of the common good, and of the infinitude of the process, but these 
negative conditions are additionally supplemented by a beatific vision of ultimate 
providential coordination, by the promise of compensation for oneself and for the social 
whole, and by the powerful image of an extra-human entity transcending individuals, but 
ordaining its own laws of justice according to its own logic. Faith in the existence of this 
unreachable point, occupied by an entity transcending human beings in knowledge, justice 
and power, functions as the blind spot of the dominant economic reasoning and as the pivot 
of the economic rational order. 
!
Therefore, to say, as Foucault does, that subjects simply do not and cannot acknowledge the 
presence of the totality, and that the transcendent viewpoint simply disappears from the 
economic field of immanence, is oversimplified and does not take into account how the 
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totality and its highest point or moment of vision are made accessible to the individual. The 
Hayekian-Misesian system does not simply negate the possibility that ‘men’ could occupy 
such a divine viewpoint, but rather - after this denial - replaces God with the market 
understood as an extra-individual, impersonal process. As Mirowski notes:  
!
The market as portrayed by Foucault in his late lectures on neoliberalism is the 
sole legitimate site for the production of indubitable knowledge of the whole; 
in other words, an absent deity rendered in a manner no different from Hayek 
or Stigler or Friedman or Buchanan. The “market” (always referenced as a 
monolithic entity) provides the boundary condition for governmentality, 
because it alone knows things we can never know.   570
!
Access to this place of evaluation/judgement is apparently denied to men. It is also denied to 
a personal God of the tradition of Jewish and Christian Messianism, being too personal and 
all too human. Such a God might produce an instance towards which an animistic (and even 
explicitly socialist) demand for justice could be formulated. What is substituted for this 
absent God is, therefore, the impersonal market, in a substitution that does not simply 
liquidate the theological, creating a purely secular and naturalistic human sphere, but rather 
functionally replaces him, claiming for the market the characteristic of cognitive 
omniscience, thus providing conditions for the formulation of a final moral judgement over 
the actions of the individual and securing this judgement with power of a process which 
exeeds both human understanding and human morality. In this way, thanks to a specific 
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prejudgement, the dominant economics/economy establishes itself as a specific natural 
theology and natural religion. Therefore, it can be defined as not anti-religious but rather anti-
Christic (i.e. anti-Messianic), making full use of the Greek preposition anti (ἀντί), which, 
according to Bible Concordance, means not only ‘over against, opposite’ but also ‘instead 
of”, denoting not only contrast but also replacement or substitution. Thus, the anti-Christ is 
both an opponent of the Messiah and also someone who puts himself in the place of the 
Messiah. We can see it clearly in the book of Revelation when the Beast replicates the 
miracles of the Lamb, putting himself in the place of Christ - temporarily - before the Lamb, 
who has been slain before the beginning of time, returns in the eschatological end-time. If we 
are thus to call the dominant economics anti-Christic or anti-Messianic it is precisely in this 
original and technical sense. That is to say, the hegemonic economics/economy replaces the 
Messianic promises of God of the Bible. This by no means has to signify that it resigns from 
absolute pretences, promising to provide a better cognition, motivation and justification for 
individual action and social order than religion did.   Market enters for the lack of something 571
better and more productive. The need for this replacement steams from the lack of success of 
Messianic religion, which has failed to provide what is has promised.   572
!
If we were to summarise the fundamental elements of the theology of the replacement 
described above and if we were to indicate the fundamental elements that must be analysed if 
we are to proceed further with our enquiry, we could say, using the terminology elaborated by 
the Messianic tradition , that the natural theology which emerges here could be encapsulated 
in three conceptual images. (1) We have seen that it is based on the opacity and invisibility of 
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the specific dominant time-world (archon-aeon), which limits the scope of the vision of the 
individuals existing under its temporal regime. As Paul says, ‘The god of this age has blinded 
the minds’ (2 Corinthians 4:4) of those sold under its rule. This invisibility cannot, however, 
be reduced to a purely conscious ideological strategy exercised by cynical economists/priests 
against the innocent masses, but rather should be understood as an ‘objective appearance’, the 
wisdom of a god, who not only blinds the minds of his believers but necessarily remains 
opaque to itself, it cannot be understood in its own terms. (Cf. 1 Corinthians 2, 6-9).  (2) 
Secondly, the moment of opacity, invisibility and objective blindness is supplemented by a 
paradoxical access to the place-time of a supposed beatific vision, which promises access to 
an ultimate eschatological time-point where the judgement of the overall efforts of the 
individual is formulated and the ultimate power of this judgement experienced. At this 
moment the suffering subject - like the biblical Job   - is convinced by the dominant 573
discourse to acknowledge that it has trespassed against these opaque, unknown laws. (3) 
Thirdly and consequently, the market as the place of judgement not only produces 
justification for the objective social order but, correlatively, also produces a specific 
subjective temporality, a modality of experiencing time that mobilises the subject to 
productive action by means of judgement. Additionally, here a specific ambiguity is at work: 
action is mobilised by an eschatological promise, which not only takes advantage of ‘self-
interest’, promising individual happiness, and of the positive will to sacrifice, the will to 
sacrifice one’s effort to a higher common good, promising the moral justification for such 
self-interested action, but also, decisively, promises eternal peace. This eternal peace is 
understood as the end of both self-interested and sacrificial action and as the end of all action 
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- indeed, as the end of life itself. In accordance with what has been said in the subsection on 
labour in the dominant economics, on the examples of Smith and Mises, who conceptualise 
action as always stemming from a lack - that is, from a lack of perfect satisfaction - peace is 
here defined negatively as lack of action. This quasi-eschatological end-point and end-time, 
when the peace of perfect non-action will be achieved, is defined as ultimately inaccessible as 
long as the subject lives (since all life is imperfect because of the constitutive lack), thus 
providing an incitement for incessant action until the end of the subject’s life - that is, until 
death, which becomes the implicit motor of productive activity. Therefore, the subject is 
incessantly striving for (1) happiness, (2) self-justification and (3) the absolute, abstract rest-
peace understood as ultimate non-action (death). As such, the subject remains the subject of 
natural theology, with an incessant oscillation between attempts at self-justification through 
works and accusation, produced by the fact that work reconstructed in this way cannot be 
fulfilled and brought to an end. As Paul says, the subjects of such natural theology ‘show the 
work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and between 
themselves their thoughts accusing or else excusing them.’ (Romans 2:15) 
This dynamic of incessant accusation (by not-fully-explicated laws) and incessant attempts 
for self-justification through works (before an indeterminate tribunal) is what gives the 
economic subject ‘this dynamic naturally inscribed in the heart of man’.   Exploration of the 574
problematic of the subject of incessant accusation and justification will lead us to the point 
where two subject-matters of our enquiry - labour and capital - coincide, creating a third 
figure: the figure of human-capital. Human-capital will be exposed as the subject which is 
reconstructed in relation of Schuld (debt/guilt) of its human life towards itself understood as 
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its own capital. The second part of this thesis will be dedicated to the investigation of the 
process of the emergence, accusation and justification of this peculiar amalgamation of 
capital and labour, called human-capital. Accusation and justification are constituted herein 
by what Max Weber has called ‘the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his 
capital, which is assumed as an end in itself.’   Thus, against Foucault - who has pictured the 575
economic subject as positioned at the antipodes of renunciation, transcendence, and the 
voluntary bond and as such as secured against sacrifice - we will try to demonstrate that the 
cryptotheological transcendent doubling enters the very subjectivity of the subject, making 
possible the construction of the specific speculative economic life of human-capital as the 
incessant sacrifice of ‘oneself’ (i.e. one’s human life and time) to ‘oneself’ (i.e. to the future-
oriented subjective temporality identified with capital). 
However, before we can properly analyse the ‘subjective’ dimension of the economic process 
of accusation and self-justification, which culminates in the figure of human-capital as the 
universal economic subject of speculation, we must first analyse its ‘objective’ correlates. In 
order to understand the peculiar natural-theological processual amalgamation constituted by 
‘time’, ‘judgement’ and ‘nature’, first we need to take account of the cryptotheological 
ambiguity that resides in the notion of process. Following the Adornian conceptualisation of 
Natural-History, presented earlier, we will try to grasp ‘the process’ as an interplay of (1) the 
biological natural process understood as the natural lapse of time, (2) the juridical idea of 
process bound to judgement and (3) the process of production in which naturalness and 
judgement mutually reinforce each other, implicitly veiling and explicitly revealing their 
crypto-theological dimension. If we are to understand this strange natural theological fusion 
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constituting the process as the natural lapse of time, juridical judgement and process of 
production, then we must proceed towards a proper analysis of the three crucial operators in 
such a processual dispositive - that is, the specific concept-devices of time, judgement and 
nature. This will prepare us for a proper analysis of the subject of human-capital, constituting 
the apex of the second part of our investigation.!
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PART TWO  
OPERATING THE PROCESS 
!
!
The first part of our enquiry tried to explicate the cryptotheological prejudgements of the 
dominant economics/economy. In the first part I have suggested that the dominant 
economics/economy in general and more specifically the dominant economics/economy of 
labour and capital, when explicated, present themselves as constituting a specific natural 
theology. This theology implicitly and explicitly transfers the characteristics of the divine 
(absolute knowledge, justice and power) onto the capitalistically organised market. The 
capitalist market, as reconstructed by the dominant economics/economy, appears as being in 
possession of (1) adequate knowledge of the totality of events in the natural world, (2) the 
ultimate objective standards of the moral judgement of individual action in its relation to 
society, and (3) the power to circumvent the human lack of knowledge and adequate moral 
standards of judgement. These characteristics of the market are found in the experience of a 
quasi-eschatological time-place, from which human action and its natural circumstances and 
social consequences are cognitively and morally judged. All three of these characteristics 
were presented in the first part as bound to a specific manner of organisation of temporality, 
with a peculiar power of the temporality of specifically constructed temporality of the 
unknown, undetermined future, which, by means of specific prejudgements, was presented as 
being, at the same time, in accordance with actually known laws of the capitalist ordering. 
!
After this reconstruction of the constitutional prejudgements of the dominant economics/
economy, the capitalist ‘market’ appears as the ultimate site of material and immaterial 
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production.   What is more, it also appears as the site of the production of truth - as the 576
ultimate cognitive mechanism providing objective information in the form of actual price-
signals.   Moreover, it appears as the ultimate site of the production of judgements - that is, 577
such truth-claims about an individual that promise to provide an objective moral measure of 
the subject’s action. Finally, this judgement appears not only as an objective and determining 
judgement, forcing the individual to accept the market evaluation of its efforts as cognitively 
adequate and morally just, but also as an active judgement, mobilising the subject in question 
to productive activity. This activity is driven by the will to (1) realise self-interest, (2) justify 
one’s behaviour as beneficial for the social whole, and (3) achieve eternal peace understood 
as the ultimate end of action. As we will try to demonstrate towards the end of our enquiry, in 
the part titled ‘Accusation and justification of the human subject of the process’, at a deeper 
level the establishment of such a mobilising judgement is made possible by the production of 
a specific temporality. This temporality is based on an incessant accusation of the subject (for 
not being productive enough) and on an incessant attempt to justify oneself through works. 
The subject is therefore entangled in an incessant process, which is simultaneously the 
process of specifically organised production, of specifically constructed moral valorisation, 
and of the specifically structured lapse of time. In order to disentangle this knot, which 
constitutes the subject of such a process as human-capital being indebted/guilty in relation to 
its ‘own’ capital, we must first distinguish the three crucial operators in this process. As 
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mentioned at the end of the first part, these are the dimensions of time, judgement and nature, 
hidden in the ambiguity of the word ‘process’. Let us then start by disentangling the 
meanings of this strange ‘signifying stress’.    578
!
Chapter IV – Separating natural and human processes 
!
In this chapter we will try to disentangle the meanings of the process, in the context of the 
dominant economics/economy. We will analyse how natural processes (conceptualised as 
driven by the ‘automatic’ lapse of time) are separated from man-made processes (driven by 
conscious ‘judgement’), and how these two separated sets of meanings intermingle in the 
sphere of production. We will then follow the identification of natural processes in the 
dominant economics/economy and their separation from man-made processes, using the 
example of separating active (judgemental) man from reactive animal. This will prepare us 
for the reconstruction of a specific critique of the dominant economics, which will be 
performed in the next chapter of our enquiry. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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1. Meaning of process: between natural lapse of time, juridical judgement and 
production 
!
1.1. Separating the meanings 
!
If we open a standard dictionary in search of a definition of ‘process’ we will witness its 
meanings proliferating. I propose to organise the meanings of process, in the context of our 
enquiry, into two semantic sets.  The first set refers to ‘a series of changes that happen 
naturally’  . The Oxford Dictionary of English gives a useful hint, setting us in the direction 579
that our enquiry will take, when it chooses to exemplify this ‘natural series of changes’   in 580
‘the ageing process’.   In this example time is not only a neutral medium in which changes 581
occur or a background against which the movements of objects can be measured, but rather 
becomes the very model of all processes. Time - process being the lapse of time (‘progress, 
advance, in the process of time’  ) - believed to be unstoppable, irreversible and 582
unconquerable, works as the paradigmatic process. Time becomes the source from which 
natural processes derive their direction and force, reciprocally saturating such a notion of 
time with tones of naturalness. My proposition is to pose the idea of the passing of time as the 
core concept of this first set of meanings. From now on I will call this semantic constellation, 
gravitating around the idea of time, Process 1. 
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!
There is also a second set, which finds its home in the sphere of law, meaning ‘to take out a 
summons against’   and to ‘proceed against by law, prosecute’.   Process understood in this 583 584
way implies a subject of the process (the interpellated), a medium of the process (law), and 
an instance (a tribunal, an office) capable of bringing it to an end (a judge, whether individual 
or collective). What triggers, manages and completes process understood as legal action - 
what empowers the law interpellating the subject, what gives direction to the course of 
events, what is supposed to have the ability to complete it with a final verdict - is the power 
to make an authoritative decision, to pass judgement. This is the second core meaning. I will 
refer to the second set of meanings, governed by the notion of judgement, as Process 2. 
!
We have thus encountered and separated two very different lines of semantic development. 
While the first evokes a natural series of changes, being at least relatively autonomous of 
human will (‘in the process as an unintended part of a course of action’  ), the second recalls 585
the idea of legal authority able to interpellate the subject, to carry through a lawful action 
and, ultimately, to pass judgement.  After this separation, however, we need to cope with a 
counter-tendency of the semantic cloud gathered around the word ‘process’. This counter-
tendency overcomes sterile boundaries, resisting separation and organisation along the lines 
of conscious human judgement and the natural lapse of time.    
!
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1.2. Blurring the semantic borders  
!
In dictionaries, the two semantic sets we have named above lie peacefully distant from each 
other. The context (natural or legal) seems to give each of them a definite meaning, 
guaranteeing a safe everyday usage. This is because the habitual dissociation of the meanings 
(process as natural lapse of time or process as a legal action crowned by an authoritative and 
conscious judgement) screens off their - equally habitual - mutual entanglement, which 
becomes visible if we focus on the area of our interest, which is the area of productive, 
‘economic’ processes. Here, following the Adornian method - aimed at critical reorganisation 
of the common understanding of the difference and identity of nature and history, and at 
reformulation of the critical notion of Natural-History (Naturgeschichte) - I will try to show 
how the borders separating Process 1 (understood primarily as the natural lapse of time) from 
Process 2 (understood as human judgement) blur, and how Process 1 and Process 2 penetrate 
each other, creating a strange amalgamation in the actual process of capitalist production.   586
!
I have stated that the first set, Process 1, denotes a natural series of changes. I have also 
suggested that it connotes at least a certain degree of inevitability. Importantly, with a closer 
look we discover that here ‘the natural’ does not stand in stark opposition to ‘the artificial’ or 
‘the manufactured’. The word ‘naturally’, as it functions in the processual context, connotes a 
sense of automatism, extending the semantic power of process to a ‘systematic series of 
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mechanised or chemical operations that are performed in order to produce something’   and 587
even to operations performed ‘on data by means of a program’.   However, these activities, 588
while being mediated chemically, mechanically or electronically, can involve human factors, 
and human intentions and purposes. Thus, the general meaning of Process 1 encompasses 
both natural and man-made processes in ‘a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve 
a particular end’.   Certain functionality, and even perhaps even teleological intentionality, 589
enters the picture, which before appeared to be under the sole rule of purely natural, 
automatic unintentionality. We notice that Process 1, although it connotes automatism, is also 
able to carry in itself the idea of action aimed at and driven by an end. 
!
In turn, when looking at Process 2 we are able to see more clearly that a kind of operational 
automatism can be traced in the properly juridical and supposedly purely ‘decisionist’ sphere 
of legal, sovereign judgements. ‘To process’ could also mean ‘to deal with (someone or 
something) using an official procedure: (the immigration authorities who processed him)’.  590
It can connote automatism. This automatism - coupled strangely with arbitrariness - has been 
there without being fully visible, both in the mediating function of legal procedure and in its 
outcome (judgement), which could come under suspicion of being a contingent product of the 
workings of the legal automata. Now the dividing line between natural processes 
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(unintentional and non-judgemental, driven by time) and legal processes (driven by 
intentional judgement) starts to blur. 
!
Is this doubling of meaning and the mutual penetration of Process 1 and Process 2 purely 
accidental? Or can it be of some conceptual significance? What is the relevance of these 
semantic fluctuations for our main purpose - that is, for gaining an understanding of 
economic, productive processes? Could the semantic separation of meanings and its blurring 
be rendered useful for understanding the structural tensions in the subject-matters of our 
enquiry (capital and labour)? 
!
We have seen that some elements of the semantic clusters of Process 1 (automatic naturalness 
driven by the inevitable passage of time) and Process 2 (purposeful action led by conscious 
judgement) could intermingle. The semantic analysis has already indicated an area where 
these elements begin to combine and cooperate with each other. The field where the necessity 
for their cooperation became most perceptible and pressing was, however, neither the sphere 
of pure legal procedures nor that of purely natural processes, but a third one: the sphere of 
production. We witnessed this when our analysis of the semantics of process led us to 
chemical, mechanical and electronic-numerical processes. Consequently, we can see that the 
relative character of the distinction between natural processes and man-made processes 
becomes all the more visible where the area of our interests, the area that deals with, inter 
alia, productive processes - that is, economics/economy - is concerned. 
!
Let us now try to reconstruct the conceptual meaning of these semantic movements, and see 
how natural processes are separated from man-made processes in the economic discourse 
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through separation of the figure of ‘acting man’, capable of judgement, from merely reacting 
animal, under the rule of pure nature.  
!
2. Separation of judgement and nature in the dominant economics: acting man vs. 
reacting animal  
!
The proponents and defenders of the dominant economic discourse/practice, are somehow 
conscious of the fact that man-made production seems to be based on natural processes. 
Mises does not hesitate to admit that man’s external nature - i.e. non-human original factors 
of production   - just as the internal nature that man ‘has in common with other 591
mammals’,   do indeed constitute a bare foundation for the higher faculties of the 592
consciously active human being, and thus, a bare fundament for economic activity. However, 
he also claims that a definite distinction between these levels (reactive-natural-animal vs. 
active-distinctive-human can and should be made: 
  
Conscious or purposeful behavior is in sharp contrast to unconscious behavior, 
i.e., the reflexes and the involuntary responses of the body cells and nerves to 
stimuli. People are sometimes prepared to believe that the boundaries between 
conscious behavior and the involuntary reaction of the forces operating within 
man’s body are more or less indefinite. This is correct only as far as it is 
sometimes not easy to establish whether concrete behavior is to be considered 
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voluntary or involuntary. But the distinction between consciousness and 
unconsciousness is nonetheless sharp and can be clearly determined. 
!
The unconscious behavior of the bodily organs and cells is for the acting ego 
no less a datum than any other fact of the external world. Acting man must 
take into account all that goes on within his own body as well as other data, 
e.g., the weather or the attitudes of his neighbors. There is, of course, a margin 
within which purposeful behavior has the power to neutralize the working of 
bodily factors. It is feasible within certain limits to get the body under control. 
Man can sometimes succeed through the power of his will in overcoming 
sickness, in compensating for the innate or acquired insufficiency of his 
physical constitution, or in suppressing reflexes. As far as this is possible, the 
field of purposeful action is extended.   593
!
After reading this fragment we might think that, according to this exponent of an important 
current in the dominant economic discourse, the decisive distinction between the discussed 
levels (the level of automatic reaction vs. the level of properly human action) lies in the 
effective power to control one’s body, led by conscious judgement. ‘Acting man’, in contrast 
to ‘reacting animal’, takes into account the fact that he has a body but, more importantly, he 
is also able to make proper use of his body by submitting it to the control of his 
consciousness, led by a judgement and driven by the will to achieve a concrete end.   To put 594
it simply: it seems that here man rules over nature. 
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!
Chapter V Apparent critique of the dominant economics/economy 
!
Now we will try to briefly reconstruct a schematic model of a possible critique of such 
economics/economy. It will consist of three main elements. (1) Firstly, such a critique must 
start by exposing the anti-natural character of the dominant economic discourse and the 
correlative anti-natural character of the dominant economic practice. (2) Secondly a critique 
of the dominant economics/economy must expose its essentially atemporal character. Just as 
the dominant economics/economy is structurally unable to take into account the finite 
character of ‘natural resources’, it is unable to take into account the finite character of time, 
being blinded by the promise of the eternalisation of the infinite time of human progress. (3) 
Thirdly, the dominant economics/economy must be criticised for being a non-judgemental 
and value-neutral science, leaving the economic subject without any ethical guidance in the 
sphere of indeterminacy, deprived of any absolute ends capable of giving direction to action. 
!
1. The dominant economics/economy as anti-natural 
!
After reading the fragment quoted from Mises concerning active human judgement and 
animal reaction, it seems easy to reconstruct the implications of such reasoning and to level 
criticism against it. It appears that the dominant economic reasoning produces a separation 
between the non-human (passive or, at best reactive) and the human (active). It separates 
‘man’ from nature, with ‘man’ in the position of the ruler over the external nature of 
resources and over the internal nature of his own bodily impulses. It separates man’s works 
(culture, industry, purposeful activity), driven by judgement, from the unintentional processes 
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of nature, driven by merely automatic reflexes. And finally, by reproducing such distinctions 
within the sphere of distinctively human activity, it enforces a separation between properly 
‘productive’ work, which is counted as contributing to the valorisation of capital, and 
reproductive, natural labour. Such ‘productive’ work happens to be done mainly by males, 
who are believed to be led by rational judgement. As such, it is distinguished from merely 
‘reproductive’ labour. Interestingly, this ‘reproductive’ labour has been deemed ultimately 
‘unproductive’ from the point of view of the dominant economics/economy; it remains 
unpaid or poorly paid and is performed mostly by women, who are judged to be - by nature - 
more prone to being caught in the reproductive cycles of their bodies (this is why, following 
Mises’ idiomatic, we have persistently spoken of ‘man’s work’).   It might appear that the 595
separation and subjugation of natural (‘passive’) processes to man-made (‘active’) processes 
must be the fundamental rule of the operation of the sphere of production, as reconstructed by 
the dominant economics/economy. 
!
This criticism is partially valid, despite the fact that the dominant economics claims to 
acknowledge the existence of nature. The subject of the dominant economics (‘acting man’) 
is aware of the existence of nature. He may also be aware that this or that set of ‘natural 
resources’, which serve as a subjugated fundament for his free economic activity, may be 
limited, and that this limitation may influence the accessibility of these resources and, 
consequently, their price and the individual’s profit. But he remains unable to really take into 
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account the limits to overall exploitation and the long term consequences of such exploitation 
beyond the scope of his profitable enterprise. Mises puts this with great clarity:  
!
Although the available quantities of these mineral substances are limited, and 
although we may academically concern ourselves with the possibility that they 
will be entirely exhausted one day, acting men do not consider these deposits 
to be rigidly limited. Their activities take into account the fact that definite 
mines and wells will become exhausted, but they do not pay heed to the fact 
that at an unknown date later the deposits of certain minerals may come to an 
end.   596
!
Changes in the accessibility of natural resources (e.g. drinkable water  ) may become a 597
matter of interest for the ‘acting man’ and for the science concerned with his actions. The 
economic subject reconstructed this way may take this into account and take advantage of the 
situation (as has had happened, for example, in Bolivia with the attempts to privatise the 
scarce resources of water  ). However, according to the critics of neoliberal economics, 598
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while the scarcity of resources can become the object of interest for the neoliberal economic 
agent as a source of extra profits, the existence of some ultimate ‘limits to growth’ cannot 
really be accounted for in the dominant economic system of thought and practice. For this 
reason, the hegemonic form of economic activity systematically endangers and debilitates the 
very conditions of social and biological production and reproduction. As Philip Goodchild 
points out:  
!
If these conditions are provided by nature and society, then they may not need 
to be regularly purchased. If they are not represented as internal costs of 
production (…) they may be consumed and depleted (…). Modern economic 
activity only measures rates of profit [i.e. the difference between input and 
output expressed in exchange value - M.P.]. (…) It is impossible to tell from 
the rate of profit whether wealth is being generated or depleted by any 
particular process. Indeed, all processes generate some forms of wealth while 
destroying others. When reduced to a single rate of profit, this ambivalence is 
no longer represented. All economic activity is accounted as positive if it 
yields profit. (…) Since it is more profitable, in the short term, to consume 
means of production than to preserve them, then economic activities that do so 
will outstrip economic activities that aim for sustainability. (…) Such a system 
will necessarily destroy its long-term conditions for survival.    599
!
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Although Hayek rejects criticism of ‘the market imperialism’, motivated by suffering, as 
short-sighted and incapable of taking into account wider systemic interrelations, situated 
beyond the scope of limited human vision, this judgement can now be turned against the 
dominant model of economics promoted by Hayek himself. The dominant economic 
theoretical and practical reasoning, blinded by the perspective of short-term profit, would be 
structurally unable to take into account the embodiment of the market in the wider systems of 
nature. If we were to express this criticism of the dominant economics/economy in the terms 
of the Hayekian system itself, we could say that ‘the market’ fails to provide adequate 
information about the interconnectedness of complex systems, and about the unplanned 
consequences of individual action on the stability of these systems. Moreover, since our 
survival relies on the existence of these interlinked systems of natural and cultural provision, 
market-regulated price-signals being unable to provide a sufficiently complex range of 
information, the market is not sufficient for securing the reproduction of human life and 
culture in a complex world, which has not been designed by a human mind. 
!
To strengthen this criticism, we could take a step back and look at the economic system as a 
subsystem of human action, embedded in the wider set of natural systems. The relationship 
between these systems could be presented as follows. The possibility of economic growth is 
itself conditioned, in the last instance, by the possibility of producing more output than input. 
According to the laws of thermodynamics, transforming input into output takes energy and 
generates waste. For this reason, the economic system (in the narrow sense) cannot be 
(ultimately) self-enclosed. Energy can be put to work only when there is  difference between 
the level of temperature of an ‘engine’ (be it a mill, a computer or a human body) and that of 
the surroundings in which it operates. This is, in turn, made possible by two basic 
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preconditions: (1) that energy for the economic action can be absorbed from the surroundings 
and (2) that the unused energy - waste, which is necessarily produced - can be exuded back 
into the surroundings.   The inability to integrate the above mentioned facts into the 600
conceptual framework of the dominant economics is expressed in the self-representations it 
produces, economics often visualising itself as a self-referential system. As we can see in the 
examples of diagrams in standard handbooks, economic ‘circular flows’   are presented as 601
self-enclosed. When these handbooks speak of possible frontiers of production, they do not 
mention ecological limits but only internal limitations, always relative and local, which refer 
solely to economy in the narrow sense - that is, to the sphere of man-made action. The 
ultimate, underlying source of the possible increment in wealth - i.e. the fact that economic 
actors are free ridingon the sources of energy (sun, fossil fuels, nuclear energy), which make 
it possible to produce more output than input in the first place - is neither registered nor 
represented. This free gift is tacitly and implicitly taken for granted, but its existence is not 
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and, as some critics claim, cannot be conceptualised unless the dominant framework is deeply 
restructured.   602
!
Thus, we see that, according to the critics of the dominant economics, the separation between 
‘man’ and ‘nature’ is only a first step. The second step involves the production of a lacuna, an 
ecological blind spot, which screens out the entanglement and the actual dependency of 
‘man-made’ production (industrial, male, intellectual, etc.) on the ‘externalities’ (natural, but 
also social, production and reproduction - environment, but also care, nourishment, 
upbringing, education, etc.). It seems that the hegemonic economics/economy takes its 
societal and natural preconditions - in the form of ready-for-use natural resources and the 
fully grown worker, brought up, nourished and educated, in short, ready for work - as they 
are. The dominant economics/economy takes nature as if it was there gratis,   but renders it 603
utterly invisible. It not only separates and subjugates it, but in the end makes it disappear - in 
theory and in practice. 
!
!
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2. The dominant economics/economy as atemporal 
!
The same kind of critique seems to be applicable not only to the problem of nature in the 
dominant economics/economy, but also to the question of time. It appears that what is not 
taken into account, what is not registered and represented by the dominant economics/
economy, are not only natural processes but, more fundamentally, something that we have 
found to be essential to the definition of natural processes themselves - namely, time - the 
lapse of time, which works as their driving force. Thus, it might appear that economics is 
inherently an atemporal science, able to produce only static tableaux; it is unable to account 
for the passing of time, and to acknowledge the fact that ‘the form of this world is passing 
away’ (1 Corinthians 7:31). According to critics, the reason for this lack of understanding 
would lie in the inability of economics/economy to internalise finitude. It would thus be 
incapable of becoming conscious of the finitude of natural resources.   Neither, we could 604
add, would it be able to take account of the finitude proper of the human being, given in the 
fact that, in the end, everybody must die. The main problem with the dominant economics/
economy would lie in the fact that it is necessarily a discourse and practice of infinitude and 
amorality, based on a belief in the infinitude of resources and the infinitude of time at the 
disposal of the human individual. Economics/economy would be an imaginative way to make 
death invisible. The specific modality of time of the modern economic practice and theory - 
that is, its specific temporality - would be that of infinite progress, which eternalises that 
which is transient and, as a result, gets rid of time altogether. 
!
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3. The dominant economics/economy as non-judgemental  
   
Moreover, ethical judgement also seems to disappear from the dominant economics/economy. 
Economic discourse presents itself as a fundamentally non-judgemental science. According to 
Mises, in contrast to the sciences of the past - i.e. the metaphysical sciences of the ancient 
Greeks or Christians - economics is a genuinely new form of knowledge. The old sciences 
were entrapped in the judgements of value, since they believed in the ultimate, absolute ends 
of Nature, God or History. This is why in order to justify their judgements, they invoked 
‘preestablished harmony’,   ‘predestination’   or ‘a “cunning of nature” which implanted in 605 606
man impulses driving him unwittingly along the precise path Nature wanted him to take.’  607
But with the discovery of the ‘inescapable interdependence of market phenomena’   - that is, 608
with the advent of the science of economics, 
!
Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with 
stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be 
viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the 
course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man 
must adjust his behavior if he wants to succeed. It is futile to approach social 
facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point 
of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgements of value. (…) 
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Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of  a science of given 
relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be - this 
was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy 
as well as for social action.    609
!
According to Mises, the critics of the economical thought reject it as useless for practical, 
moral conduct since it ‘abstains from expressing the judgement of value’.   If we would like 610
to present the argument of the critics of neoliberal economics in a slightly more subtle way, 
we could add that the problem with the dominant economics is that it leaves the subject 
without a judgement of value from which to determine which aims of action are worth 
enacting, and as a consequence makes the economic ‘acting man’ a victim of the curse of 
under-determination: the indeterminacy weighs on the subject of individual judgement, left 
without any absolute ends to direct human action and offer guidance.    611
!
Chapter VI Critique of a critique: appearances of time, judgement and nature in the 
dominant economics/economy 
!
In the previous chapter we briefly reconstructed a simplified and schematic model of the 
criticism of the dominant economics/economy, which is criticised as anti-natural, atemporal 
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and non-judgemental. We have seen that the hegemonic form of economic reflection and 
practice suppresses its own preconditions by not giving account to natural processes, which 
constitute its conditio sine qua non. It also seems that the dominant economics/economy does 
not acknowledge either the importance of time (or to be precise, the finitude of time) or 
ethical judgements (i.e. judgements determining human behaviour by pointing at final aims, 
which could direct action). All these charges are serious, and all of them bring important 
insights. However, we now must test if they are one-sided, and if this one-sidedness does not 
call for correction and supplementation. We must now examine whether the schematic model 
of critique sketched above exhausts the problem and does justice to the complexity of the 
economic dispositive. Does the mechanism of hegemonic economics/economy truly make all 
time, judgement and nature disappear? Or maybe time, nature and judgement do appear - 
explicitly - in the economic dispositive. Let us then begin with a brief analysis of these 
appearances from the question of nature. 
!
1. Economy as natural environment  
!
As the previous analysis of the ‘naturalism’ of the dominant economics/economy has already 
suggested, nature is explicitly evoked by the dominant economic discourse. Here we will 
briefly analyse how the concept of nature might work in the dominant economic dispositive 
by analysing three mutually reinforcing moments: natural facticity, ecosystemic self-
regulation and environmental fragility. 
!
Firstly, as we will recall, a specific conceptualisation of natural necessity constitutes the basis 
for treating the economic ‘facts’ as indispensable natural facts, as the ultimate givens. This 
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indispensability is fostered firstly by means of apparently purely theoretical argument; 
analysis of economic facts should, according to Mises, stop at a certain point (for example, at 
the point of individual judgement taken as the ultimate given  ) in order to avoid an infinite 612
regression of thought. This theoretical reasoning is, however, presented as grounded in 
practical reasoning, referring ultimately to the threat of biological extinction. Some economic 
elements must, according to Mises, be accepted as undeniable facts of nature and be 
exempted from further analysis. This is required of any economic subject who wants to 
succeed and, ultimately, to survive. In a competitive environment there is simply no time to 
waste on such regressive thinking. Thanks to this, some economic concepts, figures and 
devices appear as non-negotiable facts of nature. 
  
Secondly, as we tried to show, the dominant economic order seems to have an imperialistic 
tendency to present itself as (becoming) identical with all other orders and, ultimately, 
identical with the meta-order of nature, through which the supposed selection of orders takes 
place. In other words, nature appears as being itself ‘a market of markets’ or - if we use a 
term taken from classical German Idealism and developed in the Jewish-German tradition of 
thinking to which the present research is indebted - we could say that the capitalist ‘market’ 
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tries to establish/picture itself as ‘second nature’.   We see this attempt exemplified 613
discursively by Hayek and his followers, who aim at presenting the market as a spontaneous, 
ecosystem-order and as the very principle of evolutionary ordering. Such an interpretation 
identifies the supposed self-regulatory essence of nature with the essence of the market, 
imagined as equally self-regulatory and competitive, implying all historical progress to be 
simply an ever more explicit realisation of the identity of the essence of nature and the 
essence of the market. A striking example of such thinking can be found in the writings of 
Barry Maley. According to Maley, as summarised by Allan Marshall: 
!
the science of ecosystems justifies not protecting ecosystems. This writer 
[Maley - M.P.] believes that since the ecosystem is a prime example of a self-
regulating order, the best thing we could do to save ecosystems is to run our 
economies like them. Thus, Maley goes on to suggest, environmental 
protection must be left to the workings of the market, the only economic 
system that obeys the self-ordering processes of ecosystems, and ecosystems 
will actually be protected. If we interfere with the machinery of the Market, 
suggests Maley, by implementing artificial regulatory regimes such as public 
reserves, environmental regulation, wildlife centres/refuges, and eco-taxes, 
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then the economy will collapse from being self-ordering and the ecosystems 
will not survive.   614
!
This interpretation is based on a set of mutually reinforcing prejudgements: the natural 
ecosystem is a prime example of a self-regulating order and the best model for regulating 
human economic life; the best approximation of this self-regulating order in human reality is 
the market ordering; thus, nature itself will be regulated most effectively if it is regulated 
according to the market principles. This basic conceptual structure of the relationship of the 
market to nature can be traced not only in the works of Libertarians but also in less radical 
and more influential economic programs. As Felli and Castree show in their concise but 
informative comment on the UK's Government Office for Science report Migration and 
Global Environmental Change,   a specific conceptualisation of the laws of the market as 615
the ultimately given meta-laws enables presentation of the implementation of ‘neoliberal’ 
regulations as the best way to deal with environmental issues. According to Felli and Castree, 
the agenda advocated in the report focuses on solving problems of the depletion of nature and 
consequent migration by  ‘producing “adaptable” human subjects: that is, people able to 
respond tactically to anthropogenic alterations of the biophysical world while becoming ever 
more the subjects of capitalist market relations.’   These political conclusions are tacitly 616
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embedded in specific ‘philosophical’   assumptions on the character of the laws of nature 617
and market. In the report, 
!
responses to environmental degradation are not found in political-economic 
transformations, but are located at the individual/community level and 
essentially amount to increasing the ‘resilience’ of the affected populations 
(…), notably by promoting migrations. This is consistent with (…) analysis of 
‘adaptation’ to climate change, whereby it comes to mean the transformation 
of the individual in order for her or him to ‘respond’ to (…) environmental 
change. The latter is seen to happen or exist, while no real analysis of its 
origins is offered. This shifts the analytical attention away from the socio-
environmental context and refocuses it onto the individual’s qualities and his 
or her ‘capacity to adapt’. (…) It contrasts with an extant understanding in 
which adaptation meant collective transformation of the environment, as well 
as new economic development paradigms, to reduce or deflect the 
consequences of environmental change.   618
!
Here market-driven environmental change appears as an ultimately given natural 
precondition of any action, towards which individuals and communities should constantly 
adapt their ‘resilient lives’.   In accordance with the model we have tried to describe in the 619
first part of our enquiry, the meta-laws of nature are ambiguously identified with the 
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specifically reconstructed laws of ‘the market’. These market-natural laws are themselves 
understood as the ultimately given laws of the ‘environment that he [man] cannot alter’.  620
Thus, all the political work of the construction of institutions - which does indeed take place 
under the name of governance - refers not to ‘changing the very nature of the global 
environmental order’,   but rather to implementation of top-down and bottom-up policies 621
promoting adaptation of individuals, communities and states to ‘increasingly unadapted 
socioecological conditions’.   Thus, the first supposed characteristic of nature is projected 622
onto the market (indispensability), reinforces the second characteristic (self-ordering). The 
market appears as an indispensable and self-regulating ecosystem. 
!
In the course of our analysis, the movement of naturalisation of the market, which aimed at 
presenting it as a naturally necessary fact and a naturally self-regulating order to which the 
human subject must actively adjust, has been countered with an important argument exposing 
the fragile nature of self-organising orders and emphasising the role of bifurcation, instability 
and spontaneous disorder. These ecological, evolutionary arguments, which in our enquiry 
have been exemplified by the works of Hodgson and Connolly, underlined the constitutional 
fragility of all orders, including the market order. However, now we can witness that this 
argument from natural fragility could also work otherwise, strengthening the dispositive of 
the dominant economics. The market could be presented by the hegemonic economics not 
only as an indispensable natural fact, not only as a self-regulating order/ecosystem, but also 
as a fragile environment that needs incessant cultivation, not only because of its self-
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regulating power but also because of its unstable fragility. It is this very fragility of the 
market that enforces acceptance of market rules on subjects, communities and states. The 
market appears as an unstable environment that needs immediate action; it is an endangered 
ecosystem, and therefore its ‘demands’ must be satisfied without further hesitation or 
discussion.   In this respect the ‘market ideology’ seems correct - the capitalistically 623
organised division of labour does indeed constitute our second nature, on the existence and 
prolongation of which our own existence, as we know it, depends. 
!
2. Economics as an art of time allocation 
!
In the previous chapter we briefly reconstructed a simplified and schematic model of 
criticism of the dominant economics as based on the temporality of infinite growth, which is 
pictured as contradicting and destroying the conditions for prolonging the existence of 
sustainable ecosystems. Acknowledging the importance of infinitude, expressed in temporal 
terms through the ideas of infinite progress and growth, seems to be indispensable for 
understanding the dominant economics/economy. However, the picture is more complicated. 
We have already observed, while examining the diagrammatic ‘circular flows’ with which the 
dominant economics visualises itself, that apart from a kind of infinitude there is also a 
circular self-referentiality at work. What is more, with a closer look we can also discern that 
the finitude of man and the finitude of his time constitutes the fundamental element of the 
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dispositive of economics in its present form. Moreover, this finitude is not only implicitly 
present, but also explicitly heralded and announced by the dominant economic discourse 
itself. According to the standard neoclassical definition, as formulated by Lionel Robbins: 
‘Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses’.   Robbins does not forget to add that ‘We have 624
neither eternal life nor unlimited means of gratification.’   It seems that one of the most 625
important of these finite resources is time. Robbins and Mises, despite differences between 
their economic theories, have influenced each other, so it comes as no surprise that we find an 
interesting resonance of Robbins’ account of scare resources (including time) in Mises’ 
major work on human action. The Austrian scholar states that: 
!
Man is subject to the passing of time. He comes into existence, grows, 
becomes old and passes away. His time is scarce. He must economize it as he 
economizes other scarce factors. The economization of time has a peculiar 
character because of the uniqueness and irreversibility of the temporal order. 
(…) The economization of time is independent of the economization of other 
economic goods and services. Even in the land of Cockaigne man would be 
forced to economize time, provided he is not immortal.   626
!
We can see, then, that time is here treated as a decisive factor and the most important of all 
scarce resources. Mises’ insights have been elaborated further by other ‘neoliberal’ 
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economists. Gary Becker in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1992 further theorised this situation, 
taking the rich economies of the West as the exemplification of ‘the land of Cockaigne’. In 
this land, however, despite, or actually because of, the plenitude of available goods, limits 
remain and reign: 
!
Actions are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculating 
capacities, and other limited resources, and also by the opportunities available 
in the economy and elsewhere. These opportunities are largely determined by 
the private and collective actions of other individuals and organizations. 
Different constraints are decisive for different situations, but the most 
fundamental constraint is limited time. Economic and medical progress have 
greatly increased length of life, but not the physical flow of time itself, which 
always restricts everyone to twenty-four hours per day. So while goods and 
services have expanded enormously in rich countries, the total time available 
to consume has not. Thus wants remain unsatisfied in rich countries as well as 
in poor ones. For while the growing abundance of goods may reduce the value 
of additional goods, time becomes more valuable as goods become more 
abundant. The welfare of people cannot be improved in a utopia where 
everyone’s needs are fully satisfied, but the constant flow of time makes such a 
utopia impossible.    627
!
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In contrast to the picture of the dominant economics sketched in the preceding subsections, 
we are now confronted not with a pure, unmediated temporal infinitude (although an 
infinitude indeed appears here as the unstoppable ‘constant flow of time’  ), but rather with a 628
set of successive limits. These limits are not only of a spatial but also, and more decisively, of 
a temporal character. They are constituted not only by the determinations created by history 
(accumulation of past collective and individual actions, determining the scope of future 
possible actions) but also by the lived time of present experience. Although a specific 
infinitude of incessant production strives at overcoming the natural barriers of the 
temporalities of lived-worlds by extending waking hours and, through this, extending the 
time that can be dedicated to the consumption/circulation//production of capitalist value, even 
if we could imagine that we had conquered the last strongholds of ‘useless time’, which is not 
consumed productively - that is, time necessary for sleep - and even if we could imagine 
economic subjects at last permanently turned on and plugged into the incessant flow of 
production/circulation/distribution/consumption,   this would still not lead to an overcoming 629
of the aporia described by Becker. In the framework reconstructed by economics/economy 
exemplified and advocated by Robbins, Mises and Becker, we ultimately have to face a limit, 
when a unit of time spent on the consumption of this or that concrete object/service cannot be 
simultaneously spent on the consumption of another. Even the intensification of multitasking 
(I’m eating my meal, while simultaneously responding to my e-mails; I’m washing my dishes 
while simultaneously listening to music, or better, to a radio programme that could widen my 
intellectual horizons and increase my employability) cannot change that fact. According to 
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Becker, with the growing abundance of products - still ‘wants remain unsatisfied’.   It is, 630
however, not simply a problem of the biological limits of the human capacity to absorb goods 
and services and expend energy; the ultimate limit is constituted by the undeniable fact that 
the total time available to an individual remains limited - ‘provided that he is not 
immortal’.   For this reason - the undeniable fact of human mortality, i.e. the finitude of 631
individually available time - we cannot be sure if we can assign an activity to an infinitively 
available future. The disposable individual time for testing different options is limited - only 
some of them will be realised before the subject dies. Thus, according to Becker, a corollary 
follows that time becomes more scarce with the proliferation of its possible or imaginable 
uses. 
!
This is where economics/economy enters and offers its service as ‘an art to make the most of 
life’.   It achieves this status as the art of allocating, as a finite (read: mortal) human being, 632
the finite resource of time. The art of economics/economy helps that finite being to manage 
its finitude. Thus, the dominant economic discourse explicitly evokes time - limited, finite 
time - and situates it in the very centre of its definition. We can see, then, that the temporality 
of finitude, the temporality of limited time, is not only tacitly and implicitly present but also 
explicitly expressed by the dominant economic discourse itself. If we remind ourselves that 
we have also encountered its enclosed self-referentiality in the form of economic ‘circular 
flows’, we will see that the infinite line of progress (here present as the imperative of ‘making 
the most of life’) is not the sole temporal modality of the dominant economics. If we want to 
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understand the functioning (and malfunctioning) of the processes active in the dominant 
economics/economy, we must specify the most important modalities of time in the field of 
economics and identify how these different temporalities relate to each other in the 
experience of the economic subject. If we were to express the problem in geometric terms we 
could ask: how does the infinite line relate to the ultimate limit, which could be imagined as 
something ending its infinite extension? Do these temporalities relate to each other in any 
meaningful way and, if so, are these interrelations useful for understanding the functioning 
and malfunctioning of the dominant economic dispositive, especially at the subjective level? 
What remains to be explained in the course of this research are the interactions of the 
temporalities of infinitude and finitude (mortality) in the system of the dominant economics/
economy. This however cannot be done before we take into account the question of 
judgement. 
!
3. Economics/economy as a non-judgemental science for making individual judgements 
!
Let us then proceed with an examination of judgement. The economy has just been defined as 
a natural, necessary, yet fragile environment to which the subject must resiliently adjust its 
life. Economics in turn has been conceptualised as the art and science of alternative choices, 
designed for the temporal, finite being in order to make the most of its life. Individual time is 
scarce, therefore he or she must, at some point, make alternative choices, based ultimately on 
judgements of value in a determined environment. The choices ultimately refer to the 
question of how one is going to make use of one’s limited time, which has an undeniable 
ultimately given limit (death). The answer to this question depends on what the subject in 
question judges to be valuable - that is, worth the expenditure of time in its limited life - but it 
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could appear that what is absent in the dominant economics is precisely judgement, just as in 
the previous subsection it seemed that what was simply absent was nature and time. We have 
heard Mises say that it ‘is futile to approach social facts (…) from the point of view of quite 
arbitrary standards and subjective judgements of value’.   What then is the value that 633
neoliberal economics gives to subjective judgements of value; are they rejected or praised? 
!
The answer, according to Mises, is obvious: ‘Science does not value, but it provides acting 
man with all the information he may need with regard to his valuations’.   The human 634
individual seems to be left alone, absolutely free to make judgements. Economics only gives 
him or her the necessary data - it is his or her responsibility (and freedom) to make use of it. 
The responsibility for the final decision lies on the individual, and it is indeed necessary that 
a decision be reached. Individual choices are necessary in a twofold sense - theoretically and 
practically, both for economic science and for economic activity. On the scientific level, 
individual choices constitute the basic element of the correct economic theory, the ultimate 
unbreakable atom of economic physics, an ultimate limit that blocks further analysis. 
Secondly, individual choice is a practical necessity. Human beings have to make choices all 
the time. Even the choice to make no choices is a choice in itself. There is no escape from 
incessant judgement-making. The necessity to make choices rules over trivial everyday life, 
but it also finds its ultimate foundation in the question of life and death: ‘Man is capable of 
dying for a cause or committing suicide. To live is the outcome of choice, of a judgement of 
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value.’   However, even this act of ultimate freedom does not make it possible to escape the 635
infinite, immanent plane of judgement-making - that is, the field of purposeful action, the 
field of rationality - since suicide remains formally a rational choice in itself. This chain of 
logical equations seems important for the construction of a generalising discursive-practical 
machine, which establishes the dominant economics/economy as the general discipline of all 
human behaviour - correlative with the universal subject of economics/economy, which will 
be analysed in the figure of human-capital in the next, final part of our enquiry. 
!
This practical generalisation is possible thanks to a specific formal reduction. Economics as 
the general science of human action abstracts itself from judging the content or the matter of 
the aims that the subject formulates for itself. Taking this standpoint, it must account all 
human action as rational from the formal point of view. To call a behaviour rational, it is 
sufficient to find in it a formal structure consisting of (1) an individual judgement, (2) an end 
and (3) an action. Action leads from judgement towards a purpose judged by an individual to 
be valuable and achievable. It does not matter whether the motive for taking up this action 
stems from an outburst of repressed desires or from clear deliberation, since the means for 
achieving the end of an action are determined by the calculation of expense and chance of 
success.   In actual practice this particular valuation of output and input might of course 636
happen to be wrong (for example because the subject, motivated by emotions, has overrated 
his or her aim and underrated the necessary expenses and obstacles), but the formal structure 
of rating - i.e. calculation, i.e. valorisation, i.e. rational consideration - is there. There is no 
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possibility of an action with no purpose or no reason, no possibility of a true action gratuit. 
Even ‘the murderer whom a subconscious urge (the Id) drives toward his crime and the 
neurotic whose aberrant behavior seems to be simply meaningless to an untrained observer 
both act; they like anybody else are aiming at certain ends.’   As purposeful 637
!
human action is necessarily always rational. The term rational action is 
therefore a pleonasm. When applied to the ultimate ends of action, the terms 
rational and irrational are inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of 
action is always the satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since 
nobody is in a position to substitute his own value judgements for those of the 
acting individual, it is vain to pass judgement on other people’s aims and 
volitions. No man is qualified to declare what would make another man 
happier or less discontented. The critic either tells us what he believes he 
would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or in dictatorial arrogance 
blithely disposing of his fellow’s will and aspirations, declares what conditions 
of this other man would better suit himself, the critic.   638
!
No one, Mises states, has the right to pass judgment on the content or matter of individual 
judgements - that is, on the ends that man poses before himself. What is possible without 
violating the freedom of judgement of his ‘fellow man’ is only to point out that perhaps the 
means taken up are not the most appropriate to achieve that particular end.  It is possible that 
this or that individual judgement will not be optimal. It is possible that there will be an 
!  274
!  Ibid.637
!  Ibid., 19.638
Mateusz Piotrowski
objective, factual contradiction between the end chosen and the means taken to achieve it. 
Purposeful behaviour presupposes value judgements that are necessarily formally rational 
(i.e. made for a reason in order to achieve a determined end) and always involve an element 
of calculation, but this does not imply that the calculation is made in the most efficient - that 
is, the most economical - way. The acting man can simply fall short of achieving his 
purposes. This can happen, for example, if he believes in myths, which will distort his 
judgement. Economics can point to a fact such as this, showing an internal contradiction 
between desired ends and chosen means, but this does not tarnish its perfect neutrality.   639
!
It seems that we have achieved a perfect separation of powers and a perfect division of 
labour. Economic science provides the individual subject with objective information about 
the optimal means for achieving his or her ends, while he or she is left free to choose between 
these means in order to find an optimal way of achieving his or her freely chosen ends. The 
economic activity of the individual is necessarily totally saturated with value judgements, 
whereas economic discourse remains absolutely neutral in terms of value judgement. It 
appears that neutral (and thus objective) science coupled with human choice (and thus human 
freedom) cannot obtain any better guarantees. The acting individual seems to be elevated as a 
judge on the top of the mountain, endowed with sovereign authority to decide what aims it 
would like to pursue and what means are most suitable for such an aim, while all the riches 
and kingdoms of this world lie at its feet:  
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!
All human values are offered for option. All ends and all means, both material 
and ideal issues, the sublime and the base, the noble and the ignoble, are 
ranged in a single row and subjected to a decision which picks out one thing 
and sets aside another.   640
!
The set of options laying before, or rather under, the judging subject establishes a single, 
univocal plane, a desert of judgement-making-purposeful-rational-activity. The subject stands 
on the top, above this plane and makes its own judgement. Economic science is only a small, 
still voice counselling it what to do if it really wants to achieve its ends (for example, come 
into possession of worldly riches).  
!
Here we return to the generalising machine, which we encountered at the beginning in 
Lazaer’s economic imperialism. The generalisation of economics is made possible by the 
formal reduction. It is possible to extend the economic way of thinking and acting onto every 
human action, since every human activity is assumed to have, at least implicitly, that same 
formal structure of rationality and thus to be prone to further, and more explicit, 
economisation. Which is to say, the it can be grasped from the point of view of actions that 
always (although not always fully consciously and not without errors) strive to secure the 
optimal means for achieving definite ends. As such, action can be further conceptualised as 
economic [not only by the scholar but also by the subject of action, who now, being 
conscious that all his actions are always already economic, can economise them further in 
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order to achieve optimal results by means of economisation, applying the best means for 
optimising his welfare. As Robbins notes, we witness here a dematerialisation of the notion 
of economy. Unlike the older approaches, which have reduced economics/economy to 
material wealth or the money mediated market, universal economisation makes it applicable 
to every aspect of human action, which is believed to always be aimed at the ‘optimisation’ of 
subjective welfare. It is of no importance if the subject understands this welfare as constituted 
by optimal material goods, the optimal level of ascetic renunciation, the optimal measure of 
available leisure time or the optimal degree of pleasure derived from masochistic behaviour; 
‘welfare’ here is not material but a purely formal category which can be filled by the 
individual, depending on his own value judgements. Allocation of time for labour, rest, 
exercising, socialising, religious observation, crime or caring for others can be subjected to 
an economic formalisation that renders it a matter of economised choice. Thus, economy no 
longer remains a narrow ‘theory of the “economic side” of human behaviour’,   but mutates 641
into ‘a general theory of human choice’.   It constitutes not a discrete and limited field of 642
knowledge, but rather a universal method, enabling the judgement of all options open to 
human behaviour from the formal standpoint of optimisation/economisation. It creates a 
singular perspective whence all possible objects and actions can be seen and judged by means 
of value-free science by a free individual. 
!
Summing up, we could say that, like nature and finite time, judgement - individual judgement 
- also appears to be at the very heart of the dominant economics/economy. We have seen that 
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the complex interrelation of nature, judgement and time constitutes not only a specific 
economic discipline, which is virtually infinitely generalisable, but also the virtually 
universal human subject. In the dominant economics of recent years, which has elaborated 
the fundamental insights of Mises, Hayek, Robbins and Becker, this subject of infinitely 
generalisable economics/economy is known under the name of human-capital. 
!
Chapter VII The process of human-capital 
!
1. Human-capital as the amalgamation of capital and labour 
!
In the first part of our investigation we identified the specific subject-matters of our enquiry 
as labour and capital. Now we will see these subject-matters begin to amalgamate, creating a 
third figure - that of human-capital. The distinctiveness of this concept device will become 
clearer if we compare and contrast it, as we have with other ideas throughout the present 
work, with the Marxist approach to the question. Schematically speaking, the theoretical and 
political efforts of Marxism are arranged to theoretically distinguish and politically construct 
the opposition between capital (and capital owners) and labour (and labourers). At first the 
capitalist and the labourer appear as formally equal subjects of exchange, distinguished 
merely by the matter of the commodity they are exchanging. What Marx tries to demonstrate 
is that in this case it is precisely the material difference of commodities exchanged that is 
decisive, since the capitalist gives the worker an abstract exchange value (money), while the 
worker gives the capitalist her labour-power. This peculiar commodity happens to be 
inseparable from the worker’s own body and, consequently, from the worker’s time of life. 
The worker is, temporarily, selling herself, her flesh and blood time, in exchange for money 
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that she will be able to use for her consumption.   This material inequality is, however, not 643
fully visible, since it is concealed by the apparent formal equality of the exchange. 
Consequently, the opposition between capital and labour is not a natural datum fully given in 
the experience, but rather needs to be made explicit by deconstructing the objective actual 
appearance that pictures the worker and the capitalist as formally equal, concealing their 
actual material inequality, which is - in the last instance - a temporal inequality, since the 
power of the capitalist is derived from the fact that he is able to wait the worker out, 
possessing more accumulated time in the form of capital.   644
!
This, however, is not the end of the story, as told by Marx. Making explicit the opposition 
between capital and labour is theoretically and practically crucial, but the power of the 
conflict between labour and capital derives not only from their opposition but also from their 
specific identity. When labour is sold to the capitalist it begins to constitute a living part of 
capital itself. And this is, according to Marx, precisely the reason why the bargaining power 
of living labour in confrontation with capital can be constructed: when labour turns against 
capital, capital turns against itself. This eternal division within the kingdom and household of 
capital can be mobilised against capital. The point of this brief reconstruction of a simplified 
version of the Marxist theory is, again, not to examine its internal consistency or its adequacy 
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with the reality of capitalist economy, but only to make it easier to see the specificity of the 
concept of human-capital in this comparison. 
!
In the concept-device of human-capital, the difference and identity between the labouring 
subject and capital is constituted differently. While Marxism and the popular imagination 
inspired by it and by other forms of the labour movement have opposed labour-power (the 
capacities of the labourer’s body and mind, which she sells on the market for a wage) to 
capital, in the concept of human-capital one’s skills, abilities, physical and mental forces are 
treated as one’s capital. The categorical difference between these two sources of income - the 
wage of the wage-labourer and the capital of the capitalist   - seems to vanish. Thus, human-645
capital is established as the universal productive subject, beyond the class difference and 
beyond the possibility of the alienation of the worker and from the means of production in the 
form of capital, since the worker’s labour power appears as identical with her own capital. 
One’s labour power appears as one’s capital - that is, according to the Misesian definition, as 
one’s future-oriented speculative calculation directed towards yet-undetermined profit.  
!
What is more, the figure of human-capital allows for the universal generalisation of such a 
modality of experiencing of time beyond the scope of traditionally understood economic 
production. All action can be formalised and moulded in this way, as all action might be 
grasped as a specific investment (of one’s time and energy devoted to education, to 
relationships with a partner or a child, to spiritual development, etc.) measured against 
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possible future profit from the investment. This profit can be measured directly and 
materially in monetary units (higher income generated by increasing employability by 
developing education, sociability or spiritual stability, which directly affect the subject’s 
productivity) or indirectly and formally by application of the same formal structure of 
investment measured against future profits applied to different units (cognitive, emotional or 
spiritual profit derived from an activity).   In both cases - direct monetary and indirect non-646
monetary formalisation - it appears that any action can be formed this way, situating human-
capital as the universal, unitary, speculative subject correlative to the universal and univocal 
flat plane of calculation/speculation. This seems to apply to labourers and capitalists alike, 
abolishing the difference between these two classes. As Maurizio Lazzarato notes in his 
analysis of the new ‘workfare’ regime: 
!
With the new social welfare system (…) ‘managerial’ skills are demanded of 
the poor so that they are able to handle the many responsibilities of 
‘assistance’ and menial jobs. It then becomes unnecessary to create one’s 
small business in order to become an entrepreneur; one needs only to behave 
like one, adopt the logic, the attitudes, the ways of relating to the world, to 
oneself and to others.  	647
!
It seems that all the possible doublings (categorical differences between wage-earners and 
capitalists; the inner doubling within the individual working subject, producing tension 
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between herself as a worker-element-of-capital and herself as a worker-as-opposed-to-capital) 
have disappeared, producing an infinite immanent field, without any transcendence.!
!
2. Human-capital as contrasted to the subject of law and sacrifice 
!
This, as we will recall, is the anti-theological stance of both Ludwig von Mises and Michel 
Foucault. Mises contrasts the supposedly plainly immanent human and secular economic 
order with the opposing ordering, producing religious and quasi-religious theocracies.   This 648
is done by means of a transcendent doubling. The theocratic ordering is based on the idea of 
the possibility of conflict between the aims of the individual and the aims of society, and on 
the necessity of sacrificing the selfish interests and purposes of the individual in order to 
achieve the higher good of society understood as a whole; the Whole being transformed into 
a super-individual, quasi-theological entity, with its own absolute ends. This quasi-
theological idea is explicitly rejected by Mises in the name of the human science of 
economics. Sacrifice cannot be present in a rational (i.e.economic) action, since it is an action 
in which the subject pursuing its own interests must necessarily serve also the interests of 
others. 
!
Foucault provides an important supplement to this thesis, considering the subjectivity of the 
economic subject in this respect. He contrasts the immanent, atheistic field of economics/
economy and its subjective correlate, the economic subject - now exposed as human-capital - 
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with the field of law and its subject, who functions according to the logic of renunciation and 
sacrifice. In The Birth of Biopolitics, he defines the subject of right in the following way. 
!
What characterizes the subject of right? Of course, at the outset he has natural 
rights. But he becomes a subject of right in a positive system only when he has 
agreed at least to the principle of ceding these rights, of relinquishing them, 
when he has subscribed to their limitation and has accepted the principle of the 
transfer. That is to say, the subject of right is, by definition, a subject who 
accepts negativity, who agrees to a self-renunciation and splits himself, as it 
were, to be, at one level, the possessor of a number of natural and immediate 
rights, and, at another level, someone who agrees to the principle of 
relinquishing them and who is thereby constituted as a different subject of 
right superimposed on the first. The dialectic or mechanism of the subject of 
right is characterized by the division of the subject, the existence of a 
transcendence of the second subject in relation to the first, and a relationship 
of negativity, renunciation, and limitation between them, and it is in this 
movement that law and the prohibition emerge.   649
!
The juridical subject seems to be in direct opposition to the economic subject, who ‘is never 
called upon to relinquish his interest.’   As such, homo economicus is positioned at the 650
antipodes of ‘renunciation, transcendence, and the voluntary bond’.   On the level of 651
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intersubjective sociality, transcendence and renunciation are liquidated, since there is no 
collective super-subject to whom the sacrifice could be offered. Consequently, on the 
correlative level of subjectivisation, sacrifice and transcendence are not allowed to enter the 
‘interiority’ of the subject itself. It seems that there can be no doubling within the subject. 
Therefore, it appears that it is impossible that this subject would be able to sacrifice one’s self 
positioned at a lower level to another self positioned at a higher level.	
The economic subject, whose labour-power and capital appear as inseparably amalgamated, 
whose subjectivity has been explicitly realised as human-capital, appears to exist beyond the 
reach of law, and therefore beyond the possibility of inner, subjective doubling, and therefore 
beyond the grip of any sacrificial system.	
!
VIII Towards natural theology of the process of human-capital	
We concluded the first part of this thesis with an attempt to expose a specific natural theology 
present - implicitly and explicitly - in the constitutive prejudgements of the general and 
specific subject-matters of our enquiry. Now we will try, for the last time, to repeat the test to 
see if a specific natural theology - bound to questions of law, nature and time - can be traced 
in the apparently purely secular sphere of economics. Now our research will focus on the 
crucial question of the processual nature of the infinitely generalisable human subject of 
economic process - human-capital - which appears as the ultimate synthesis of the specific 
subject-matters of our investigation, as an inseparable fusion of capital and labour. It seems 
that this synthesis or amalgamation exorcises any possibility of transcendence, any possibility 
of inner doubling within the subject and any possibility of sacrifice. Our brief analysis will 
proceed to test these beliefs, (1) starting with judgement, showing how specific doubling does 
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emerge within the subject, producing an obligation for the sacrifice of one’s life to ‘one’s 
own’ capital and constituting a specific judgement over the individual. (2) We will then 
continue through the question of nature, exposing how - rather than there being a clear-cut 
separation between economical human actions based on human judgement and natural 
reactions - the subject of human-capital is confronted with an incessant judgement, 
pronounced in relation to every action of the individual, engaging not only subjective 
conscious judgement but also the subject’s ‘animal spirit’ into the economic process, 
constituted as a specific processual totality. (3) Finally, we will conclude with the question of 
time, exposing death as not only the ultimate limit of individual disposable time but also as 
the motor of productive action, not only by means of a promise of individual success and of 
contribution to the common good but also of the eternal peace of non-action, which will bring 
the process to an end.	
1. Judgement: re-emergence of obligation, transcendence and sacrifice 
!
In the previously cited text of Foucault’s lectures, we find a passage which, if read carefully 
enough, could put under scrutiny the belief in the anti-juridical, atheist and anti-sacrificial 
character of the economic subject of human-capital. Foucault, summarising a motif that we 
find recurring from classical liberalism through to the neoliberalism of thinkers such as 
Hayek and Mises, states:	
Not only may each pursue their own interest, they must pursue their own 
interest, and they must pursue it through and through by pushing it to the 
utmost, and then, at that point, you will find the elements on the basis of which 
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not only will the interest of others be preserved, but will thereby be 
increased.   652
!
What is emphasised here is not only the existence of an opportunity (‘may each pursue their 
own interest’  ) but also of a specific imperative (‘they must pursue their interest’  ). The 653 654
difference between opportunity and imperative in this respect might become clearer if we 
briefly analyse a popular reaction against those social agents who are judged as not being 
successful economic competitors. We have previously stated that, according to the dominant 
economics as exemplified by Becker and others, the subject called human-capital should 
invest in itself (i.e. in its own capital) in order to bring about profits (i.e. to augment ‘its own’ 
capital). Now, what happens with those who ‘fail’ to achieve success in the market 
‘competition’? Are they considered merely as ones who did not take advantage of an 
opportunity? If the ‘call’ or ‘calling’ to successfully pursue one’s own interest were only a 
noncommittal, optional opportunity, then the failure to use that opportunity would not be 
judged as morally wrong. Moreover, one could even think that the fact that some economic 
players fall, at least to some extent, from the ‘competitive game’ (becoming, for example, 
unemployed, homeless, single mothers or working poor) could be understood as something 
that statistically increases the chance for other players to ‘win’, since there would then be less 
competitors in play. Therefore, there would also be no reason for passing a moral judgement 
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on those who are not ‘successful’. This is, however, not the case. The result of the market 
game is considered just, but the condition of ‘losing the game’ is not considered to be 
sufficient a punishment. ‘Losers’ not only suffer from factual exclusion from access to goods 
and services, but also from moral condemnation directed against them. They are judged as 
not participating intensively enough in obligatory productive action directed towards the 
valorisation of capitalistically understood value, with which participation in the increase of 
the common good is identified.   If the successful pursuit of ‘one’s own 655
interest’ (constructed according to the prescripts of the dominant economics as pursuit of 
‘one’s own’ capital) is conceptualised as identical the common interest, through participation 
in the multiplication of common wealth,   then those who fail to join this movement are 656
judged as acting anti-socially. Now, although this resentment might be more intense in 
relation to those who actually participate somehow in tax-funded benefits, it also falls upon 
those subjects living beyond the official formal relation of waged-labour, who do not have 
access to state-funded help.   They are considered to have not only failed to take a good 657
opportunity that was supposedly equally open to them, but also as having failed to fulfil a 
specific imperative commitment towards both their individual (their own) and community’s 
social capital, identified as the valorisation of capital. 
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!
This imperative aspect of the relationship of the economic subject towards capital 
(conceptualised as ‘its own’ capital) is famously described by Max Weber. Retrojecting the 
later development of the growing explicitness of the concept of human-capital on the 
Weberian description, we could state that what is being described here is the subjectivising 
relationship of ‘human’ and ‘capital’. This relationship of individual subject and capital is 
directed by the fundamental ‘idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his 
capital, which is assumed as an end in itself.’   What Weber underlines is that within the 658
dispositive described by him as ‘the spirit of capitalism’ a failure to fulfil the individual 
imperative towards augmentation of ‘one’s own’ capital cannot be understood merely as a 
morally neutral instance of missing an opportunity: ‘Truly what is here preached is not 
simply a means of making one’s way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its 
rules is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty.’   659
!
What makes this relationship of obligation possible is a doubling - a specific inner 
transcendence. Against the Foucauldian reconstruction of the subject of economics, we 
witness here that the subject (its life, its time) is obligated to itself (i.e. its ‘own’ capital). In 
order to understand this relationship, we need to grasp it in temporal terms. Capital has been 
conceptualised as a calculative device directed towards future profits - and such profits are 
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essentially unknown. This apparently undetermined future does not cease, however, to 
determine subjective behaviour. It is assumed that we do not know, and cannot know, what 
the future will bring (this is the condition for speculation), but what is simultaneously 
assumed is that what this future should bring, what the subject is obliged to bring (for itself, 
for other subjects and for the total social productivity) from the future, is already determined: 
put simply, profits. Thus, what emerges in this doubling is an inner transcendence. The 
doubling reproduces - in each and every action - an obligation to bring profits, and enables 
the sacrifice of one’s time and life for one’s capital (i.e. for ‘one’s own’ undetermined future 
possibilities in a determined form of future profits). Thanks to this, the indeterminacy of the 
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future does not disappear but rather invades the very action of the subject in the present.  660
The speculative, competitive economic subject cannot be sure if the present productive 
sacrifice of its time and energy for the prospect of future profits, will prove itself to be 
productive enough. The reason for this is not only the genuinely unknowable character of the 
future but also the specific character of the measurement of action applied. While the lower 
limit of productiveness can easily be determined and grasped by observation of those who 
were not productive enough and for this reason have been forced out of competition, 
determination of the upper limit of productivity is impossible. This is because the aim of 
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‘experience of our generation’ would be ‘that capitalism will not die a natural death’. Walter Benjamin, The 
Arcades Project (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 667.
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production under such a regime is not the production of a particular thing, nor consumption 
of a particular use-value, nor even a particular sum of money, but rather an unachievable, 
immeasurable, abstract wealth. Even if a particular sum, which stands for a partial object, for 
an allegory of this total wealth, might be achieved, there is always more. Thus, the present 
performance of the subject can never be counted as productive enough. The abstract form of 
profit is another reason - apart from the abstract indeterminacy of the future - why human-
capital, while incessantly investing in itself, is simultaneously under the constant threat of 
wasting its time. Therefore, human-capital must be held under incessant scrutiny (externally, 
by means of a growing bureaucratic control of labour, and internally, by means of 
internalisation of the productivist norms by the subject itself), measuring if it is acting 
productively enough.  
!
Uncertainty and ‘worries’   produced by this mechanism are not only ‘individual-661
material’   but also ‘community-based’.   Even if the subject is required to express happy 662 663
affects and a positive attitude to convince others and itself that it is successful (‘elected’, to 
use a Weberian term), still this uncertainty constitutes a basic feeling, or rather a Stimmung - 
a mood, a mode, an atmosphere, the very air we breathe, a specific aeon-archon of our age 
(‘the prince of the power of the air’, as it is referred to in Ephesians 2:2). Due to the structural 
impossibility of saturating the infinite obligation towards the abstract and future, yet 
determinative profit by any concrete and actual work, one finds her/himself in a situation of 
abstract guilt/debt without any concrete reason. Rationalisation of abstract guilt, which 
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attempts to bind it to a concrete event or action, comes later (as when a subject wakes up in 
the morning in a foul mood, trying to localise its guilt and to remind itself what it was that it 
did not do yesterday). The judgement that looms over the human-capital for trespassing 
against the spirit of capital refers essentially to what the subject has left undone, to what it 
has failed to do with maximum intensity and productivity. And since there is no upper limit 
capable of defining this maximum, the economic subject lives in a condition of permanent 
judgement, which produces not only obligation but also guilt/indebtedness [Schuld]  664
towards ‘its own’ capital. 
!
2. Nature: incessant scrutiny of productivity 
!
While reconstructing the critique of the dominant economics/economy, we have described 
how animal nature, led by instinct, is separated and opposed to the human, economic subject, 
led by conscious judgement. This separation has been linked to the establishment of a 
separation within the sphere of human activity between labour that is counted as productive 
and labour that is counted as unproductive.   This separation remains an important device 665
that enables the separation and management of the workforce, which is divided along the 
lines of gender (productive work vs. unproductive, ‘merely biological’, women’s labour) or 
legal status, often linked to race or age (workers with citizenship vs. legal or partially legal 
immigrant workers; workers on permanent legal contracts vs. the youth and other precarious 
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workers on temporary contracts, etc.).   However, now we can see how this separation, 666
rather than being a rigid border separating the natural (reactive, instinctual, etc.) from the 
human (judicious, driven by reason, etc.), invades the subject itself, becoming an ever-
moving dividing line that cannot be ultimately settled. The subject incessantly attempts to 
establishes a line between the productive and the unproductive, scrutinising each individual 
action in relation to the unknown future, determined by the imperative of the increase of 
‘his’/‘her’ capital. Each and every action must be scrutinised by human-capital through 
calculation against the unknown future. 
!
This possibility for generalisation of the specific form of speculation onto virtually every 
individual action is made possible by a specific formalisation of human action. As we will 
recall, according to Mises it is this pure form (consisting of an end, a means leading to it and 
judgement/evaluation) that enables the evaluation of an action as rational-economic. Actual 
conscious human reasoning in the process of establishing ends and selecting means is not 
necessarily always predominant, since both speculation on ends and calculation of the means 
required for their achievement might stem from either ‘clear deliberation or from forgotten 
memories and suppressed desires’.   However, such difference in the degree to which 667
calculations are explicitly conscious, according to the author of Human Action, ‘does not 
influence the nature of action.’   Both action driven by ‘natural’ instinct and action driven 668
by deliberate judgement might count as rational-economic. 
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!
We can see, then, that the biological ‘nature’ of the subject is not simply suppressed but also 
incessantly mobilised for economic processes. Thus, those critiques of the dominant 
economic rationality that criticise it for a one-sided concentration on conscious rationality are 
themselves one-sided. A successful, competitive subject, according to the dominant 
economics/economy, should mobilise and put to productive use all its available resources. It 
should subsume under speculation not only its reason, but also its ‘nature’, ‘instinct’, 
‘emotions’, ‘intuition, ‘animal spirit’, etc.   This mobilising judgement seems to have no 669
natural end apart from ‘the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself’,  670
and as such it appears as endlessly generalisable on every action. This is the reason that, if in 
the previous section it might have appeared that judgement of productiveness/
unproductiveness can be securely projected on others (the unemployed, the unproductive, the 
working poor, etc.), we now see that it also falls upon the judging subject itself. As Paul says 
ex re the natural theology of the subject who is sold under sin and who tries to justify itself 
thorough works: ‘You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass judgment on someone else, 
for at whatever point you judge another, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass 
judgment do the same things.’ (Romans 2:1) This is because that which calculates is not 
simply the calculating human reason but an extra-human process. This universal process of 
valorisation/evaluation/judgement constitutes a specific totality under which the finite subject 
- with all its animality - is subsumed.  
!
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3.3. Time: death and the end of the process 
!
Here not only sacrifice but also a specific totality re-emerges. It is not, however, simply a 
static totality (as suggested by the metaphor of the sovereign divine viewpoint, used 
preferably by Foucault), but rather a totality in motion, a totality in process, a totality in 
which the final goal becomes not only the limit but also the activating motor, which is present 
in the actuality of action and lends it direction. What we encounter here is an ironic return of 
the quasi-messianic notion of totality, as described by the young Lukacs:   
!
we then perceive the tendencies which strive towards the centre of reality, to 
what we are wont to call the ultimate goal. This ultimate goal is not an abstract 
ideal opposed to the process, but an aspect of truth and reality. It is the 
concrete meaning of each stage reached and an integral part of the concrete 
moment. Because of this, to comprehend it is to recognise the direction taken 
(unconsciously) by events and tendencies towards the totality. It is to know the 
direction that determines concretely the correct course of action at any given 
moment- in terms of the interest of the total process .   671
!
Each economic action of human-capital gravitates towards an invisible centre, which is ‘the 
interest of the total process.’   As in the Weberian description, all actions (socialising, 672
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recreation, sport  ) are directed towards an ultimate end - which here is the end of ever-673
increasing productivity. Even if they are not directly linked to this end they are formed 
according to its logic (as when leisure is treated as something that should produce the 
maximum ‘quality time’). The process of giving direction might be more or less conscious, 
but what the realisation of this ‘tendency’ - in the form of economic science guiding action - 
brings about is growing explicitness. The profit-motif appears as its own explicit justification. 
What is more, individuals and institutions are more and more explicitly and openly 
scrutinised, having to justify their existence before the market tribunal constituted of 
managerial authorities, who in turn are more and more subjugated to financial sectors. What 
Hayek has described as ‘signs’,   which ‘direct him [the economic subject] to an invisible 674
goal, the satisfaction of the distant unknown consumer of the final product’,   are 675
extensively, explicitly visualised to the workers as their productive or selling targets. As 
Lukacs states, ‘the inherent meaning of reality shines forth with an ever more resplendent 
light, the meaning of the process is embedded ever more deeply in day-to-day events, and 
totality permeates the spatio-temporal character of phenomena.’   676
!
We are thus approaching the ultimate end of the process. Within the economic dispositive as 
reconstructed here, the subject acts motivated by the promise of realising its own, specifically 
constructed interest. It also acts motivated by the promise of participation in devoting its life 
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to the realisation of extra-individual interest.   Finally, according to Mises and to the 677
tradition of economic thought that goes back at least to Smith, the subject acts motivated by 
the ultimate end of action, and as the Austrian scholar states, ‘the incentive that impels a man 
to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would 
have no incentive to change things. He would have no wishes nor desires; he would be 
perfectly happy. He would not act; he would simply live free from care.’   If action must 678
always be motivated by a lack (lack of perfection) leading to uneasiness, then the state of 
perfection and peace equals non-action - but this is not possible as long as man lives, as the 
only imaginable state of perfect non-action is death. 
!
Death appears as the most abstract future possibility, which cannot become present. However, 
despite this abstract sublimity it does not cease to function as the determining instance of a 
determined social order - as the ultimate social institution   - motivating the subject to 679
action. Death - the image of death as the state of eternal peace in which labour is finally 
finished - incites the subject to work. It’s just a few more hours; I’ll just finish this and I’ll be 
done; after this deadline I’ll finally rest. The dead-line, the ultimate line that when finally 
reached would end the process of producing and labouring is, however, always displaced. 
After one ultimate dead-line there is another dead-line. The image of an ultimate line of death 
produces enough pressure to put the subject to work; it is functional for the infinite extension 
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of the process, at least until such a time that the pressure becomes unbearable and the subject 
falls into a depression, a small death, imagined to be a state in which it could finally rest, 
freed from obligations to live and be productive. Deleuze and Guattari describe this desire: 
!
From a certain point of view it would be much better if nothing worked, if 
nothing functioned. Never being born, escaping the wheel of continual birth 
and rebirth, no mouth to suck with, no anus to shit through. (…) Everything 
stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place - and then the whole 
process will begin all over again.   680
!
Or as it is expressed in the process/trial of Job. 
!
1 After this, Job opened his mouth and cursed the day of his birth.  
2 He said: 
“Why did I not perish at birth, 
    and die as I came from the womb? 
(…) 
12 Why were there knees to receive me 
    and breasts that I might be nursed? 
13 For now I would be lying down in peace; 
    I would be asleep and at rest 
14 with kings and rulers of the earth, 
    who built for themselves places now lying in ruins, 
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15 with princes who had gold, 
    who filled their houses with silver. 
16 Or why was I not hidden away in the ground like a stillborn child, 
    like an infant who never saw the light of day? 
17 There the wicked cease from turmoil, 
    and there the weary are at rest. 
18 Captives also enjoy their ease; 
    they no longer hear the slave driver’s shout. 
19 The small and the great are there, 
    and the slaves are freed from their owners. 
20 Why is light given to those in misery, 
and life to the bitter of soul, 
21 to those who long for death that does not come, 
who search for it more than for hidden treasure, 
22 who are filled with gladness 
and rejoice when they reach the grave? 
(Job 3:1-2; 12-22) 
!
The process, reconstructed in this way, must be driven by a death-drive and cannot come to 
an end, although the end is already present in it as an internal lack. In the present ordering it 
is this lack that governs the production and management of surplus, just as it is growing debt 
that governs the production and management of credit.   Both management of surplus and 681
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management of debt/credit are, however, motivated by a not-fully-explicated image of the 
state of eternal peace understood as perfect non-action, an inaccessible moment when all the 
debts are finally repaid and all the labour is over, and the process comes to an end. 
!
!
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!
CONCLUSION 
  
Chapter IX Fulfilling the Law, or Towards a working ethics of Grace 
!
The aim of this research was to describe the process of labour and the process of capital as 
they are reconstructed by the dominant economics/economy. This has been performed in two 
parts. In the first part, after a short presentation of the scope and method of the enquiry, the 
implicit and explicit prejudgements of the process were exposed. This led to an exposition of 
the specific natural theology of capitalism, in which divine faculties of absolute cognition and 
absolute moral judgement are transferred onto the market process, infinitely exceeding 
individuals. Through this functional replacement of God by the market, the human subject 
becomes the subject of a specific process. In the second part, the crucial operators 
constituting this process - that is, time, judgement and nature - with their separation and 
entanglement, have been analysed. In the end of the second part, the human subject taking the 
form of human-capital has been presented. Finally, it has been demonstrated how a peculiar 
natural theology forms human-capital not only as the amalgamation of capital and labour and 
as the universal subject of speculation, but also as the subject of guilt/debt, trying, in vain, to 
justify itself through works. Therefore, the process has been presented as something that, by 
its very nature, cannot come to an end, although the ultimate end of labouring - death - is 
incessantly present as its motor, promising the eternal rest of perfect non-action. 
!
Such a reconstruction must lead to the conclusion that the present work has been 
predominantly a critique of the dominant economics/economy and of the workings of its 
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laws. As such, it should also be noted that the dominant economics (especially in the 
exemplary cases of Mises and Hayek) brings indispensable, positive insights, even if in a 
distorted form. What the economic discourse dimly suggests and incompletely expresses are 
essential intuitions concerning human action. Firstly, it suggests that human production is 
bound to processes and forces that are not of human design and which human minds cannot 
fully control. Secondly, it indicates that the economic engagement of human subjects with 
these processes is intimately bound to judgement and valuation. Thirdly, it shows that this 
judgement is essentially structured by the relationship of the human being to the time of its 
life, especially to the unknown future.   Finally, it exposes a fundamental surplus, which 682
under the present organisation of economic activity tends to predominantly take the form of 
debt.   Further detailed analysis and critique of the actual economic mechanisms involved in 683
the creation of this debt-driven economy (which, as as it has been suggested here, is 
ultimately a death-driven economy) remains one of the most important tasks of the social 
sciences. 
!
However, such a critique (to which the present research tried to offer some theological 
contributions) constitutes only a preliminary and preparatory work, which is by no means 
sufficient. As Saint Paul states, mere recognition of the law at work in our bodies, waging 
war against the law of our minds and making us prisoners of the law of sin at work within us 
(Romans 7:23), gives us only knowledge of sin. Here, Paul states, analysis of the natural laws 
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and extra-human structures governing it must reach its limits and can take us no further. To 
proceed further something more than a critical analysis of law is necessary. This requires the 
creation (also philosophical, conceptual creation) of actual institutions - actual modes of the 
organisation of time, nature and judgement - that would be more productive than the 
dominant economics/economy. This might involve a deep transformation of the very 
definition of productivity, a transformation of the methods of its measurement and its basic 
factual coordinates. Nevertheless, even after such a transformation, at least one Hayekian 
demand remains crucially valid: that any alternative theory and practice of productive labour 
and productive management of capital would need to be able to reproduce the biological and 
cultural existence of human beings, for whom the capitalistically organised division of labour 
has indeed become second nature.   Organisation of monetary exchange, credit and debt, 684
organisation of ecologically sustainable production - and innumerable other issues in such an 
extended order - remain urgent tasks for both social sciences and social movements, 
exceeding, however, the limited scope of the present enquiry and the limited competences of 
its author. 
!
In the end, let the author be allowed to formulate one last theologically motivated suggestion, 
indicating a direction that could be taken in the development of the fundamental insight of the 
dominant economics/economy in the matter of reconstructing productivity, and which could 
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be treated as a working hypothesis for further research. What seems to be the fundamental, 
although distorted, intuition of the dominant economics/economy, especially in its Hayekian 
interpretation, is its acknowledgement of the fact that there is an extra-individual process that 
acts through human subjects. This is what is being expressed - in an inverted, anti-Christic 
manner - by the dominant economics/economy and its secular and religious ideologies. This 
is what is being expressed by Hayek, who recognises that traditional property ‘several rights’ 
cannot do full justice to the complexity of work and, consequently, to socially just rewards in 
the extended economic social order   (even if Hayek might be suspected of formulating this 685
thesis in order to debilitate the position of small individual property-owners in confrontation 
with extra-individual entities like corporations). This is what is being anti-Chrisitcally 
expressed by those pro-capitalist strands of charismatic Christianity that consider the 
individual wealth of its members (often stemming from financial speculation) as absolutely 
just, since they believe that it is owed not to their individual works and labours, but to a pure 
graceful gift of God, thus simply equating God’s judgement with the results of the interplay 
of the market forces. Works of grace, directed by communal justice, push this reasoning 
further, beyond the limits of the dominant economic ordering. 
!
The Anti-Christ, as the book of Revelation suggests, not only attempts to replace the Messiah, 
coming before him, but also resembles him. The process of the dominant economics/
economy is recognised as the workings of the law that makes man a prisoner of objective 
guilt/debt. The Messianic Pauline theology of grace tries to deal with this impossibility of 
fulfilling the law through works differently. It states that divine peace can become an actual 
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element of our present activity, here on earth, through receiving the gift of grace. This gift of 
grace brings the self-perpetuating sacrificial system - in which human beings exist in 
repetition and reproduction of objective sin of the corrupted natural order, and live through 
the incessant death of other creatures (see Hebrews 9) - to an end. This is achieved by the 
final, perfect sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Through this sacrifice, rest/peace (shalom) becomes 
attainable, here on earth. It becomes a dimension of Kingdom-bringing action, making 
possible a community’s earth-transforming, charismatic works of grace (see Hebrews 4). As 
Bible scholar James Dunn explains:  
!
(…) charisma is formed from charis, ‘grace’, and can be described in 
shorthand terms as the result or effect or expression of grace. Charisma for 
Paul is that which brings grace to expression, to concrete reality. (…) 
charisma is divine grace coming to effect and expression in word or deed (…). 
Paul defines a charism as the ‘function’ (praxis) of an organ or limb of the 
body (…). [C]harism is not for personal use or benefit, but as a function of the 
body, and so ‘for the common good’ (1 Corinthians 12:7), for the benefit of 
others, for the benefit of the whole.    686
!
In the dominant economics, fulfilment of the process and the end of works - eternal peace - is 
identified in theory and practice with an ultimate lack of action (death).   In the working 687
ethics of grace, the day of rest/peace is an exercise, a spiritual exercise that should make us 
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progressively ever more able ‘to include in our work a dimension of receptivity and gratuity, 
which is quite different from mere inactivity.’   As Pope Francis states, resting on Sunday 688
!
is another way of working, which forms part of our very essence. It protects 
human action from becoming empty activism; it also prevents that unfettered 
greed and sense of isolation which make us seek personal gain to the detriment 
of all else. The law of weekly rest forbade work on the seventh day, ‘so that 
your ox and your donkey may have rest, and the son of your maidservant, and 
the stranger, may be refreshed’ (Ex 23:12). Rest opens our eyes to the larger 
picture and gives us renewed sensitivity to the rights of others. And so the day 
of rest, centred on the Eucharist, sheds it light on the whole week, and 
motivates us to greater concern for nature and the poor.   689
!
‘Let us labour therefore to enter into that rest’ (Hebrews 4:11).   690
!
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